paratus so complicated and fo fingular, ought to rouse our attention. Nature doth nothing in vain; and we may conclude with great certainty, that this curious branch of the human constitution is intended for fome valuable purpose. To the discovery of this purpose I shall with ardor apply my thoughts, after discoursing a little more at large upon the punishment, for I may now call it so, that Nature hath provided for indecent or unbecoming behaviour. This, at any rate, is necessary, in order to give a full view of the subject; and who knows whether it may not, over and above, open some track that will lead us to what we are in queft of? A gross impropriety is punished with contempt and indignation, which are vented against the offender by every external expreffion that can gratify these passions. And even the flightest impropriety raises fome degree of contempt. But there are improprieties, generally of the flighter kind, that provoke laughter; of which we have examples without end in the blunders and abfurdities of our own species. Such improprieties improprieties receive a different punishment, as will appear by what follows. The emotions of contempt and of laughter occafioned by an impropriety of this kind, uniting intimately in the mind of the spectator, are expressed externally by a peculiar fort of laugh, termed a laugh of derifion or fcorn *. An impropriety that thus moves not only contempt but laughter, is diftinguished by the epithet of ridiculous; and a laugh of derision or scorn is the punishment provided for it by nature. Nor ought it to escape observation, that we are so fond of inflicting this punishment, as sometimes to exert it even against creatures of an inferior species; witness a Turkycock swelling with pride, and strutting with displayed feathers. This object appears ridiculous, and in a gay mood is apt to provoke a laugh of derifion. We must not expect that the improprieties to which these different punishments are adapted, can be feparated by any precise boundaries. Of improprieties, from the * Sce chap. 7. flightest flightest to the most gross, from the most risible to the most serious, a scale may be formed ascending by degrees almost imperceptible. Hence it is, that in viewing fome unbecoming actions, too risible for anger and too ferious for derision, the spectator feels a fort of mixt emotion partaking both of derifion and of anger. This accounts for an expreffion, common with respect to the impropriety of fome actions, That we know not whether to laugh or be angry. It cannot fail to be observed, that in the cafe of a risible impropriety, which is always flight, the contempt we have for the offender is extremely faint, though derision, its gratification, is extremely pleasant. This disproportion betwixt a passion and its gratification, seems not conformable to the analogy of nature. In looking about for a folution, I reflect upon what is laid down above, that an improper action, not only moves our contempt for the author, but also, by means of contrast, swells the good opinion we have of ourselves. This contributes, more than any other article, to the pleasure we feel in ridiculing the follies and VOL. II. C absurdities absurdities of others. And accordingly, it is well known, that they who put the greatest value upon themselves, are the most prone to laugh at others. Pride is a vivid paffion, as all are which have felf for their object. It is extremely pleasant in itself, and not less so in its gratification. This paffion fingly would be fufficient to account for the pleafure of ridicule, without borrowing any aid from contempt. Hence appears the reason of a noted obfervation, That we are the most disposed to ridicule the blunders and abfurdities of others, when we are in high spirits; for in high spirits, felf-conceit displays itself with more than ordinary vi gor. Having with wary steps traced an intricate road, not without danger of wandering; what remains to complete our journey, is to account for the final cause of con gruity and propriety, which make so great a figure in the human constitution. One final cause, regarding congruity, is pretty obvious. The sense of congruity, as one of the principles of the fine arts, contributes in a remarkable degree to our entertainment. This is the final cause assigned above for our fenfe of proportion *, and need not be enlarged upon here. Congruity indeed with respect to quantity, coincides with proportion. When the parts of a building are nicely adjusted to each other, it may be said indifferently, that it is agreeable by the congruity of its parts, or by the proportion of its parts. But propriety, which regards voluntary agents only, can never in any in stance be the fame with proportion. A very long nose is disproportioned, but cannot be termed improper. In fome instances, it is true, impropriety coincides with dispropor tion in the same subject, but never in the same respect. I give for an example a very little man buckled to a long toledo. Confidering the man and the sword with respect to size, we perceive a disproportion. Confidering the sword as the choice of the man, we perceive an impropriety. |