this negotiating process is fundamentally flawed. Only the United States working with the European Community has the credibility on the island and in Greece and Turkey to move the settlement process forward decisively. I believe we can do it. I think there are two caveats. One, the parties on the island must willingly accept our involvement. We cannot do it unless they are willing to have us play a role. And if we do go forward we should recognize that any settlement that results from our efforts will not be fully satisfactory to either side. And one of our roles will be to take some of the blame from everyone for what the solution will be. I think we need the European Community, because I think one of the elements of a solution is having Cyprus in the Community. Cyprus' economy is tied to the Community now. It would be healthy for the Greek Cypriots, it would be healthy for the Turkish Cypriots, to be part of something larger than themselves. Mr. Chairman, I also had responsibility at the State Department for Northern Ireland. I was a specialist on divided islands and unsuccessful there, as with Cyprus. But I do think that in Ireland, too, there are a lot of dynamics. But one dynamic is being part of the European Community and not completely isolated. I think that the Community has to play a role, but I think the United States can play a dynamic role. And we ought to think big. We ought to get out of these intercommunal talks led by the Secretary General. I once tried to add up how many hours of negotiations actually ever took place in the 4 years I was involved, and I would guess if you took all the negotiations from 1974 to now, 17 years, and try to figure out how much negotiation really ever took place it would be a very, very small amount. That does not mean there is not a lot of diplomacy not going on. But I think the fundamental process is flawed, and you will never get from here to there without some more active involvement by us or someone else. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator BIDEN. You will get a kick out of this. One of my staff members, an extremely competent one who has worked in Northern Ireland in addition to working here, passed me a note. It says, there is some movement in Northern Ireland now as well. See, he is not even smiling. He is saying it and he is serious. And that-we hire only optimists on this staff. At any rate, Mr. Scheffer. STATEMENT OF DAVID SCHEFFER, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. SCHEFFER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The hour is late, so I am going to ask that my written statement be submitted to the record. Senator BIDEN. The subject is important. You take your time. I want to focus on the enforceability of the Security Council resolutions; not to throw cold water on them, but rather to try to clarify how we go about enforcing them; not to rush ahead, but rather to consider what the steps might be necessary to get there. The situation in the gulf over the last 8 months certainly has proven the ability of the Security Council to enforce its own resolutions. But that was an atypical situation, and I would argue that Cyprus has become somewhat of an atypical complex of political and legal issues as well. There have been about 76 Security Council resolutions on Cyprus since 1964. They have some very interesting provisions which are worthy of enforcement. There was a demand in 1974 for an immediate end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus, and immediate withdrawal of unauthorized foreign military personnel. Resolution 359 of 1974 has a rather fascinating element to it. It says: We demand that all parties cooperate with the U.N. force in carrying out its humanitarian functions in all areas of Cyprus. A subsequent resolution requested the Secretary General to continue to provide emergency U.Ñ. humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of Cyprus in need of it. That was a rather interesting precursor to Resolution 688 of a few days ago with regard to the Kurds, which we all were identifying as the first right to interfere. But, in fact, in Cyprus we had somewhat of a precursor to that. I do not think we ever really followed through on it very well, but there was a basis established in 1974 for the U.N. force to interfere for humanitarian purposes on the island of Cyprus. Other resolutions also call for the speedy withdrawal of Turkish troops. In 1983 a very important resolution declared legally invalid the declaration of the Turkish republic in northern Cyprus, and also called upon all states not to recognize it. In 1990 the all-important Resolution 649, which incorporates a lot of terminology and language (e.g., bizonal, bicommunal) about how the Cyprus problem is actually going to be negotiated and resolved. All of those key terms are in 649. It is important that the Security Council recognized the work that the Secretary-General has been doing along those lines and the at least tentative understandings that he was starting to achieve. I think it is also important to recognize that it is not just the Security Council that has been seized with the Cyprus problem. There are three significant General Assembly resolutions from 1978, 1979, and 1983 which have a very interesting provision in each of them and a controversial one, because there was a split vote and lots of abstentions. The General Assembly instructed the Security Council to examine the question of implementing, within a time frame, its relevant resolutions and adopt, if necessary, all appropriate and practical measures under the U.N. Charter for