If so, why doesn't the AEC request such new authority?

Mr. RAMEY. Mr. Price, I think Mr. Kratzer could respond to this. It is my understanding that we do construe our authority to cover toll enriching for IAEA. Mr. KRATZER. Yes, sir. That is correct. We have no limitations such as exist in the EURATOM Cooperation Act in the form of the words "sale or lease" on our authority to distribute material to the IAEA.

There are no other groups of nations to which we distribute material other than EURATOM or the IAEA, so since we are already in good shape on the Agency and since we are requesting this authorization for EURATOM we feel that that will take care of the problem.

Representative PRICE. In other words, the reason you require the legislation now is the fact that you do have restrictions under the present EURATOM Act? Mr. KRATZER. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Representative PRICE. Is it necessary to amend section 124 of the Atomic Energy Act to make reference to section 161 v. of the act in light of the proposed amendments?

Mr. HENNESSEY. I don't think it is necessary, Mr. Price. Section 124 is a very broad authority for the President to enter into agreements for cooperation with groups of foreign nations.

It does not specify any of the details of such agreement. It does not include any restrictions upon the authority of the President to enter into these agreements. So, since the authority is so broad I think it would also encompass the authority to agree to toll enrich without further amendments.

TOLL ENRICHMENT UNDER AEC-EURATOM JOINT PROGRAM

Representative PRICE. Will AEC consider toll enrichment of uranium for use in EURATOM projects under the AEC-EURATOM joint program?

Mr. RAMEY. I would think, Mr. Price, if we are requested and we have the authority we would do so.

Representative PRICE. The AEC bill analysis states the additional agreement for cooperation with EUROTOM contains wording broad enough to permit toll enrichment of uranium to fuel reactors within its scope.

The joint program agreement for cooperation does not appear to be sufficiently broad to permit toll enrichment. Would you explain that more fully?

Mr. RAMEY. I believe Mr. Kratzer can respond to that one.

Mr. KRATZER. We have in the agreement for cooperation with EURATOM pretty much the problem we have in the legislation. We have the limitation, with respect to some of the material that we can distribute, that it must be provided either by sale or lease. The original joint program agreement with EURATOM does limit our authority to distribute that material by sale or lease. Now, the additional agreement for EURATOM refers to 30,000 kilograms of material which can be made available only on a sale or lease basis, but it goes on to say that we can make available, and there are no limiting words such as sale or lease, any additional amounts of material which are authorized and agreed upon.

The total amount authorized today by the Congress is 70,000 kilograms so that we do have under the additional agreement the authority to distribute 40,000 kilograms without any limitation on the nature of that transfer. It is that material which, with this change in legislation, we would be able to provide on a toll enrichment basis.

Representative PRICE. Mr. Morris, do you have any questions?
Representative MORRIS. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Representative PRICE. Mr. McCulloch.

Representative MCCULLOCH. No questions.

Representative PRICE. Does the staff have any questions?

SEGREGATION BY AEC LICENSES OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS

Mr. CONWAY. As a result of the proposed deletion of the Presidential determination set forth in section 41b., will the AEC rescind the requirement imposed on AEC licensees in the past that they segregate special nuclear material leased to them by AEC under section 53 of the act from other special nuclear material in their possession?

Mr. RAMEY. I think, Mr. Conway, that I would put it this way. Not necessarily. I think the purpose of the segregation of material is not related solely to the need for controlling this material from the standpoint of its use or getting it back for possible military purposes.

I gather that there are other purposes, including just plain accountability for requiring the segregation of lease material.

PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF ELIMINATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION

Mr. CONWAY. Will you summarize the practical effects that will flow from the elimination of the Presidential determination under section 41b.?

Mr. RAMEY. I think it eliminates, and perhaps Mr. Hennesey could go into this in greater detail, some of the paper work that we have gone through in submitting this through the Defense Department and up to the President and having the President make a formal determination of this amount.

This is fairly voluminous and somewhat time consuming and, as indicated in my testimony, the practical effect will be that in developing our budget projections, particularly our long-term budget projections and our annual 2and 3-year projections, this type of production will be reviewed but not in the sense of a formal determination.

Mr. CONWAY. During the recent hearings on the criteria for toll enrichment services quite a bit of discussion took place concerning the systems the Commission would use in the future to assure that the commitments do not extend beyond available reserves and production capabilities.

Do you anticipate any new type of system that will evolve within the Commission once you eliminate the Presidential requirement and Department of Defense review?

Mr. RAMEY. I think it will be somewhat different along the lines discussed in the toll enriching hearings in that we will want to keep track of total commitments for materials over the 30-year lifetime of a plant and to keep that type of projection geared to our estimates of inventory and estimates of

reserves.

Mr. CONWAY. Basically, you won't be doing anything different than you are doing today, I presume, as far as making projections in the future and what your known requirements will be, both military and domestic?

Mr. RAMEY. Certainly not on the military side. I think on the domestic side, because of this upsurge in power requirements, we are going to have to be a little more careful and a little more detailed on our projections on the civilian side.

