commit all of our capacity so this gives them a 30-year period in which they could expect a good faith commitment on our part to provide 500 kilograms.

CONTINUATION OF COMMITMENT IN CASE OF UNLIKELY EVENTS

Representative HOSMER. Let us take one very extreme and improbable situation. Let's suppose, hypothetically, that Mr. Castro should go down and take over Colombia and then that Mr. Mao Tsetung would make an arrangement whereby Australia became an appendage of the Chinese Empire, these commitments do not hold in those unlikely events, do they?

Dr. NABRIT. Even though Australia does not know at the present governments of these countries. When the legal government has been replaced by another through circumstances of war, we would have no commitment to the new regime.

Representative HOSMER. Do the other parties?

Dr. NABRIT. Under these circumstances there would be no expectancy and I am certain we would not even attempt to continue this commitment in force under the conditions that you have suggested.

Representative HOSMER. You do not hear anybody criticizing that kind of activity of the United States under such an extreme contingency, do you?

Dr. NABRIT. No, sir.

Representative HOSMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Representative YOUNG. The next question I have is in two parts.

PROVISION OF NATURAL URANIUM BY THE COMMISSION AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE SALE OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

First, does subparagraph (1) of the amended article VII on toll enrichment, which requires the Commission to provide natural uranium whenever it is not reasonably available to Australia, conflict with subparagraph (2), which gives the Commission exclusive authority to determine when a transaction will be on a sale basis rather than on a toll basis?

Secondly, what does "not reasonably available" mean?

Dr. NABRIT. We do not view this as a question of conflict. Actually, as it now stands, our policy would treat Australia as we do our domestic customers.

We would prefer to provide toll enrichment but in the event the conditions in a competitive market made it impossible for them to acquire uranium, then, if we had adequate uranium available, we would provide them with the uranium and do it from our sources. This is what we mean by "reasonably available." There would not be a single source from which they could acquire their uranium which could in turn move the price up to the point where it would not be reasonable. So they would not want to then purchase it and send it to us to enrich for them. Fortunately, in the case of Australia, this would not seem to be the question, because they have a stockpile of over 2,000 tons of uranium ore at the present time and they do have an indigenous source of the ore.

SALE OF NATURAL URANIUM

Representative YOUNG. Thank you. Dr. Nabrit.

If natural uranium were sold to Australia under article VII A (1), at what price would such uranium be sold, and could it be at a price less than $8 per pound, U,O, through June 30, 1973?

Dr. NABRIT. Under our announced policy, we could not sell it for less than $8 a pound prior to that date.

Representative YOUNG. Do you have any further questions?

PLOWSHARE TECHNOLOGY

Representative HOSMER. Dr. Nabrit, in his instructions to the U.S. delegation at the reconvened 18-nation disarmament conference, the President made reference to Plowshare activity and the willingness of the United States to cooperate with other nations in that connection.

Could you spell this out for us what the intentions of the President are?

Dr. NABRIT. I don't want to speak for the President, but I would say that, so far as the AEC is concerned, what we have had in mind when we talked about Plowshare availability was that it would be unnecessary for any country to always have a capability in the development of atomic explosives in order to employ these simply for the purpose of enlarging a harbor, or fracturing for gas or oil or of digging a canal. We would be willing to use our technical skill and provide them with the explosives and would carry out this type of peaceful construction work without having them violate any of the safeguards commitments that now exist or by developing an independent capacity in the development of nuclear explosives. This is, in general, I believe, what the President had in mind.

Representative HOSMER. Your answer was as to some rather primitive techniques of excavation and so forth. Let's assume that the U.S. technology proceeds and more sophisticated types of activities are found to be within Plowshare technology; for instance, Gasbuggies and so forth.

Would you limit cooperation with other countries to merely the existing technology or would the cooperation be as to whatever advanced technology we might have, too?

Dr. NABRIT. The suggestion is that, as long as it is primarily a peaceful application, then, if we master the technology, we would be willing to share this know-how with other nations.

