domestically, and to other States or international organizations in accordance with our international undertakings.

My remarks this morning will concentrate on the international aspects of the bills, and particularly their relationship to our undertakings under article V of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was signed by the United States on July 1 of this year and is now before a committee of the Senate for the purpose of ratification.

The purpose of that treaty is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It recognizes that nuclear explosive devices intended for peaceful purposes can be used or adapted for use as weapons and therefore must not be transferred.

H.R. 18448 and S. 3783 are consistent with this position and with articles 91 and 92 of the Atomic Energy Act in providing that the custody and control of the devices used must remain with the Commission.

I assume that when these explosions are carried out domestically, custody and control will likewise remain with the Commission.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Mr. Fisher, you have no doubt that the Atomic Energy Act would maintain all rights to custody and control within the domestic sphere, do you?

Mr. FISHER. I have no doubt, myself, sir, but the shoemaker is sticking to his last. That is not my area of primary competence.

I do not intend to express any doubt, Mr. Chairman. I was simply noting that these bills deal explicitly with the question of custody and control only where the service is in territory under the jurisdiction or control of another nation.

ARTICLE V

Article V of the Nonproliferation Treaty now before the Senate provides as follows:

Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclearweapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.

A key provision, which is reflected in the proposed legislation, is that the potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon parties on a nondiscriminatory basis and that the charge to such parties for the

1 For full text of treaty, see app. 1, p. 35.

explosive devices used will be as low as possible and will exclude any charge for research and development.

I assume that the proviso following the second sentence of section 3 of the bills we are discussing this morning is intended to refer to article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

FIVE PRINCIPLES

An integral part of the legislative history of article V is the statement of five principles enunciated by the U.S. representative to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on March 21, 1967.

request that these principles be inserted in the record at this point. Representative HOLIFIELD. Without objection, they will be inserted. (The document referred to follows:)

PRINCIPLES RELATING TO NUCLEAR EXPLOSION SERVICES SUGGESTED BY U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO ENDC, MARCH 21, 1967

First, if and when peaceful applications of nuclear explosives which are permissible under the test-ban treaty prove technically and economically feasible, nuclear-weapon-states should make available to other states nuclear explosive services for peaceful applications. Such a service would consist of performing the desired nuclear detonation under appropriate international observation with the nuclear device remaining under the custody and control of the state which performed the service.

Second, there should be a means provided for non-nuclear-weapon states wishing to do so to request nuclear explosive services from the nuclear-weapon states through an international body in which the non-nuclear-weapon states would participate. The purpose of these arrangements would be to make clear that, once the participating nuclear powers are prepared to undertake practical applications of peaceful nuclear explosives, they will not withhold nuclear detonation services to others because of extraneous considerations.

Third, costs to non-nuclear-weapon states for peaceful-purpose detonations by nuclear states would be kept as low as possible. They should not, for example, include the costs of research and development.

Fourth, there should be full consultation among nuclear and non-nuclear parties to the limited test-ban treaty about any amendment of that treaty required in order to carry out feasible projects.

And fifth, the conditions and procedures for international collaboration in accomplishing peaceful nuclear explosive projects would be developed in full consultation with the non-nuclear-weapon states.

Mr. FISHER. Among other things, they make clear that the provision of these services will not be withheld for extraneous reasons.

Article V also provides that, as soon as possible after the treaty enters into force, negotiations are to commence on a special international agreement or agreements under which nonnuclear weapon states party to the treaty will be able to obtain the potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of nonnuclear weapon states.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

As the President put it in his message to the opening session of the ENDC on July 16:

In the view of the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the "appropriate international body" through which the non-nuclear-weapon Parties to the Treaty may obtain these benefits under Article V of the Treaty if they choose to do so. We also believe that the IAEA is the appropriate forum for development of procedures and agreements relating to the furnishing of the peaceful nuclear explosive services obtained through the IAEA.

In this connection I assume that it will be made absolutely clear that this legislation will permit us to enter into an agreement with the IAEA that will meet the requirements of article V.

If I may digress from my statement, Mr. Chairman, it has been a long time since I have been intimately familiar with the details of the Atomic Energy Act and it has been substantially amended since that time.