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT REQUIREMENT CONCERNING FINDING OF "PRACTICAL VALUE"

Mr. CONWAY. There is one other point I wish to raise, Mr. Chairman, and that has to do with the finding of practical value. That has been a matter upon which the committee has been waiting for the Commission to make a determination and possibly including in an omnibus bill.

On January 20, 1966, Chairman Holifield wrote to Dr. Seaborg concerning the continued need for the formal administrative procedure for determining practical value of a particular facility or type of facility. Since then, the committee has urged AEC to expedite its response and late last night Dr. Seaborg responded to Chairman Holifield's letter.

Would you be in a position to summarize the Commission's position on that matter?

Mr. RAMEY. I believe Mr. Hennessey can do this, Mr. Conway. In brief, it is that we would be prepared during the recess to submit recommended legislation for the next session on the elimination of the practical value requirement.

We do believe that the original purpose of the practical value legislation, which was based on the scarcity of raw material, has somewhat changed and by reason of the circumstances and the change of context we think some of these requirements should be modified.

Mr. HENNESSEY. Mr. Holifield's first question presented to the Commission was whether there was a continued need for the requirement of a formal finding of practical value under section 102 of the act.

The Commission, in its response, takes the position that, first, the reason that Commissioner Ramey just alluded to, the abundance of material nowthat was one of the original reasons for maintaining this distinction-no longer has application.

The second principal reason was to maintain a degree of Congressional control through statutory limitations on the availability of materials for power reactors and to restrict the Commission's ability to provide financial assistance to the development of reactors.

Since that time there have been a couple of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act which first required congressional authorization of any agreement for cooperation and finally has required congressional authorization for the total AEC program.

We believe that this is at least an adequate substitute for the inflexible restrictions that are contained in the Act and that the elimination of the distinction between 103 and 104 licenses would make it no longer necessary to include any of these inflexible restrictions and leave to the Administration and to the Congress the decision on a year-to-year basis of what projects, what specific projects should be given assistance and what the specific assistance should be.

Mr. Holifield's further questions dealt with whether the distinction between these classes of licenses should be retained and what should be done about the peripheral effects of the elimination of distinction.

In our reply we say yes, if the finding of practical value is eliminated there is no longer need for distinction between 103 and 104 licenses.

On the specific collateral effects we discussed in our reply each of these effects. I won't go into them in detail. The principal ones, of course, are the providing of financial assistance to which I referred earlier.

In addition, one significant aspect of the elimination of the distinction would be the elimination of the requirement that the Justice Department review every application for a commercial license and provide AEC its views as to antitrust implications, this being a condition of the granting of a license by AEC.

We have obtained the views of the Justice Department and those are furnished with our reply to Mr. Holifield.

The Justice Department believes that the requirement for obtaining their views on antitrust implications can be eliminated as a condition of the granting of a construction permit. They do state that they should continue to be informed by the AEC of license applications and have an opportunity to study them and furnish AEC their views if they felt a statement of a position was called for but not as a condition for the granting of a license.

There will, of course, be a number of amendments to be made in many provisions of the act. Our letter to Mr. Holifield states, as Mr. Ramey said earlier, that we are giving consideration at the present time to proposing legislation on this subject and we would present more definitive views as to what amendments should be made at the time legislation is presentd.

Representative PRICE. Thank you. Now we will proceed to the second part of our hearings this morning and we will receive testimony on the proposed legislation relating to recordkeeping for radiation workers.

APPENDIX 8

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON ROLE OF UNITED STATES IN CREATION OF EURATOM

[Prepared by Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, Sept. 7, 1967]

PART I. ITEMS FROM PERIODICAL LITERATURE INDICATING THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO EURATOM

Baehr, Paul. European and international collaboration in the area of nuclear research. Neue Tech. 5:212-16, 1965 (In German). [Bilateral and multilateral agreements for nuclear research and briefly indicated with emphasis on the the development of Euratom and Foratom.]

Chatenet, Pierre. Why Euratom? NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1962, pp. 66-8. Gueron, J. The lessons to be learned from Euratom. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 23:38-41, March, 1967. [Discusses agreements between Euratom and the United States and, to a lesser degree, with the United Kingdom.] Nieburg, H.L. Euratom: a study in coalition politics. World Politics. July 1963, pp. 597-622.

Polach, Jaroslav G. Euratom: its background, issues and economic implications; preface by Sam H. Schurr. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. Oceana Publications Inc., 232 p. bibl.

re

Research carried out under Euratom/United States agreement. Brussels, European Atomic Energy Community, 1964. EUR 1840.e. [Four monographs viewing the results of the joint research and development program in selected areas.] Scheinman, Lawrence. Euratom: nuclear integration in Europe. New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967. 66 p. (International Conciliation, no. 563, May 1967.)

