trades, ought to address these issues at least within the first 21⁄2 years of a new administration. Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. McCloskey, I would like to reclaim my time. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Yes, I am sorry. Ms. MIKULSKI. To pick up on Mr. McCloskey's point, in the early days when the witnesses testified, we asked what these plans were, we were told that they were under study. We were told that there was an internal task force being coordinated by OMB, and a variety of other things. We were assured that we were going to be, number one, kept abreast of the strategy that was developing, or the policies that were being formulated, and no later than a year ago, or they said a year, we were going to have the strategy. So we do not want you to feel that this is some kind of spring hazing coming up on Capitol Hill, where it comes like an annual event, and we have our little words with you, and then off we go. This is really a source of great frustration, and I know that what we are really emphasizing is to take the message back and say where is this work that we have been promised. I think we have really reached our saturation point. I am sorry that you had to bear the somewhat tart remarks, but that is the intensity of the level of frustration because of this thing that has been pervasive Mr. WOOLSEY. I completely understand, Congresswoman, and I appreciate your remarks. The CHAIRMAN. Mr Sutter? Mr. SUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I am a little puzzled by the dialog that you held with Mr. McCloskey, the ranking minority member, concerning the national security utility of these dry bulk vessels. Perhaps the best way to approach the problem is in the fiscal year 1980 budget you are proposing to us; construction subsidy to aid in the construction of three of these dry bulk vessels. My understanding of the authority under that is 501(b) of the Merchant Marine Act, and perhaps I could read it, and then you could agree with me or disagree with me, as to what procedure you use. Section 501(b) states: The Secretary of Commerce shall submit the plans and specifications for the proposed vessel through the Navy Department for examination thereof and suggestion for such changes therein, as may be necessary or proper in order that such vessels shall be suitable for economical and speedy conversion to a naval or military auxiliary, or otherwise suitable for the use of the U.S. Government in time of war or national emergency. Now, is that the procedure that is followed by the Navy? Mr. WOOLSEY. Yes. Mr. SUTTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. The CHAIRMAN. Further questions? Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Chairman, I do have one. This is a philosophical question, Mr. Secretary. At present the trade and national security aspects of our maritime policy are governed by sub-cabinet officers. The Secretary of the Navy has been reduced from a cabinet Secretary to an Assistant Secretary; the Maritime Administrator is one of the Assistant Secretaries of Commerce. With the Russians entering into maritime competition with us and the concerns that this committee and the Navy have in that regard, in your personal opinion, would it be appropriate to elevate the consideration of our trade, our Navy, and our maritime problems around the world to a full cabinet office level? Mr. WOOLSEY. Congressman, I cannot speak for the structure of the Maritime Administration's posture, cabinet or subcabinet level, or the desirability of it. From the Navy Department's point of view, the Secretary is an Executive Level 2, the same level as a Deputy Secretary of Defense, or Under Secretary of State, and heads a military department comprising roughly 1 million people, and $44 billion budget annually. His position is one of being a very close adviser to, and he participates with, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in making decisions related to military naval matters. For the Navy and merchant marine, this is, I think, appropriately structured. I believe it would be difficult for the Secretary of Defense, or any Department of Defense, to adequately advise the President and serve its function of overall coordination of the military aspects of national security if there were a separate-a separate navy or maritime department and the Navy was part of it, outside of the Department of Defense. I would hasten to say, Congressman, that the first man to hold my job, James Forrestal, felt very differently, at least until he became Secretary of Defense. Even then, the issue that was fought out in those days, of whether or not we should have had defense consolidation, was very much centered around the Navy's desire to be separate. But for better or for worse, the country made that decision in 1947 with the National Security Act, and I do not think on the whole it has operated badly. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Well, I do not quarrel with that decision. But today, at a time when foreign trade and international commerce have reached a position where they may be as important to our national security as the military strength of our Navy, when we find a lack of coordination between the Navy and the merchant marine, and we find we need to build up the merchant marine in order to accomplish our trade and national security objectives, I have difficulty with an administration which proposes that we have a new Cabinet Office for Education, where there is little Federal concern, when we have the inability to coordinate our maritime trade and the national security objectives at the Cabinet level. I think whatever else has been disclosed by your testimony, there remains a glaring lack of coordination between the Navy, the merchant marine, and our trade policies. Now, the Soviets have no such lack of coordination, and if they remain our primary opponents, it seems to me that the U.S. Government, particularly the Navy, has a vital stake in seeing that there is a coordination between our Navy, our merchant marine and our trade policies. It seems to me that somebody ought to take an overall look at the national security problem of trade, merchant marine, and the Navy. They tie together, and if that is not being done at the sub-Cabinet level, I just invite your attention to the possibility of Cabinet level