It would seem to me that the EC could be encouraged as a consequence of that do use the degree of aid that it is providing through Turkey to the Kurds as some leverage on the Cyprus issue. In other words, 3 or 4 months from now, after a large amount of aid has flowed to the Kurds through Turkey, it might be an appropriate time for the EC to remind Turkey of the commitment that the EC had to that problem in Turkey and that it is an opportunity and a timely circumstance now for Turkey to respond with respect to some problems in Cyprus. And link that into the consideration of Turkey's admission into the EC.

Mr. BOYATT. I think one thing became very clear in the gulf war, and that is that there is no EC foreign policy. There are only national foreign policies. And I do not even know that there is a vehicle by which the EC could act in concert on serious foreign policy issues.

When the question of the admittance of Turkey or Cyprus really gets before the EC, both the staff in Brussels and the finance ministers, you will find that there is a lot less enthusiasm for that to happen in Europe than there is in Turkey and in Cyprus. And it is seen as strictly financial economic issue. And I think it is really something for the long term. That is on the financial economic side. And on the political side, there simply is no EC foreign policy. Senator SARBANES. Mr. Nimetz, I would like to ask you in this open session, when you put all that pressure on to lift the embargo in 1978 what did you expect to get for it?

Mr. NIMETZ. Well, as you remember, after we lifted the embargo, we had a Cyprus plan, as you remember.

Senator SARBANES. But did you have any plan to get any, in effect, short-range responses on it to move the whole process forward, some territorial concessions?

Mr. NIMETZ. Yes. There were two issues. One was the Verosha resettlement. As you recall, we pressed the Turkish side to offer Verosha back. Verosha is that part south of Famagusta which was Greek but which they never settled. It was just held by the Turks. And it was our expectation that immediately after lifting the embargo, negotiations would start on the return of Verosha.

Senator SARBANES. What happened?

Mr. NIMETZ. We also had a plan that was a more generalized plan.

Senator SARBANES. Well, that is the-that was the ultimate resolution. And of course, as you have said even in your statement here today, that is very difficult to come by because the two sides are enormously suspicious and no one wants to lay down their final cards. But what went wrong in getting some interim steps which would have done a lot, I think, to change the whole perception of the issue?

Mr. NIMETZ. I do not have those papers, and they are classified. They will not even show it to me again, I guess. But our general plan for Cyprus had two parts. One was an outline of what we thought a settlement ought to include. I might say parenthetically, most of those ideas have later been incorporated in what has gone on in the last 12 years.

But then there was a second part that said as a first step as we negotiate these points, there will be a resettlement of Verosha.

And then we had, as I recalled, a more detailed elaboration of that. I think we even had a map of Verosha that had virtually each building and how we would resettle it. And we called for immediate discussions on the modalities of cleaning it up, getting people back into it.

That whole thing fell apart, unfortunately. And I must say I think the Greek-Cypriot Government bears some major responsibility for that. I think it was an error in tactics and judgment. I think the Turks were very, very unhappy with our proposal. But because we were just lifting the embargo and we had not sent any weapons yet we were just starting to get them out of mothball-the Turkish Government did not turn it down. And they breathed a real sigh of relief when the Greek Cypriot Government, inexplicably to me to this day, said they would not deal with us, and rejected our plan.

Senator SARBANES. Did you link the return of Verosha to the more general approach?

Mr. NIMETZ. I would have to go back, Senator. I really do not remember. As I recall, we had a specific

Senator SARBANES. So you, in effect, were in the position of getting nothing for the lifting of the embargo.

Mr. NIMETZ. Well, the lifting of the embargo stood on its own because we had real security interests in Turkey. And then we negotiated a new base and cooperation agreement which I negotiated which was very essential.

Senator SARBANES. You are here today telling us, you know, people ought to put the pressure on and take an interest. And you had in your at the time a tremendously significant weapon. You in effect let go of it and you got absolutely nothing on Cyprus. Now, you may not have gotten the full resolution of Cyprus. I mean, that would have been-if that could have been done, that would have been even better, but you did not get anything.

Mr. NIMETZ. Nope. Well, we

Senator SARBANES. And I thought at the time that you had a— you were going to get Verosha-

Mr. NIMETZ. We thought so too.

Senator SARBANES [continuing]. Just as a starter, unrelated to the ultimate plan. Is that not correct?

Mr. NIMETZ. We thought so too. We have to go back in the record on the timing of that. We got effectively nothing on Cyprus. No one has gotten anything on Cyprus.

Senator SARBANES. Well, but you had the most to get at the time. Mr. NIMETZ. We also, Senator, had the most to lose.

Senator SARBANES. Because you had a tremendous weapon in your hands, and you let it go and you did not get anything at all. Nothing on this issue. And, you know, we have been wrestling with it ever since.

Why do you think reducing the number of troops would not make a positive contribution?

Mr. NIMETZ. It is not that it would not be positive. I think when you have such overwhelming force that reducing it by a small amount does not really change the strategic balance, and you are putting a lot of effort into something that is symbolic.