In other words, we are so much interested in safeguards that we would bend over backward to make it unnecessary for them to develop an independent capability in this connection.

EFFECT OF TEST BAN TREATY ON PLOWSHARE PROGRAM

Representative HOSMER. Dr. Nabrit, the Limited Test Ban Treaty has a prohibition against the radioactive effects of peaceful nuclear explosions, apparently as we interpret it, from going 3 miles beyond the border of a country.

Would it be possible, under that interpretation, for us to make an arrangement with another country, take a device to that country, ex

plode it on the territory-or would we be prohibited because it is not within 3 miles of our border?

Mr. KRATZER. Our studies indicate that most of the interesting nuclear excavations shots that have been considered thus far cannot be undertaken without some modification in the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

In other words, they are of such a nature that, given current technology, they fall so close to national boundaries that that limitation implied by the current treaty could not be met.

We do believe a certain amount of development can take place within the current treaty language, but any large-scale application of the sort that has been suggested so far would require modification. Representative HOSMER. I am not asking you about a U.S. device going off in country X under an arrangement with that country and causing some radioactivity to reach country Y; I am talking about, first, whether or not the treaty prohibits us from making an arrangement, firing the device in country X to begin with, since it is not our sovereign territory.

What is the situation there?

Mr. KRATZER. That is a good question. I think it should be referred to the legal people of the State Department and our own legal staff. I am not familiar enough with the treaty language to want to try an interpretation of it.

(Subsequently the following correspondence was received on this question :)

Hon. CRAIG HOSMER,

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, D.C., April 25, 1967.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN HOSMER: During the recent hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy concerning the new bilateral agreements with Australia and Colombia, you raised a question about the relationship between the Limited Test Ban Treaty and possible cooperation with other nations in the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions.

The Legal Adviser of the Department of State has prepared the attached Memorandum of Law in answer to that question and I am forwarding it for your information.

Please call upon me whenever you think the Department might be of help. Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, Jr.,

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

During the recent hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the new bilateral agreements with Australia and Colombia, Congressman Hosmer asked whether it would be possible under the Limited Test Ban Treaty for the United States to make an arrangement with another country whereby we would take a nuclear device to that country and explode it in its territory, assuming the explosion occurred underground and no radioactive debris was caused to be present outside the territory of that country.

The answer is yes.

Article I of the Limited Test Ban Treaty provides:

"1. Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control:

"(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial waters or high seas; or

"(b) in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted . . ."

Insofar as relevant, this language is the same as that contained in the U.S. draft treaty tabled at the Geneva Disarmament Conference on August 27, 1962. The manifest purpose of the prohibition on explosions which cause "radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted" is to provide a test for determining which underground explosions are permissible and which are not in terms of the radioactivity released into the atmosphere. There is nothing to indicate, either in the Treaty or in any of its negotiating history, any intention to interfere with cooperative arrangements between States for the carrying out of nuclear explosions that meet the criteria established for underground testing. Such an intention would be alien to the purposes of the Treaty. It is hardly conceivable that a treaty which permits the underground testing of nuclear weapons should be construed as prohibiting cooperative arrangements among countries for underground explosions of a peaceful character.

The one limitation which the Test Ban Treaty imposes on cooperation among States in the carrying out of explosions is found in Article I, paragraph 2. The Parties are there prohibited from "causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, anywhere which would take place in any of the environments described, or have the effect referred to, in paragraph 1 of this Article."

Parties to the Treaty may thus not cooperate with one another, or with nonparties, in carrying out explosions prohibited by the Treaty, but there is no limitation on cooperation in carrying out underground explosions which meet the Treaty's standard on radioactive debris.

It is clear from the legislative history of the Treaty before the Senate that it was well understood that the language in question merely established a test for determining the permissibility of underground explosions, wherever they oc curred, and did not prohibit a country from carrying out an underground nuclear explosion with the cooperation of another country in that country's territory. The President's message to the Senate transmitting the Treaty explained that its provisions permit "nuclear tests and explosions underground so long as all fallout is contained within the country where the test or explosion is conducted.” (Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. on Executive M, p. 2 (1963)).