So I am not in a position to say whether or not what I have said here that it makes an agreement with IAEA possible, is accurate or not. I would prefer others to testify on this subject. I would merely urge that if it does not that it be worked out so that we can enter into an agreement with the IAEA to provide these services to parties who request such a service through the international body, thereby living up to the commitment in article V of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

Some other features of article V were dealt with in Chairman Seaborg's excellent statement last Friday before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

I request that the pertinent portion of that statement be inserted in the record at this point.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Without objection, it will be accepted. (The document referred to follows:)

EXCERPTS FROM STATEMENT MADE BY CHAIRMAN GLENN T. SEABORG BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON JULY 12, 1968, WITH RESPECT TO THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

In conclusion, I would like to comment on Article V of the Treaty. This Article specifically commits us to take appropriate measures to make available the benefits which can be obtained from peaceful nuclear explosions. This resulted from the recognition, when the Treaty was formulated, that nuclear explosive devices intended for use for peaceful purposes could be used as or could be readily adapted for use as weapons. Hence, to avoid a loophole, Articles I and II were written to preclude the non-nuclear weapons parties from manufacturing or acquiring nuclear explosive devices even for peaceful purposes. At the same time, and within this limitation, it was recognized as essential to provide the non-nuclear parties with the firmest possible assurances that they will be able to derive the full potential benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions.

Article V, consequently, stipulates that all parties to the Treaty will undertake to take appropriate measures to insure that the potential benefits of such peaceful applications will be made available to non-nuclear weapons parties on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible and will exclude any charge for research and development. These services are to be provided either through an international body (which, I believe, should be the IAEA) or bilaterally. In each case, an opportunity shall be provided for appropriate international observation of the actual detonation.

The seriousness with which the United States views its prospective obligations under this section of the proposed Treaty was emphasized by President Johnson who said, before the United Nations General Assembly, ". . . we shall continue our research and development into the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and we shall make available to the non-nuclear treaty partners without delay and under the treaty's provisions the benefits of such explosions." The importance of this obligation is underscored by the fact that the United States has full intentions to be one of the principal suppliers of such explosion services. We plan to demonstrate these intentions by a series of steps.

We will continue to conduct, within the limitations of available funds, an active program to develop nuclear explosive devices particularly suited for peaceful applications and to develop the technology for using nuclear explosions in a variety of peaceful applications. Let me emphasize that the technology of us

ing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still in a relatively early stage of development. Considerable effort is still required to apply our basic knowledge to specific commercial applications and we have much to learn about the industrialization of operations and the design of supporting equipment. Our domestic research and development program is addressing all of these facets, but it will be several years before optimum nuclear explosive designs and the technology for all applications of nuclear explosions will be developed to the stage of commercial use. However, beginning in the near future, we hope some applications will become economically attractive and will be exploited even as the technology continues to develop.

As our research and development efforts proceed, we will continue to make freely available the information and data obtained, except information relating to the design or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices. Furthermore, we will be prepared to make arrangements whereby we will make available technical advice and assistance, within our capability, to those non-nuclear weapon parties to the Treaty which seek assistance in studying specific peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. The knowledge we would gain from assisting in such studies should also permit us to take into account, in our research and development program, various applications in which other countries are interested. We would not rule out the possibility, for which we already have the basic legislative authority, of conducting, within our research and development program, cooperative experiments abroad, under arrangements similar to those for cooperative experiments with U.S. industry.

When particular applications are found to be feasible, we plan to make a nuclear explosion service available on a commercial basis to domestic users and to non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT. Such a service would include the fabrication of the nuclear explosive device, its transportation from the assembly plant to the project site, its emplacement at the prepared site, and its arming and firing. The service would also include appropriate technical reviews of the proposed detonation, such as those relating to health and safety. The users of the service, whether it is furnished domestically or pursuant to Article V, will pay for the service in accordance with rates established for its various elements. As I have already noted, the charges for the nuclear explosive devices used in furnishing the service will not include the cost of their research and development. Arrangements for ensuring that the nuclear explosive devices used in furnishing such a service to non-nuclear weapon parties to the NPT, remain at all times under the custody and control of the U.S. Government, are necessary in order to be consistent with Articles I and II of the Treaty. Furthermore, the objectives of the Treaty could not permit any observation contemplated by the Treaty to include access by the observers to the design or internal operation of nuclear explosive devices. Consequently, there will be no transfer of nuclear explosive devices or control over them; nor will the service, in any way, assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear explosive devices.