We did, in the 1970's, get the Turks to reduce the troops. And I considered it just a gesture. I felt disappointed. They would announce they were taking out 2,000 men. I never knew whether they brought them back sometimes, whether those were just a rotation for the winter or summer. And it did not make any difference, because it is like the balance between the United States and Mexico in terms of military strength. It is not a meaningful thing.

If they took all the troops off, that would be something, and have a new regime, new relationship between the two.

Senator SARBANES. I think if they significantly reduced the troops that would be something.

Mr. NIMETZ. But why would it be? You are in the south, there are some troops up there in the north on a base, you do not know whether there are 10,000 there or 5,000 at that base. They reduce it. Does it make you feel more secure?

Senator SARBANES. Yes. I think if there are 5,000 or 10,000 troops in the north rather than 30,000 or 35,000 troops, that is an important difference.

Mr. NIMETZ. Clearly defensive and not possibly offensive.

Senator SARBANES. 30,000 to 35,000 can launch an offensive and within a matter of hours can take the entire island; but 5,000 to 10,000 may not be able to do that. And therefore if there is going to be an offensive action it is going to be a more complicated process because it is going to have to involve action from the mainland. Therefore you heighten the security-the sense of security in the south because they do not have the prospect of immediately overwhelmed before the international community or anyone else can do anything to try to preclude what is developing. It seems to me it is an important difference.

Mr. NIMETZ. Yes. I agree with that. When you get it down to very low levels-and I think that would be a major-significant accomplishment. I do not know why the Turkish army has so many troops there. I cannot explain it. I never could explain it.

Mr. BOYATT. It would, of course, give any-

Senator SARBANES. There is no good reason for it, is there, other than-since there is no good reason for it, it then leads to the concern that the reason for it is to mount an offensive at some point if they judge it that they want to do it; is that not correct?

Mr. NIMETZ. It certainly is open to that implication, sure. Mr. BOYATT. I think there is an additional element here, too. If some third-party adjudicator is engaged in this, whether it is the United States diplomatically or the Secretary General's special representative or the Security Council's special representative, an action of that magnitude would give that mediator serious ammunition to ask the other side to make an equally serious step of some nature and get the process moving.

Senator SARBANES. Well, gentlemen, thank you very much. We appreciate your testimony and your coming to give us your counsel today.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:33 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

[The Mediterranean Quarterly]

THE USE OF FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASE OF CYPRUS

(by David Hunt)

The words used in my title are taken from the Charter of the United Nations. The full text of Article 2(4), the charter's key passage, is: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations."

My purpose in using that particular language is by no means fortuitous but deliberate. It was designed to emphasize the need to base international relations in the post-Cold War era not on calculations of the relative strengths of individual countries or alliances but on the principles of international law. The concept of a Law of Nations, superior to the interests of separate states and overriding their own domestic legislation, is ancient. Indeed, it can be traced back, as can so many things in European civilization, to the shores of the Mediterranean and, in particular, to Greece. The United Nations Organization has been the basis of international law for forty-five years. Its decisions, made under the terms of its constitution, are declaratory of that law and it is empowered by the same constitution to give effect to them. By Article 24 of the charter the members "confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf." As a former diplomat, and before that a soldier, I find the concept of the rule exhilarating. It is on the basis of that concept that I shall examine the use of force against Cyprus.

I

In July 1974 the armed forces of the Turkish Republic invaded the territory of the Republic of Cyprus. By the middle of the next month they had extended their military occupation to the northern half of the island, including the northern half of the city of Nicosia, capital of the republic. The territory subjugated by the Turkish Army amounted to 40 percent of the area of the island, and at the time it accounted for 70 percent of its productive capacity. There was extensive looting and destruction of antiquities. The Greek inhabitants of the area were expelled. In a serious breach of the Geneva Convention governing the law of war, an effort was made, which still continues, to alter the demographic nature of the area by transporting and settling there some 60,000 immigrants brought from Anatolia. The military occupation of the northern part of the island has remained unchanged in character and extent from 1974 to the present day.

The Turkish government purported to act under the provisions of the Treaty of Guarantee, signed in Nicosia in 1960 by Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey, which institutionalized part of the Greco-Turkish agreement reached at Zurich in the previous year. The operative clause of that treaty, which must be interpreted strictly as is the case with all treaties of guarantee, lays only one obligation on the three guaranteeing powers: to consult together in the event of a breach. At the insistence of the Turkish negotiators, a sentence was added stating that each power "reserved the right to take action with the sole aim of reestablishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty." This meant in particular the elaborate provisions of the republic of both enosis (the movement to unite Greece and Cyprus) and partition. This was soon shown not to be the sole aim of the Turkish government which has in fact imposed partition.

It should be noted that this sentence is merely declaratory, not contractual. There is no reference to the use of force anywhere in the treaty; if there had been it would (55)