21. How does the Commission assure that radioactive materials resulting from underground nuclear explosions will not contaminate underground streams near the explosion site? Groundwater hydrology is studied as a part of the overall safety evaluation made on every proposed Plowshare project (see Question 18). A nuclear explosion is not approved unless it can be shown that underground water supplies can be adequately protected.' 22. How many underground nuclear tests has the AEC conducted? Indicate how many of these were weapons tests, and how many were Plowshare tests. Where have they been conducted? As of August 12, 1968, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had announced 254 underground nuclear test detonations; of the nuclear detonations to this date, 21 have been Plowshare experiments and five have been part of the seismic detection (Vela) program. Nearly all of the underground nuclear detonations have taken place at the AEC's Nevada Test Site (NTS). One weapons-related test has been conducted in central Nevada and four Vela tests have been conducted off the NTS-one near Fallon, Nevada; two near Hattiesburg, Mississippi; and one at Amchitka Island, Alaska. Two Plowshare experiments have taken place off the NTS-one near Carlsbad, New Mexico; the other near Farmington, New Mexico. 23. Can a nuclear excavation project, such as the proposed transisthmian canal, be conducted within the terms of the present limited nuclear test ban treaty? If not, how should the treaty be amended to permit such projects to go forward when they are once determined to be feasible and worthwhile? We believe that certain large excavation projects could not be conducted within the restrictions of the limited test ban treaty. As the excavation technology develops, some sort of modification or amendment to the treaty will be necessary to permit the carrying out of such projects. However, at the present time it appears that an amendment to the limited test ban treaty would be required to carry out the transisthmian canal project. The specific action sought will depend on the circumstances at that time. Mr. ROBERT E. HOLLINGSWORTH, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, General Manager, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, DEAR MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Thank you for the Commission responses of August 30, 1968, to the Committee questions on H.R. 18448 and S. 3783 concerning commercial Plowshare services. However, because several of the answers submitted do not provide the information necessary to complete the record on this important legislative matter, the Committee would appreciate additional information in the following areas: Question 11. Additional information on exlporatory studies on the use of reactor grade plutonium is desired. What are the technical problems associated with the use of this material? If it could be successfully adapted, what effect could it have on ultimate costs of the devices? What is the estimated availability of plutonium for Plowshare uses in the light of the fast breeder reactor program? Are further studies underway? Questions 12 and 14. The need for a higher yield developmental cratering shot appears to be closely related to the validity of the Canal Study Commission report. While the Committee is appreciative of present budgetary constraints, what is desired is a thorough and objective discussion of the significance of such a shot as part of the basis for assessing the true potential of nuclear means of canal excavation. In the past Senator Pastore has written to both the AEC and the Canal Study Commission with regard to the status of plans. Perhaps an appropriate way of updating status would be the AEC to provide pertinent exchanges of correspondence with the Canal Study Commission, to supplement the discussion requested above. 1 See p. 439 for additional comment. Question No. 21. In asking how the Commission assures avoiding contamination of underground streams, the Committee desired a brief summary of techniques employed in studying ground water hydrology, with some indication of the overall reliability of those techniques. Your assistance in providing the information requested not later than September 12, 1968 would be appreciated. Sincerely yours, JOHN T. CONWAY, U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY, Executive Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, DEAR MR. CONWAY: Enclosed are answers to the questions posed in your letter of September 5, 1968 concerning three topics related to the Committee's hearing on H.R. 18448 and S. 3783. The first topic, question number 11, has been discussed only in general terms as we and our laboratories are currently investigating this question further. We will keep you informed of our findings. Sincerely, R. E. HOLLINGSWORTH, Question 11: Additional information on exploratory studies on the use of reactor grade plutonium is desired. What are the technical problems associated with the use of this material? If it could be successfully adapted, what effect could it have on ultimate costs of the devices? What is the estimated availability of plutonium for Plowshare uses in light of the fast breeder reactor program? Are further studies under way? Among the technical problems associated with the use of reactor grade plutonium in nuclear explosives are that the isotopic composition of the material varies and that the material is highly radioactive. We are interested in determining if these and any other problems would prevent the use of such plutonium in Plowshare explosives and, if that is the case, what would be involved in upgrading the material to where the problems are surmounted. A study of this matter is currently under way. If our investigations are favorable regarding the suitability of reactor grade plutonium, or an upgraded form of this material, for any of the types of nuclear explosives contemplated for Plowshare uses, we will pursue the economic considerations. We would plan to study the possible demand for such explosives, the