ensuring the implementation of the U.N. resolutions in Cyprus. Now, as my written testimony indicates, you will see that the abstentions continued to decline down to only 25 abstentions in 1983 in the last such resolution. But it is important that that is now on the books, that the General Assembly has provided that direction to the Security Council. Nonetheless, the enforceability of the Security Council resolutions on Cyprus do differ markedly from those adopted in connection with the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. For all intents and purposes, the Cyprus resolutions have been adopted under chapter VI for the specific settlement of disputes under the U.N. Charter. That does not mean one could not interpret some of the language, particularly demanding withdrawal, as being quasichapter VII language. But the Security Council did not explicitly identify it as chapter VII directions. The rest of the context of these resolutions at least from a lawyer's point of view-require that you look to chapter VI to fully understand and interpret them. In contrast, as you know, in Iraq we started with chapter VII on day 1 in Resolution 660. We jumped right into chapter VII, and we were in chapter VII to the end, and we still are in Chapter VII. In fact, I think one of the interesting issues on the right to interfere is article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter.Article 2(7) is typically invoked to prohibit the right to interfere in internal affairs of states. But it has a final clause which says: this prohibition on the right to interfere is not applicable if you are operating under a chapter VII enforcement context, which we are in Iraq. So, a lot of the arguments that you have heard about not interfering in the internal affairs of a member state do not pass first base, because there exists this carve-out clause at the end of article 2(7). Some of that concept could also be applied to Cyprus if the Security Council can be motivated to address these issues with a new resolution under chapter VII. Otherwise, I think you will see much dispute and argumentation within the Security Council and among the permanent members that any attempt unilaterally, or perhaps with a coalition of some sort, to enforce the Security Council resolutions without further Security Council direction as to how to enforce these prior resolutions, would not be well received in the Council. The main point that I am making is that we are currently in a chapter VI regime for Cyprus. Peacekeeping forces are established under chapter VI. If we are to move to a chapter VII regime, it is going to take some more action. It is going to take an initiative in the Security Council. It does not mean it cannot be done, but I think more action needs to be taken before, for example, we could consider military action to dislodge the Turkish troops at this point. I just want to quickly respond respectfully to Mr. Boyatt's proposal on transferring the venue from the Secretary-General to the Security Council. I recognize the long travail of the Secretary-General on this particular issue. I also recognize, however, that as you read what has been clarified as problems as well as tentative understandings through his work, there is some progress. I do not quite know how the Security Council could advance the SecretaryGeneral's work without there being some considerable redundancy. I would, in the alternative, note-because I think it may be more timely that we have an election for a new Secretary-General coming up. And I think one of the key issues for the United States is to ensure that the individual who is nominated and finally elected as the new Secretary-General is the kind of individual who we have confidence will pursue the Cyprus issue and perhaps accelerate it. He or she must have negotiating skills that could be of great value in that enterprise. Further, I want to point to the U.N. peacekeeping force and mention that it is quite interesting to go through a lot of the terminology that has been recorded in the Secretary-General's work so far, and also the statements by Mr. Denktash regarding the existence of peoples in Cyprus, the principle of self-determination. From a lawyer's perspective, those are very, very important words, and I would argue that, in the context of Cyprus, it is not constructive or even necessarily correct at this point to talk about the principle of self-determination for the two communities of Cyprus. Like it or not, we crossed the self-determination threshold back in 1960. At that time, the principle of self-determination was understood in an anticolonial sense, and that threshold was crossed. There was a lot of help from the guarantor powers, but it was crossed. International law has not advanced to the extent that would be implied in statements that one might hear now about the self-determination of the two separate peoples on Cyprus. The reason is that that principle simply has not confirmed that these separate groups within nations which have already achieved their self-determination then also can claim the right of self-determination. We may get to that point some day, but I would not claim that is international law at this time. Senator BIDEN. It will be if there is a couple hundred thousand troops. Very quickly it would be international law. Mr. SCHEFFER. Finally I would just mention, Mr. ChairmanSenator BIDEN. By the way, I might add there is no possibility of it happening, in my view. Mr. SCHEFFER. I would argue that we could revisit the mandate of the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus. It has never