Similarly, Secretary Rusk explained:

"Underground explosions are permitted so long as the radioactive debris remains within the country where the explosion takes place." (id., p. 13)

An Opinion of the Legal Adviser of August 14, 1963 stated that the Treaty "permits weapons tests and other explosions underground, so long as the radioactive debris is confined within the territorial limits of the State in which the explosion is conducted." (id., p. 77) There is no suggestion anywhere in the legislative history that the State conducting the explosion must conduct it within its own territorial limits.

Chairman Seaborg, in explaining the restrictions on the Plowshare program which the Treaty imposed, referred to the US interest in digging a new transisthmian canal by nuclear means. He stated, "it probably could not be done under the present treaty limitations because of the short distance to territorial boundaries." (id., p. 210) There was no reference to any other inhibition that the Treaty might be thought to contain on the carrying out of underground explosions beyond the United States.

Finally, the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations stated flatly: "The United States will also be able [under the Treaty] to explode nuclear devices underground for peaceful purposes in other countries, at their request, provided, of course, that such an explosion does not cause debris to be issued beyond that country's territorial limits." (p. 21)

Representative HOSMER. But it is clear that, if it went from country X to country Y, it would be a violation?

Mr. KRATZER. Yes, sir.

Representative HOSMER. I think, Dr. Nabrit, you expressed the belief that this was a curious and unnecessary limitation. Dr. NABRIT. When did I do this?

Representative HOSMER. Somebody mentioned that something might have to be done about the Limited Test-Ban Treaty to permit this kind of arrangement to occur.

Dr. NABRIT. I don't believe I commented on that.

Mr. KRATZER. I simply made the factual statement that a modification would have to be made to do these things. I was not drawing any inferences.

Representative HOSMER. The President's instructions to the conference at Geneva presupposed that some substantial value can be obtained from Plowshare and, if this Limited Test-Ban Treaty is inhibiting the realization of these values, why does not the administration get busy and negotiate some changes?

AVAILABILITY OF PLOWSHARE SERVICES

Mr. Zook. I believe the President's reference to this, Mr. Hosmer, and previous references within the administration have been with reference to the desirability of making the service available internationally-if and when the Plowshare technology is demonstrated to be both economically and technically feasible.

That is, there are four conditional elements if and when economically and technically feasible. As Mr. Kratzer pointed out, additional experimentation and testing of the principles of the technology, it is felt, can be conducted without the risk of a violation of the present language of the treaty. If those should prove sufficiently fruitful— that it would appear that further changes should be made then undoubtedly this would be addressed at that time. But I believe the feeling at this moment is that there is not yet sufficient knowledge of the certain practicability of technical and economic feasibility to warrent a change in the treaty at this time.

Representative HOSMER. Then the treaty is the fifth inhibiting element, in addition to the four that you mentioned there?

Mr. Zook. It might be.

Representative HOSMER. You express an administration position that the other four have to be surmounted before we get to work on a fifth. Is that right?

Mr. Zook. I don't believe it has been posed quite that way, but the other four certainly are recognized as the primary obstacle, without which the fifth would not have true meaning.

Representative HOSMER. It is strange to me that you have paralyzed action on the first four by the cancellation of Cabriolet. Do you have any explanation of that?

Mr. Zook. No, sir.

Representative HOSMER. Just prior to the serious negotiation of the Limited Test-Ban Treaty, as I recall it, Mr. Kennedy ordered the cancellation of some kind of nuclear events that were to take place.

DEFERMENT OF CABRIOLET

Was this cancellation of the Cabriolet by way of a signal that the United States was seriously intent upon quickly negotiating a nonproliferation treaty?

Mr. Zook. I believe the U.S. intent on that has been signaled a number of times without the utilization of an occurrence such as this.