availability of plutonium from the civilian reactor program, and the related costs. Questions 12 and 14: The need for a higher yield developmental cratering shot appears to be closely related to the validity of the Canal Study Commission report. While the Committee is appreciative of present budgetary constraints, what is desired is a thorough and objective discussion of the significance of such a shot as part of the basis for assessing the true potential of nuclear means of canal excavation. In the past Senator Pastore has written to both the AEC and the Canal Study Commission with regard to the status of plans. Perhaps an appropriate way of updating status would be for the AEC to provide pertinent exchanges of correspondence with the Canal Study Commission, to supplement the discussion requested above. Extension of nuclear technology to higher yields (on the order of one megaton) is particularly important to the deliberations of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission since construction of a sea-level transisthmian canal by nuclear means would require yields ranging to a few megatons. AEC's experience to date is not sufficient to answer the technical questions associated with such high yields. Sedan, the largest Plowshare cratering experiment to date, involved a 100 kiloton explosion, one tenth of a megaton. However, Sedan was conducted in desert alluvium. The largest Plowshare cratering explosion in hard rock has been Cabriolet at 2.5 kilotons, one four-hundredth of a megaton. To make confident predictions regarding nuclear excavation for a transisthmian canal, we need to establish the scaling relationships in hard rock between our past cratering work and the high yields at which we would be working, during canal excavation. We must determine whether the scaling of craters change as the explosive force increases and, similarly, for ground and acoustic shock transmissions. As the next step in answering these questions, the AEC is planning to conduct Project Schooner, a forty kiloton cratering explosion in hard rock, at the Nevada Test Site in FY 1969. Beyond FY 1969, the AEC would like to conduct a cratering explosion in hard rock, with a yield of a few hundred kilotons. This would be an intermediate step toward a third experiment with a yield of about one megaton, again in hard rock. The enclosed exchange of correspondence between the AEC and the AtlanticPacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, dated August 23 and August 30, 1968 describes how these three experiments would fit into a revised experimental cratering program. This program has not yet been reviewed in relation to the President's budget, and thus must be considered tentative. Question 21: In asking how the Commission assures avoiding contamination of underground streams, the Committee desired a brief summary of techniques employed in studying ground water hydrology, with some indication of the overall reliability of those techniques. The possibility of ground water contamination as a result of underground nuclear detonation is a subject that is given thorough and careful consideration in planning all underground nuclear tests. Detailed studies are made of the geology and hydrology of all sites for proposed experiments to determine the location of water-bearing formations, the amount of water they contain, the rate and direction of water movement in the formations, and the ability of the formations to absorb or otherwise immobilize hazardous radionuclides. The information, together with a knowledge of ground water use in the area, permits us to design and conduct an experiment that is safe. The principal techniques employed in studying ground water hydrology include geologic mapping, test drilling, borehole geophysical logging, pumping tests and mapping the configuration of the water table. Geologic mapping provides a generalized three dimensional picture of the geologic framework of the area of interest, including the location of the water-bearing formations. Test drilling further refines the picture provided by the geologic map by defining more precisely the location and characteristics of the water-bearing formations. Frequently cores of the formations of interest are obtained for laboratory determination of porosity, permeability, mineralogical composition, distribution coefficients and other significant properties that affect the movement of water and radionuclides through the rocks. Borehole geophysical logs of various kinds provide additional information on the nature of the rocks penetrated by the well bore. Pumping tests of wells provide the best information on the ability of the waterbearing rocks to store and transmit water. From such tests, values for the coefficients of transmissibility and storage can be computed. These factors control in part the rate of ground water movement. Finally, information on the configuration of the water table must be obtained. This is done by measuring the depth to the water table in wells penetrating the water-bearing formations of interest. The direction of ground water movement is controlled by the slope of the water table, moving from points of higher to lower pressure. From analysis of the information collected, predictions can be made as to the rate and direction of ground water movement and of radionuclides that the water may contain. These predictions are sufficiently precise for the Commission to determine with confidence whether an experiment can be done safely, and what specific conditions are required to assure this safety. ATLANTIC-PACIFIC INTEROCEANIC CANAL STUDY COMMISSION, Hon. GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C., August 23, 1968. