Russia herself. Nations are not normally in the habit of endorsing each other's financial bills; and Russia's object in making herself responsible for China's obligations was obviously that of securing, as her principal creditor, large contingent rights of control over her affairs. The vaguely defined increase in political influence which the making of a loan confers has been recognised by all nations in their dealings with China; but the Russian offer was peculiar, in that a foreign Power became, in effect, itself the creditor, in lieu of merely acquiring general rights of protecting, in case of default, the financial interest of its subjects.

China's uneasiness as to the consequences that the Russian guarantee might entail made her hesitate to accept the offer; and her reluctance was only overcome by strong pressure from Russia, supported by France. M. Gérard lays stress (pp. 67-71) on the eagerness which Russia showed in the pursuit of her object ('le gouvernement russe, en effet, n'avait perdu ni un jour ni une heure'), and admits the pressure that was required to secure it, but nevertheless describes the transaction as ' establishing a fresh title to the gratitude of the Peking Government,' as if China had asked for the loan instead of having it forced upon her. The theory, however, on which his whole interpretation of the Russian policy of the time is based is that all Russia's actions, even when directly furthering her own interests, had as their inspiring motive a regard for China's welfare.

The loan strengthened the position of two of the Powers that had intervened on China's behalf, but the claims of the third, Germany, to a recompense for her services had in the transaction been left out of account. No light is thrown by M. Gérard on the motives that led Russia to ignore these claims; and there hangs, indeed, much obscurity over her attitude towards Germany at this time with regard to Chinese affairs.* In view of the main object of the Franco-Russian alliance, the close

It may partially be explained by the fact that the relations between Germany and Russia, since the non-renewal of Bismarck's re-insurance treaty in 1890, were no longer what they had been. Moreover William II's new policy in the Near East roused Russian apprehensions, while in the Far East the other two Powers, recently allied, naturally regarded Germany as an interloper.

co-operation of the three Powers in the Far East would no doubt have been difficult to maintain; but the exclusion of Germany, within a few weeks of the joint intervention, from a share in its reward seems a needlessly early and impolitic breach. Its immediate result was that Germany joined Great Britain in opposition to the Russian proposals; and their joint efforts, though failing to prevent the acceptance of the Russian loan, were successful in securing the promise of an AngloGerman loan by way of counterpoise Some sense that the exclusion of Germany from the first loan had been an error in policy may possibly have prompted a Russian project to which M. Gérard alludes (p. 126) for the association of the Berlin market with those of St Petersburg, Paris, and Amsterdam in a second loan, early in 1896; but the arrangements for the Anglo-German loan were by that time well advanced, and the scheme was abandoned. At a later date, i.e. in December 1897, a fresh offer from Russia of a loan under her guarantee was successfully countered by a similar offer from Great Britain, coupled with a series of alternative demands, framed on such a scale as to produce on the Chinese Government the desired deterrent effect.

For her main schemes Russia made careful preparations, well summarised (p. 92) by M. Gérard, who shows how Prince Lobanoff, after the conclusion of the guaranteed loan, proceeded to study the means by which, both in Manchuria and in the China seas, Russia might place herself in the best position for 'preserving the Central Empire from new dangers.'

'C'est ainsi qu'il exprima le désir de pouvoir, à l'occasion, abriter les flottes russes dans les ports chinois, notamment à Kiao-tcheou. C'est ainsi encore qu'il faisait étudier, par les ingénieurs du ministère des Communications, les tracés qui, soit sur la frontière de Mandchourie, soit, au besoin, par la Mandchourie même, permettrait la construction la plus rapide et la plus profitable du chemin de fer trans-sibérien. C'est ainsi enfin qu'il laissait M. Witte, ministre des Finances, préparer, par la création de la Banque Russo-Chinoise, l'instrument futur de toute cette politique.'

But the disclosure of this policy,-'bienfaisante d'ailleurs et tutélaire pour la Chine'-was reserved for

Prince Lobanoff's conferences with Li Hung-chang on the occasion of his embassy to Russia in 1896.

To this embassy of Li Hung-chang and its results M. Gérard devotes many interesting pages, which clear away much of the mystery previously surrounding the agreements then concluded between Russia and China. The so-called Cassini Convention' had, he shows, strictly speaking no existence as a formal document, although among the details supposed to be contained in it there were few that had not a counterpart in one or other of the actual engagements entered into between the two Powers. The basis of all these engagements was a pledge by Russia to come to China's help in case of an attack on her by Japan; and demands for far-reaching concessions found their justification in the plea that they would place Russia in a position to render this aid more promptly and more effectively. Of these concessions the extension of the Trans-Siberian railway through Chinese territory to Vladivostock was incomparably the most important in its subsequent influence on the political situation.

