lay hold of, in order to gratify their favourite propenfity. The persons galled have no other refuge but to maintain, that ridicule ought not to be applied to grave fubjects. It is yielded, on the other hand, that subjects really grave and important, are by no means fit for ridicule: but then it is urged, that ridicule is the only proper test for discovering whether a subject be really grave, or be made so artificially by custom and fashion. This dispute has produced a celebrated question, Whether ridicule be or be not a test of truth? I give this question a place here, because it tends to illustrate the nature of ridicule.

The question stated in accurate terms is, Whether the sense of ridicule be the proper test for diftinguishing ridiculous objects from those that are not so? To answer this question with precision, I must premise, that ridicule is not a subject of reasoning, but of sense or taste *. This being taken for granted, I proceed thus. No person doubts that our sense of beauty is the true teft of what

See chap. 10. compared with chap. 7.

is

is beautiful, and our sense of grandeur, of what is great or fublime. Is it more doubtful whether our sense of ridicule be the true test of what is ridiculous? It is not only the true teft, but indeed the only teft. For this is a fubject that comes not, more than beauty or grandeur, under the province of reason. If any fubject, by the influence of fashion or custom, have acquired a degree of veneration or esteem to which naturally it is not intitled, what are the proper means for wiping off the artificial colouring, and difplaying the subject in its true light? Reasoning, as observed, cannot be applied. And therefore the only means is to judge by taste. The test of ridicule which feparates it from its artificial connections, exposes it naked with all its native improprieties.

But it is urged, that the gravest and moft serious matters may be set in a ridiculous light. Hardly fo; for where an object is neither risible nor improper, it lies not open in any quarter to an attack from ridicule. But fuppofing the fact, I foresee not any harmful consequence, By the same fort of reasoning, a talent for wit ought to be condemned, because it may be employed to burlesque

burlesque a great or lofty subject. Such irregular use made of a talent for wit or ridicule, cannot long impose upon mankind. It cannot stand the test of correct and delicate tafte; and truth will at last prevail even with the vulgar. To condemn a talent for ridicule because it may be perverted to wrong purposes, is not a little ridiculous. Could one forbear to smile, if a talent for reasoning were condemned because it alfo may be perverted? And yet the conclufion in the latter cafe, would be not less just than in the former; perhaps more just, for no talent is so often perverted as that of reason.

We had best leave Nature to her own operations. The most valuable talents may be abused, and so may that of ridicule. Let us bring it under proper culture if we can, without endeavouring to pull it up by the root. Were we destitute of this test of truth, I know not what might be the consequences: I fee not what rule would be left us to prevent splendid trifles paffing for matters of importance, show and form for substance, and fuperftition or enthusiasm for pure reli

gion.

VOL. II.

H

CHAP

58

W

CHAP. XIII.

WIT.

IT is a quality of certain thoughts and expreffions.

The term is

never applied to an action or a paffion, and as little to an external object. However difficult it may be in every particular instance to diftinguish a witty thought or expreffion from one that is not fo, yet in general it may be laid down, that the term wit is appropriated to such thoughts and expreffions as are ludicrous, and alfo occafion fome degree of surprise by their fingularity. Wit also in a figurative fenfe expresses that talent which some men have of inventing ludicrous thoughts or expressions. We fay commonly, a witty man, or a man of wit.

Wit in its proper sense, as fuggefted above, is diftinguishable into two kinds; wit in the thought, and wit in the words or expreffion. Again, wit in the thought is of

two

two kinds; ludicrous images, and ludicrous combinations of things that have little or no natural relation.

Ludicrous images that occasion surprise by their fingularity, as having little or no foundation in nature, are fabricated by the imagination. And the imagination is well qualified for the office; being of all our faculties the most active, and the least under restraint. Take the following example.

Shylock. You knew (none so well, none so well as you) of my daughter's flight.

Salino. That's certain; I, for my part, knew the tailor that made the wings she flew withal.

Merchant of Venice, act 3. Sc. I.

The image here is undoubtedly witty. It is ludicrous: and it must occafion surprise; for having no natural foundation, it is altogether unexpected.

The other branch of wit in the thought, is that only which is taken notice of by Addison, following Locke, who defines it "to " lie in the affemblage of ideas; and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any refem" blance

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