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At our August 16 Commission meeting we carefully reviewed the progress of our investigation to date and came to the conclusion that we should again ask the Atomic Energy Commission to press for timely execution of the remaining experiments needed to determine the technical feasibility of nuclear canal excavation. We have twice asked the Congress for extension of our study time, and our final reporting date is now December 1, 1970. The additional study time was granted by the Congress with the understanding that it should be adequate to permit the completion of the AEC's supporting nuclear excavation experiments. We will be extremely reluctant to request additional time, and it is our present intention to render a report on the prescribed date with or without a final determination of the feasibility of nuclear excavation. The coming need for additional canal capacity and the necessity for the United States to make adjustments in its existing treaty relations with Panama will not permit indefinite postponement of decision on future canal policy. During the August 16 meeting we were pleased to have Mr. John S. Kelly meet with us and describe the status and plans for the PLOWSHARE nuclear excavation program. He summarized the planned nuclear cratering experimental program as follows: FISCAL YEAR 1969 Schooner a 40 kiloton point charge cratering experiment in hard rock. FISCAL YEAR 1970 Yaul--a several-100 kiloton yield point charge cratering experiment in hard rock. Galley a row charge experiment in varying terrain involving simultaneous detonation of about 7 nuclear explosives each in the yield range of a few kilotons to a few hundreds of kilotons. Gondola--a cratering experiment planned to be conducted in a wet, weak, clay shale whose design will depend on the characteristics of the site to be selected. FISCAL YEAR 1971 Phaeton-a one megaton point charge cratering experiment in hard rock. Mr. Kelly advised us that this program will be difficult to carry out because of the additional workload, the tight schedule, and the problems of obtaining the necessary support and approvals. We recognize that this represents a large increase in effort and costs in Fiscal Year 1970 and appreciate the problems such increases pose. However, our Engineering Commissioners and the Engineering Agent, after reviewing the program described by Mr. Kelly, believe it to be the minimum on which we can make specific recommendations concerning the use of nuclear explosives to excavate a sea-level canal. We fully recognize and appreciate the efforts you have made and continue to make to carry out nuclear cratering experiments in support of our investigation. We are aware of the many obstacles to the timely execution of the additional experiments as described above. Nevertheless, we urge you to seek whatever funds are required and early approvals for the above cratering experiments. If there is any way in which we can assist, please let us know. Respectfully yours, ROBERT B. ANDERSON, Chairman. Hon. ROBERT B. ANDERSON, U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, Chairman, Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission, DEAR MR. ANDERSON: Thank you for your letter of August 23, 1968. My fellow Commissioners and I appreciate having the Canal Study Commission's up-todate views on the need for data from our nuclear excavation experiments for your use in considering the technical feasibility of nuclear excavation of a sea-level canal. We are also familiar with the assurances provided to and views of Congress in connection with the extension of time for your study. We are very conscious of the problems created for the Canal Study Commission by our previous inability to obtain requisite approval for our nuclear cratering experiments. Now that this problem seems to have been alleviated for appropriately designed experiments, you may be assured that we will do everything possible to carry out the additional required experiments. As you mentioned, we will shortly be considering certain of the required additional experiments in connection with our Fiscal Year 1970 budget. In this connection, also, it is our intention to do everything possible, within the esources made available to us, to carry out the program outlined to you by 'Ar. Kelly. Sincerely, GLENN T. SEABORG, Chairman. APPENDIX 22-CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JOINT COMMITTEE AND ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, Executive Director, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, DEAR JOHN: With respect to your letter of July 23, 1968 requesting any additional detailed comments on H.R. 18448, S. 3783, and H.R. 18701, I would like to make the following remarks on behalf of the Department of State and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. As my testimony pointed out, I am concerned that it be clear that the legislation would permit us to agree with the International Atomic Energy Agency to provide peaceful nuclear explosion services. I understand that the AEC has submitted an amendment to Section 124 of the Act which will reference Subsection 161w to accomplish this purpose. I hope that the Committee report would emphasize that the inclusion of amendments to Sections 123 and 124, as well as the addition of Subsection 161w, provide the AEC with the authority to cooperate with the IAEA or any other appropriate group of nations with which there is in force the international arrangement required by Section 124, in the provision of services pursuant to an agreement for cooperation concluded in accordance with Section 123. Yours sincerely, ADRIAN S. FISHER, Acting Director. Mr. ADRIAN S. FISHER, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, DEAR MR. FISHER: The Joint Committee would appreciate receiving any detailed comments on H.R. 18448, S. 3783, and H.R. 18701 in addition to those which you expressed on behalf of the Department of State and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency during your appearance before the Committee on July 19, 1968. Time permitting, the Committee anticipates acting on this or similar legislation during this session of Congress. Therefore, the Committee would appreciate receiving any additional comments which you may have on this proposed legislation not later than August 26, 1968. Please furnish five copies of your reply. Sincerely yours, JOHN T. CONWAY, |