Spaak, F. The politics of nuclear fuel supply in the community. Neue Tech. 5:217– 23, 1965 (In German). [The present and future situation with respect to the market for nuclear fuels in the European Atomic Energy Community and in the free world is discussed, with respect to natural uranium, enriched uranium and plutonium.]

Yondorf, Walter. Monnet and the action committee: the formative period of the European communities (including the European Atomic Energy Community) International Organization 19:885-912, Autumn, 1965.

U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

AEC authorizing legislation, fiscal year 1966. Hearings before the
Cong., 1st sess. 1965, Part 2.

Testimony on Euratom, pp. 822-832.

Justification, pp. 1076-1079.

** 89th

AEC authorizing legislation, fiscal year 1967. Hearing before the *** 89th Cong., 2d sess. 1966, Part 1.

Euratom program, pp. 151-2.

Budget justification data, pp. 388-389.

AEC authorizing legislation, fiscal year 1968. Hearings before the *** 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, Part 2.

Euratom program, pp. 9808-9.

Budget justification data, pp. 1115-1116.

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

Major activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January-December 1965. Washignton. D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. p. 255.

Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January-December 1965. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967. pp. 174–5, 261-2, and 266.

PART II. CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING OF NEWS ITEMS INDICATING ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO EURATOM, JANUARY 1966 TO SEPTEMBER 1967

May 1966. Euratom asks AEC to provide for big plutonium sales. Nuclear Industry, p. 15.

May 8, 1966. Euratom seeking record purchases of U.S. plutonium. John W. Finney, New York Times.

May 9, 1966. Remarks on the AEC's joint research and development program with Euratom. Senator Clinton Anderson, Congressional Record, pp. 9544-6, Daily Edition.

May 9, 1966. AEC and U.S. State Department weigh Euratom bid for 1000 kg of Plutonium. New York Times.

May 22, 1966. Euratom Commission president Chatenet says organization has not made formal offer to buy 1000 kg of Plutonium from the U.S.; says purchase may be made if U.S. changes law limiting sales to any one buyer. New York Times.

July 13, 1966. Mr. Holifield introduces H.R. 16211 to permit, among other things, Euratom to contract with the AEC for enrichment services. Congressional Record, July 13, 1966, p. 14823, Daily Edition.

July 15, 1966. Senator Pastore introduces S. 3617 to permit, among other things, Euratom to contract with the AEC for enrichment services. Congressional Record, July 15, 1966, p. 15086, Daily Edition.

July 15, 1966. Amendment of Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and Euratom Cooperation Act of 1953. Remarks of Senator Pastore. Congressional Record, July 15, 1966, p. 15087, Daily Edition.

August 30, 1966. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy holds hearings on S. 3617 and H.R. 16211, Congressional Record, August 30, 1966, p. D827.

September 1966. Euratom plutonium export proposal before Congress. Nuclear Industry, September 1966, pp. 31-33.

September 6, 1966. The Chairman of the AEC transmits a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Euratom Cooperation Act of 1958, as amended, to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Congressional Record, September 6, 1966, p. 20880 and September 8, 1966, p. 21198, Daily Edition.

September 7, 1966. Senator Pastore introduces S. 3808 to permit the sale or lease of 1500 kilograms of plutonium under the Euratom Cooperation Act of 1953, Congressional Record, September 7, 1966, p. 20974, Daily Edition.

September 7, 1966. Mr. Holifield introduces H.R. 17557 for the same purpose, Congressional Record, September 7, 1966, p. 21103. Daily Edition.

September 7, 1966. Euratom seeking U.S. Plutonium. New York Times. September 7, 1966.

September 7, 1966. Administration asks Congress to approve record 2,200 lb., $43 million sale of plutonium to Euratom. New York Times. September 7, 1966. October 1966. Clear sailing next year for plutonium export bill? Nuclear Industry, October 1966, pp. 23-4.

November 13, 1966. U.S. and Euratom to exchange data. Edward Cowen, New York Times, November 13, 1966.

November 13, 1966. U.S. and Euratom complete drafting of pact for exchange of data on Orgel reactor. AEC says it would expect Euratom to buy 40 tons of heavy water it leases for Ispra research station if pact not reached by February. New York Times, November 13, 1966.

December 1966. Euratom foresees solution to Pu financing problem. Nuclear Industry, December 1966, pp. 20-2.

January 15, 1967. Euratom in financial crisis, French refuse to pay $2.8 million share of cost of plutonium bought from U.S. Euratom planned to lease plutonium but U.S., after Euratom budget was approved, said it would only sell the plutonium. New York Times. January 15, 1967.

March 2, 1967. U.S. atomic delay vexes Europeans. New York Times. March 2, 1967. March 5, 1967. U.S. may cut off plutonium to Euratom. Washington Post. March 5, 1967.

March 7, 1967. U.S. nuclear delay termed technical. New York Times. March 7, 1967.

March 9, 1967. Remarks of Senator Pastore dealing with Euratom member attitude towards the nonproliferation treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Congressional Record, March 9, 1967, pp. S3452-3455. Daily Edition.