It has been made clear, in the principles relating to Article V which Mr. Foster has placed in the record of these hearings, that Article V of this Treaty is not intended to modify the provisions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Therefore, in providing a nuclear explosion service pursuant to Article V, the U.S. will be obligated to observe the requirements of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Meeting those requirements will not be difficult in our research and development of nuclear explosive devices for all peaceful applications or in the development of the technology for application to underground engineering projects. There will be some nuclear excavation projects, however, such as a trans-isthmian canal for which the development of the technology could not be completely carried out or which could not be executed within the present restrictions of the Limited Test Ban Treaty as presently interpreted; modification of that Treaty would be required to permit the U.S. to provide the nuclear explosion service for those projects.

I am confident that the technology of using nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will produce enormous civil dividends not only for ourselves, but also for the non-nuclear weapon countries with whom we will cooperate, pursuant to the Treaty. Moreover, I think the Treaty should facilitate such cooperation to a greater extent than was previously possible.

Mr. FISHER. I call your attention particularly to his comments about the treaty's provision on "appropriate international observation."

In this conection, I also request that there be inserted in the record of these hearings six questions that the staff of this committee has posed with regard to such international observation, and the answers that were submitted by the AEC for the record of the Nonproliferation Treaty hearings.

Representative HOLIFIELD. Without objection, that may be done. (The questions and answers referred to follow :)

JCAE QUESTIONS AND AEC ANSWERS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION Question 1. Would international observers be given access to sensitive information on the nuclear explosive devices used in an international Plowshare project? Answer. No. The peaceful nuclear weapon explosion services contemplated under Article V must be carried out within the provisions of Articles I and II, which prohibit nuclear-weapons Parties from transferring, and non-nuclearweapon Parties from receiving, either nuclear explosive devices, as such, or assistance in manufacturing or acquiring them.

Accordingly, neither nuclear explosive devices nor information which would constitute assistance in their manufacture could be made available to the international observers contemplated under Article V. Furthermore, the U.S. has made it clear that the nuclear explosive devices used in providing the nuclear explosion service, pursuant to Article V, would be required to remain, at all times, under the custody and control of the nuclear-weapon state performing the service. This, of course, is consistent with the existing requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

Question 2. Am I correct then in assuming that the functions of the observers are to assure that a nuclear detonation was conducted and to report on the conditions and purpose of the detonation?

Question 3. Is it fair to say, then, that such observers would serve a function similar to that of the observers at our first Plowshare experiment, Project Gnome, in 1960, and at our recent experiment, Project Gasbuggy?

Answer. In answer to the related questions 2 and 3, we envision that, prior to each nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes carried out by the US in the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon state pursuant to Article V, a reasonable opportunity will be provided for international observation. The principal purpose of such an invitation would appear to be to provide assurance to other Parties to the Treaty, that the nuclear explosive devices used by the US, in furnishing the nuclear explosion service, remained under the custody and control of the US at all times and that the nuclear explosions carried out in the course of furnishing the service were not being used for other then declared purposes.

It will be necessary to work out arrangements for providing an opportunity for such observation and, at the same time, assuring that information inconsistent with US law and Articles I and II of the Treaty, concerning the design and manufacture of the nuclear explosive devices used, is not made available to the observers.

It would appear to us that the IAEA would be the appropriate international organization to be invited to carry out international observation, pursuant to Article V. It is therefore likely that international observation arrangements will be worked out ultimately with the IAEA and the government in whose territory the explosion will be carried out.

We do not expect that these arrangements would interfere with any independent plans by the host government to invite visitors from other countries to witness the nuclear explosion or other aspects of a project.

Question 4. In other words, am I correct in stating that observers at peaceful nuclear experiments will be permitted, but not required? In other words, we would not have to hold up a peaceful nuclear explosion service just because some recalcitrant foreign country or organization was opposed to the project and refused to attend?

Answer. Article V of the Treaty would certainly require that a reasonable opportunity be offered for international observation of explosions conducted pursuant to that Article. In all probability, the IAEA will be the organization or at least one of the organizations invited to observe peaceful nuclear explosions conducted pursuant to Article V. If the invitation is extended in good faith and allows reasonable notice to permit the international observation, then we believe the obligation under this provision would be discharged, even if the IAEA or