office, perhaps operating as the Special Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I am referring to a GAO report dated August 30, 1978, entitled "The Navy Should Reconsider Plans to Acquire New Fleet Oilers and Ocean Tugs." Are you following the recommendations of the GAO in that report? Mr. WOOLSEY. We are probably going to be buying very few fleet tugs in the future, Congressman. That capability, unlike the salvage capability, is available commercially. But fleet oilers are a very different capability from commercially available tankers, and in our judgment, both are required. There are certainly similarities between the two kinds of ships, and some oiler functions, particularly in the shuttle ship role, can be performed by tankers. We are looking hard at the substitutability now of tankers for oilers, particularly small tankers, of course, but I cannot tell you now that we are going to get out of the business of building oilers. If I might add one further point. I think one option we are going to have to very seriously consider is service life extension programs for our existing oilers, because funds from our point of view are very limited, and whether or not we are going to be able to afford to buy, or otherwise have new ships, and exactly the kind of ships that we would like to have, is very questionable. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Secretary, I do not think the committee questioned at all the Navy's need for a certain number of fast fleet oilers but let me read you the specific recommendation of this GAO report, because I would like to ask you specifically if you are following it. Recommendations: In coordination with MA and commercial operators, identify areas in merchant marine tanker fleets that could improve national defense value and enhance overall readiness. Specific attention should be given to national defense features, the tankers' role in fleet support, methods effecting responsive and timely availability, and construction alternatives that optimize commercial and defense value. The origin of that recommendation was our concern, that if commercial tankers exist, that did not have pumps, or hose, or connection compatibility with Navy ships, that we were missing the boat, is that recommendation, being complied with? Mr. WOOLSEY. As that recommendation is stated, the answer is yes. Because it asks us to pay specific attention. We are doing that vigorously in the study, and otherwise. We are looking at the whole spectrum of service life extension programs on existing oilers of construction of oilers, using commercial specs, of utilization of specially constructed tankers, and national defense features on new tankers, national defense features being retrofitted on existing tankers. But, as you are aware, Congressman, frequently the problem with the oiler/tanker issue for the Navy is that the type of tanker it is normally desirable to construct, from the Navy's point of view, is the handy size, 30,000 tons or so, or 70,000 tons, maximum. That is not the size tanker that is normally most attractive from the commercial point of view, and therefore there is frequently a mismatch. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could supply for the record, subsequent to this hearing, a precise statement of the plans related to non-U.S.-flag ships, bulk carriers as well as tankers, that would be necessary in case of a national emergency to continue the input of goods to the United States that the Navy has permitted MA to go forward with? Mr. WOOLSEY. I will. [The following was received for the record.] FOREIGN FLAG SHIPS SERVICES In connection with securing the services of ships registered under foreign flag but owned or controlled by U.S. citizens, MARAD has several methods of assuring commitment when needed. These methods include conditions attached to war risk insurance binders and permits to register under foreign flag. We would defer to MARAD to provide the details of their program. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. I understand it is a MA program, but it seems to me that it falls within the national security, and your responsibility, and I would like to have a summary from you of just what ships will be available, and under what programs, and with what degree of certainty, and in what places in the event of a national emergency, say the Iran situation, or the Straits of Formosa require an expeditionary force. Mr. WOOLSEY. This is non-Union flag? Mr. WOOLSEY. I will. Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Thank you [The following was received for the record:] This is in response to your recent letter to Mr. Woolsey concerning his appearance before the House Merchant Marine Subcommittee in connection with the Maritime Administration Authorization Bill for FY 1980. In accordance with your request, I am attaching a copy of the Summary Record of my meeting with Mrs. Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, on 12 January 1979. Concerning your questions on shipyards, I am attaching three additional enclosures which should be responsive to your needs. With respect to your question on foreign-flag shipping, we understand that the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee was provided in April 1977 with a study prepared by the Joint Chiefs on the utilization of the Effective U.S. Controlled (EUSC) Fleet. The EUSC fleet consists of U.S. owned or U.S. controlled ships of foreign registry which are subject to call for the use of the U.S. government. Sealift resources identified in the Joint Staff study included the EUSC fleet as one of the several sources of sealift for reinforcement of Europe. Department of Defense (DoD) planning for contingencies includes the use of EUSC assets, as necessary, based on the availability of U.S.-flag shipping. EUSC sealift envisioned is minimal, and is comprised of tankers. There is presently sufficient U.S.-flag tanker capacity to support DoD needs for a NATO contingency. However, there is the likelihood of a requirement for EUSC shipping to carry sufficient petroleum imports to meet national security requirements. While all EUSC ships might not be needed or necessary under contingency conditions, we have no reason to believe that a significant portion would not be made available if required. Sincerely, WGraham Clastent Attachments (4) W. Graham Claytor, Jr. |