CYPRUS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 1991

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:56 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Sarbanes, and Pressler.

Senator BIDEN. Our next hearing will please come to order. Today, the European Affairs Subcommittee examines the continuing impasse in Cyprus, a nation that has received little attention from the world community in recent years.

As we embark upon this review, it is worth recalling some of the events that led to the current situation. In the fateful month of July 1974, a coup by radical Greek Cypriots, instigated by a rightist junta in Athens, threatened the Turkish minority in Cyprus; the plotters sought to unite Cyprus with Greece. Turkey, a guarantor of the treaty establishing Cypriot independence, sent forces, with two benign results: the coup in Cyprus failed, and the dictatorship in Athens collapsed.

Had Turkey withdrawn at that point, the world could have hardly complained. A few weeks later, however, in the midst of the peace talks in Geneva, Turkey launched a second invasion-40,000 troops proceeded to carve the nation in two.

The invasion was as vicious as it was rapid. Hundreds were killed. Nearly 200,000 Greek Cypriots-30 percent of the population-fled their homes in northern Cyprus and resettled in the south. To this day, over 1,500 people, including 5 Americans, remain unaccounted for.

As with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, alert U.S. diplomacy might have averted the tragedy. Warnings by President Johnson on two occasions in the 1960's had helped prevent Turkish intervention. But the Nixon White House distracted by Watergate ignored predictions of a coup on Cyprus and stood by while Turkey launched its invasions.

Unlike Iraq, however, Turkey's illegal actions were only briefly punished. The United Nations demanded Turkey's immediate withdrawal but enforced no sanctions. A partial U.S. arms embargo imposed by Congress lasted just 4 years.

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Meanwhile, the occupation of northern Cyprus was buttressed by the immigration of mainland Turks who were encouraged to settle in Cyprus by Ankara. In 1983, Turkish Cypriots declared secession by establishing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. The U.N. Security Council again spoke forcefully, declaring the act "legally invalid," but failed to act further. Last September, in his address to Congress, President Bush proclaimed that the fifth objective in the gulf crisis was the creation of a New World order where the rule of law supplants the "rule of the jungle."

Unfortunately, the rule of the jungle persists in Cyprus. Today, U.N. peacekeepers monitor a Cypriot dividing line. Beyond it, Turkey occupies nearly 40 percent of Cyprus in defiance of the U.N. Charter and the Helsinki Final Act.

If we are to realize the vision outlined by the President and demonstrate that the New World Order is more than a slogan, the United States must energize the pursuit of other sound objectives affirmed by the United Nations beyond the liberation of Kuwait. The Bush administration has made clear that it seeks peace between Israel and Arab states as well as resolution of the Palestinian question. Justice demands that the administration also turn to the Cyprus issue with equal vigor by pressing forcefully for Turkish withdrawal.

Such efforts would, of course, encounter the paradox that Turkey played a key role in laying the cornerstone for the New World order. Turkey's shutdown of Iraq's export pipeline was critical to the U.N. blockade and allied planes used Turkish bases. But Turkey's contribution to principled U.N. action in one area cannot provide immunity against principled U.N. action elsewhere. There is no such thing as time off for good behavior.

The administration may resist courting Turkey's anger at this moment, but applying principles-and dealing with the difficult-is precisely what the promise of the New World Order is about. The United States cannot dispatch 500,000 troops in every instance of aggression. We can demand consistency in applying the principle that aggression be collectively resisted.

In recent weeks, there have been a few signs of progress on the Cyprus question. First, the European Community has expressed new willingness to work for a solution. Second, the Secretary General, who is responsible for mediating the intercommunal Cyprus talks, is said to be hopeful that progress is within reach. Finally, this week, Secretary Baker met with the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Mr. Denktash. While I am concerned that this meeting might send an improper signal that the United States recognizes the illegal State of Northern Cyprus, I am heartened that the Secretary appears to be taking a more active role in the issue. The failed history of 17 years of diplomacy suggests that caution is in order. A few meetings and a few diplomatic statements do not a settlement make. Were that the case, we would have had a resolution of the Cyprus question long ago.

Nonetheless, I believe that a resolution is possible if key conditions are met. First and foremost, the Turks must understand that its occupation of Cyprus cannot continue. The United States and

other permanent members of the Security Council should make this clear in the strongest possible terms.

Second, to minimize Turkish Cypriot fears about Turkish troop withdrawal, the United Nations should consider expanding its peacekeeping force on the island in the event of Turkish withdrawal. Third, the two Cypriot communities must be encouraged toward a settlement and made to understand that their interest will be served by a settlement. Toward that end, the United States should renew its commitment, first made by President Reagan in 1984, to provide $250 million for a peace and reconstruction fund for Cyprus. The European Community and Japan should make similar pledges, and the United States should seek to elicit such promises in formal and quantified terms.

Today, we will hear from several distinguished witnesses who will provide perspective on the long, diplomatic, and legal history of the Cyprus issue. Our first witness will be a very distinguished public servant, Ambassador Nelson Ledsky, State Department Special Coordinator for Cyprus.

But before we go to our first witness, two of my colleagues are with me today. Each may have an opening statement, and I yield now to Senator Pressler, if he has an opening statement.

Senator PRESSLER. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for having this hearing.

I shall not read my opening statement, but I would just like to briefly say that I hope we are in the dawn of a new day on the Cyprus question. It has long been my feeling that we should be friends with Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. That would be the ideal thing.

All three of those countries have done favorable things for our country and with our country, and I noted in reading Ambassador Ledsky's statement that there is a new optimism, or at least we have an opportunity. We are in an atmosphere in the world where the Berlin Wall has come down, where troops are being pulled out of different countries.