The first intimation that this extension was to be asked as part of Russia's recompense for her intervention was made to the Chinese Government, as M. Gérard relates (p. 137), in April 1896 by Count Cassini, the Russian representative at Peking, as soon as the necessary preliminary survey had been completed by Russian engineers. The Chinese Ministers received the intimation with stupefaction ('frappés d'une sorte de stupeur'), the altruistic character of the scheme being clearly not immediately apparent to the beneficiaries. No further discussions took place at Peking, all subsequent negotiations being conducted at St Petersburg and Moscow with Li Hung-chang, who not only himself accepted, with little apparent hesitation, the whole of the Russian proposals, including this extension of the railway, but also procured their immediate acceptance by the Chinese Council of State. To Count Cassini was assigned only the duty of securing the Chinese ratification of a separate agreement, negotiated at St Petersburg with the Chinese Minister, after Li's departure, embodying the detailed arrangements for the construction of the line.

In such secrecy did Russia deem it expedient to veil these transactions that not even to France, her ally, did

she, according to M. Gérard (p. 148), communicate the treaty of alliance against Japan; and only under 'les plus expresses précautions et réserves' was the French Government permitted to learn the main terms of the agreement relating to the railway. Even this information would apparently not have been vouchsafed had not the disclosure been necessitated by the French interest in the Russo-Chinese Bank, which was to finance the scheme. The original object of Li's embassy was to represent his Sovereign at the coronation of the Emperor of Russia; and it was during the coronation festivities that these secret agreements were arranged, the first communication of the Russian offer of an alliance against Japan, and of the conditions attached to it, being made to him, M. Gérard states (p. 143), by the Tsar himself. Li's acceptance of these conditions has been the subject of much hostile criticism, Chinese as well as foreign; but Mr Morse's view (III, 82) that he acted from fear of Japan is probably correct.

Far more remarkable than Li's own readiness to accept the Russian offer is the abnormal rapidity with which the Chinese Government came to the same decision; and his personal influence is very far from adequately explaining it. Even in the case of a Government less prone to seek safety in procrastination the rapidity of so weighty a decision would have been extraordinary, for within a month from the first broaching of the subject to Li by the Tsar the Chinese Imperial assent had been given and the document signed. The customary attitude of the Chinese Government towards foreign proposals being one of deep suspicion, there must obviously have been applied some powerful stimulus to produce this hasty acquiescence; and the only motive that can be indicated as sufficiently powerful is fear. It may therefore with some safety be conjectured that the Russian offer of support against Japan on specified conditions was accompanied by a terrifying presentment of the consequences to China of a rejection of these proposals; and that it was to coercion, not to persuasion, that the Chinese Government, in accordance with its usual habit, gave way.

This conjecture is supported by the nature of Li's reception on his return from Europe, which was not one

appropriate to the originator of a policy willingly adopted by his Government. In point of fact, his policy of granting immediate concessions to Russia, in return for a contingent promise of support, had not been accepted without grave misgivings, of which the Government's attitude towards him was a visible sign. These misgivings deepened as the effect of the concessions to Russia began to be realised. An excuse for the despatch of troops into Manchuria lay now always ready to hand in the necessity for protecting the Russian railway; and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Pavloff, made it his business to inspire a belief that the temptation to use it was being with difficulty resisted. All previous military operations of Western Powers against China had been undertaken with manifest reluctance and hesitation; but in Russia's case it came to be understood that her troops on the frontier were straining at the leash, and she had thus always at command means of coercion that were freely used to secure compliance with fresh demands on China. The Chinese Ministers thus lived under the shadow of a perpetual menace.

Great Britain had refused to join in the demand for the restoration of the Liaotung peninsula to China; and there was for some time, on the part of the Chinese Government, a not unnatural inclination to adopt towards her representative an attitude that might be expressed in the formula: 'You did nothing for us; why should we do anything for you?' But the course of events gradually demonstrated the essential strength of England's position. Except on the Burma frontier, her interests in China were of long standing, and the support of them involved no new and startling claims, such as those advanced by Russia; while, owing to these interests being not only important but widespread, questions relating to them constantly arose, and the settlement of each of the ever-recurring minor problems involved the coming to an agreement with the British representative. Thus an attitude of unfriendly aloofness on the part of the Chinese Ministers could not long be maintained. Moreover, while at first the argument seemed strong that China was bound to show herself grateful to the Powers that had come to her aid, this argument gradually