been revised. It stands as it was in 1964. And the only reason that the U.N. force now operates somewhat differently than it was tasked to do in 1964-which was to operate all over the island and do all sorts of things-is because of the reality of 1974, and the subsequent squeezing of that force into a buffer zone. The Secretary-General at that time simply took the initiative to redefine the activity of the peacekeeping force. But it is certainly within the scope of the Security Council's abilities-and I think probably very practical abilities, at this point-to revisit the mandate of the U.N. force and consider how we might move to that transition period where a larger, better armed force operating under different rules of engagement can be incorporated in a new U.N. force that would replace the bulk of the Turkish forces in northern Cyprus. I would add that we might want to reconsider, as well, moving the financing of the U.N. force from one of voluntary contributions to one of assessed contributions. I know there is a rationale here on the Hill for keeping it as voluntary contributions, but at the same time, it suffers from an enormous debt within the whole U.N. system as a consequence of that policy. That issue needs to be addressed in order to reconfirm our commitment to that peacekeeping force. Finally, I will offer one final suggestion, and I defer to my more seasoned panelists here as to the practicality of it. When we approach what I would consider the crunch moment in the negotiations over the future of Cyprus, and that is territorial adjustment for the bizonal concept, I think it is going to be necessary for our negotiators to have a series of options in front of them as to where to draw the lines. Is the Turkish community going to retain 40 percent of Cyprus? Is it going to be cut back some? Where is it going to be cut back? What villages are going to be in what community? Now, I do not know of any plan that has been worked out as to exactly how that is going to be done. And I would suggest that because of its sensitivity and the difficulty of it, that it might be useful to have a very confidential team of experts drawn perhaps from the private sector, the U.N., the Greek Cypriot community, and the Turkish Cypriot community, on a very confidential basis. No names would be disclosed. These people could sit down for 6 months to a year and work out some options as to where this territorial adjustment could actually be undertaken. I say "confidentially" because I think otherwise, just as might happen in the West Bank, you might find that one's personal safety is at risk to be a part of that kind of effort. But the purpose is to have those plans in front of the negotiators so that when you reach that point in the negotiations you are not starting at square one, "Where do we draw the line?" You would have some ideas in front of you and some very well thought-out proposals. [The prepared statement of Mr. Scheffer follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID J. SCHEFFER The Iraq-Kuwait crisis, the gulf war, and the harsh aftermath have been atypical events giving rise to atypical, albeit historic, responses by the United Nations and by the nations which enforced international law with such extraordinary determination. The precedents established over the last 8 months have given rise to speculation that similar initiatives, under U.N. authority, can be undertaken in response to violations of international law in other conflicts. The perpetual gridlock over Cyprus suggests that if the precedents from the gulf war could jump-start any regional conflict, then is not Cyprus the obvious candidate? For many reasons, this will not necessarily be the case. Cyprus labors under its own atypical complex of political and legal issues. My testimony first addresses this dilemma: whether the U.N. Security Council can enforce its many resolutions on Cyprus in a manner comparable, or at least as successful, as it did in response to the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. Second, I will describe the good offices mission of U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar to bring about a peaceful resolution of the Cypriot stalemate. The legal terminology used by all parties in this process merits close scrutiny. Third, I will point out some characteristics about the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Finally, I will offer some proposals on how the United Nations machinery might be further employed in the future to bring about a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus. ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS CONCERNING CYPRUS Since 1964 more than 76 resolutions have been adopted by the Security Council in connection with the situation in Cyprus. Among the most important of these have been the following: • Resolution 186 (1964) created the United Nations Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus. •Resolution 353 (1974) demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in Cyprus and requests the immediate withdrawal of unauthorized foreign military personnel. • Resolution 359 (1974) demands that all parties cooperate with the U.N. Force in carrying out its humanitarian functions in all areas of Cyprus. Resolution 361 (1974) requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide emergency United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of Cyprus in need of it. (It is assumed by some that Resolution 688 (1991), which insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq, is the first instance of the Security Council exercising |