I, too, join in saying that Turkey did a lot of fine things during this recent Iraqi situation, but there still remains the issue of Article II, Section 4 of the U.N. Charter, the same provision violated by Iraq in the invasion of Kuwait, and numerous U.N. Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in Cyprus.

So, we have to keep the pressure on Turkey to move toward a withdrawal of their troops. I am hopeful this can be done in a positive way. I do not want to spend my time bashing Turkey today, but rather to say that it is time for a new, positive day, and I hope that the Turkish Government hears what we are saying because the present situation cannot continue on Cyprus, in my judgmentin the judgment of this Senator, and I do commend the good ambassador for his work. I hope that all parties will move in the direction of an independent Cyprus where self-determination is the order of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for holding this hearing. In the aftermath of international action to carry out the U.N. resolutions with respect to Iraq one obviously

turns to the question of carrying out U.N. resolutions with respect to Cyprus.

There are a number of them on the books, and little, if anything, has been done over the 17 years since-almost, now, 17 yearssince the brutal occupation of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 to restore peace and justice to that island, and I am anxious to hear from Mr. Ledsky, our Special Coordinator on the Cyprus issue, exactly what is transpiring right now, and in particular, what initiatives the administration has in mind, and what scenario they see unfolding in the near future.

This issue has been allowed to fester for far, far too long, and there are many who think that if the administration-U.S. administration-were to devote to it the time and energy and attention which has devoted to some other issues on the international scene, that in fact a fair and just resolution could be achieved, and I am anxious to hear from Mr. Ledsky on that point.

Senator BIDEN. Before we turn to you, Nelson, I just want to announce the next panel so people will know who are coming.

Following Ambassador Ledsky will be a panel of witnesses, including two former State Department officials who worked closely on this issue: Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, who received a good deal of notoriety and fame at the time, who served as the State Department's Director of Cypriot Affairs from 1971 to 1974, and later as Ambassador to Colombia and Upper Volta; the Hon. Matthew Nimetz, who served as counselor to the State Department and as Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance during the Carter administration, and Mr. David Scheffer, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr. Scheffer will provide us perspective on the international legal issues involved. I welcome all of you gentlemen as well.

Now let me turn to you, Nelson. Welcome back. We have not had you back up here since, I think, your confirmation, and the reason being we continued to be, as I am sure you were, hopeful that just around the corner there was something in sight, and every time I would go to set up a hearing, I would be advised by a number of people, and I think correctly so, that now is not the time to do that, but I have kind of run out of string up at this end. I am anxious to hear what you have to say.

STATEMENT OF HON. NELSON LEDSKY, SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR CYPRUS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. LEDSKY. Thank you very much, Senator Biden, Senator Sarbanes. I have prepared a very brief statement I would like to go through it with you, and then take your questions.

Let me start by saying that it is a pleasure to see behind me both my former instructors and my former bosses with whom I learned and worked on the Cyprus issue many years ago. If there is a failure, it is mine. They would have provided the solution by this time had they been on the job.

Senator BIDEN. You are very gracious, but I think they probably doubt that themselves.

Mr. LEDSKY. If I had only listened to Matt Nimetz when he told me what to do.

Senator BIDEN. Do not take this job.

Mr. LEDSKY. Let me start by thanking you for this opportunity to give you a report on my activities as Special Cyprus Coordinator over the past year. It was exactly 12 months ago that I was seated at this table at my confirmation hearing. I said then that I wanted to work closely with this committee, and I have been able, on a continuing basis, to talk to staff members and individual Senators about my work on Cyprus, but this is my first chance, as you said, to come back here and talk to you directly and formally about my activities.

I also want to congratulate you for scheduling these hearings at this juncture. I think your timing is very, very good. I know you are frustrated over the lack of progress this past year, as, indeed, in the preceding 16 years, and I want to tell you that I share that sense of frustration with you. I have worked very hard, and if I have not made more progress than I have, it is not for lack of trying.

I also think that you correctly sense that this is a moment of opportunity, that there is in the international climate some factors which offer new and perhaps unique opportunities for solving the Cyprus problem. I personally am optimistic that in the next months we have a chance of at least reaching the first plateau of a Cyprus settlement, something that has eluded us since 1974.

In my judgment, there is no simple or single key to a Cyprus solution. I do want to say at this juncture that we will carefully examine the four or five points that you outlined today. I think some of those ideas deserve to be looked at with care and careful consideration, including your idea of going back to a fund for settlement of property and other economic issues on Cyprus.

I honestly think that sloganeering of the type we get occasionally does not help, and that there is no magic formula for solving the Cyprus problem. That is why we in the administration, in the State Department, have been working and will continue to work on three different fronts simultaneously on the Cyprus issue. I would like to explain each one of those in some detail.

First and most basic is our support for the U.N. Secretary General's "good offices" mission. This mission was established, endorsed, and reendorsed on countless occasions by the U.N. Security Council. The Secretary General has been trying for some years now to put together, with the two ethnic communities on Cyprus, a detailed outline of how a new federation for the island might work. The various pieces of the outline have come close to being assembled on many occasions, but the process has not been completed because, to put it simply, neither of the participants has been willing to make the necessary concessions for such a new partnership.

I would be pleased to elaborate on this point in response to your questions, but a recent article by Mr. Nimetz superbly outlines, in my view, the specific areas where the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots need to make specific compromises. That article was published in The Mediterranean Quarterly just very recently, and it is based on a speech Mr. Nimetz gave in Athens last summer, I believe it is a very good summary of what the remaining difficulties are. I hope Mr. Nimetz will review these points with you during his comments this afternoon.