I think the U.S. position on this nonproliferation treaty has been made clear by the President, the Secretary, Mr. Foster, and others. It may be that the decision in this instance may have been related to the current negotiations in Geneva, but I don't think it was needed as a signal of the U.S. interest.

Representative HOSMER. Well then, why was Cabriolet canceled? Mr. Zook. I am sorry I don't know the full story on that, sir. Representative HOSMER. In what capacity are you here today, Mr.

Zook?

Mr. Zook. Representing the Department of State.

Representative HOSMER. In connection with international, scientific, and technological affairs?

Mr. Zook. Yes, sir.

Representative HOSMER. And you are not familiar with Cabriolet? Mr. Zook. I am familiar with Cabriolet.

Representative HOSMER. But you are not familiar with why the State Department got hold of the Atomic Energy Commission and turned off this event, on which $212 million had been spent, and which was only awaiting proper weather conditions to fire?

Mr. Zook. I am not sure where the final decision on that was made, Mr. Hosmer. In any event, I don't think it was a permanent cancellation. I believe it was more in the sense of a postponement, a deferral. Mr. KRATZER. If I may interject here, I think it has been made clear that this deferral of the Cabriolet shot was taken in consideration of the sensitive negotiations that were then going on both in Latin America at the time, with the Latin American Free Zone Treaty, and, as you suggested, in Geneva on the nonproliferation treaty. It was a step taken in a desire not to add any factor which could even remotely complicate these sensitive negotiations.

Representative HOSMER. I think it was on a Thursday or a Friday that Cabriolet was chopped off and it was on a Saturday that the nuclear free zone treaty was signed in Mexico City.

In any event, that is out of the way. No. 2, on the wires today, there is news that Mr. Foster has made a request that the so-called Easter recess at the 18-nation disarmament conference be not just a week but be combined with the later spring recess so that they won't be sitting over there in Geneva for a period of 6 to 8 weeks. Don't you think it is time, then, that Cabriolet be brought back on?

Dr. NABRIT. I think it is too late now-in terms of the grazing

season.

Representative HOSMER. In terms of what?

Dr. NABRIT. The grazing season.

Representative HOSMER. Then this was not, as it was billed, a postponement, nor is it a brief one, as implied. This was a substantial delay and perhaps a total abandonment of Cabriolet, as I alleged in the first place; isn't this right, Dr. Nabrit?

Dr. NABRIT. No; we would still consider this a postponement. Representative HOSMER. You consider it a postponement, and I don't. What would be the earliest date that Cabriolet could be turned back on?

Dr. NABRIT. In the fall after the grazing season has ended.

Representative HOSMER. And after the Geneva negotiations have been suspended because the United Nations General Assembly goes back into session.

Dr. NABRIT. You asked the technical reason. The technical reason would be in relationship to the grazing season. That would be after frost falls.

Representative HOSMER. There seems to be more than technical considerations involved here.

Dr. NABRIT. You asked me when could we turn it back on now.
Representative HOSMER. And it would not be until fall.

Dr. NABRIT. It would not be possible until the fall.

Representative HOSMER. I could ask you why this was not made clear when the announcement of the cancellation was made, but I won't ask you that.

Is the AEC maintaining any readiness to turn Cabriolet back on? Dr. NABRIT. We hope to be ready in the fall if we get the permission to proceed.

Representative HOSMER. Dr. Nabrit, if the President's intention is to instruct his negotiators to share this knowledge with other countries, and if it is to be of help to these other countries, how can there be any assurance to them if, at the same time, the tests upon which development of the technology depends are cancelled?

Dr. NABRIT. I think that the question is a good question, but you can also see the possibility that this was a test that was experimental for us and suppose at the same time, you had had not only the crater form but an escape of radioactivity into the atmosphere that crossed our boundary.

Then we could have been accused of violating our own agreements on limitation of tests.

Representative HOSMER. By whom?

Dr. NABRIT. By other nations with which we are negotiating the nonproliferation treaty. So this would certainly not have been the appropriate way to try to convince them that they ought to agree to limitations.

Representative HOSMER. The Russians have twice caused releases to be made beyond their national boundaries in Plowshare activities. Nobody has accused them of violating the treaty.

We wrote them a letter and asked them what went on and they did not answer. On the second occasion, we wrote them another letter and they did not answer it. Does that indicate their interpretation that there is some kind of threshold and, unless you get beyond that in your release beyond the national boundary, that you are not in violation of the test ban treaty?

Dr. NABRIT. No; I believe you actually have to know something of the technical terminology involved in the treaty as to the nature of the type of material released and you have to be able to be sure that that type of material was released in order to make an accusation which you could back up by actual proof of violation.

DETECTION OF RADIOACTIVE RELEASES

Representative HOSMER. Is there anything but radioactive material that activates a Geiger counter?

Mr. KRATZER. That is one means of detection of the presence of radioactive material.

Representative HOSMER. And the ban is against the release of radioactive material beyond boundaries, is it not?

Dr. NABRIT. That is right. You are talking about technology that is far more sensitive than detection by a Geiger counter.

Representative HOSMER. My complaint is we didn't write a letter to the Russians when these two events occurred and say, "we detected what you conducted and we congratulate you for conducting a vigorous Plowshare program and we realize it was not in any violation of a limited test ban treaty." I say that because we have apparently interpreted the treaty one way in respect to our own restraint and then an entirely and more generous way with respect to other signatories. Isn't it time we treated them all alike including ourselves?

I have no further questions.

Representative YOUNG. I want to thank you gentlemen for being here today. Mondays are a difficult time around the Hill here to assemble a group but I know your problems are not any easier than

ours are.

We do appreciate your being here and giving us this valued information.

We have some additional questions concerning these agreements which will be submitted to you in writing. Without objection, these materials will be included in the record when received.

(The questions referred to and the AEC's answers thereto follow :)

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY,
Washington, D.C., March 23, 1967.

Mr. R. E. HOLLINGSWORTH,
General Manager,

U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HOLLINGSWORTH: Enclosed are additional questions concerning the Colombian and Australian agreements for cooperation which it was indicated at the close of the hearing on March 20, 1967 would be submitted to the Commission.

A reply at your earliest convenience would be appreciated.
Sincerely yours,

JOHN T. CONWAY,
Executive Director.

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., March 31, 1967.

Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY,

Executive Director,

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
Congress of the United States.

DEAR MR. CONWAY: In response to the questions you raised in your letter of March 23, 1967, concerning the Australian and Colombian Agreements for Cooperation, we are pleased to provide the following information.

Question 1. The Colombian Agreement is due to expire on March 28, 1967. Will there be a gap between the expiration of the existing agreement and the entry into force of the proposed amendment?

Answer. There will be a gap between the expiration of the existing agreement and the entry into force of the amendment despite efforts to complete ratification procedures prior to March 28. The Government of Colombia, however, has provided a diplomatic note to us recognizing the effective continuation of United States safeguards rights and the statutory guarantees over the material and equipment or devices received under the Agreement. No material, equipment or service will be transferred by us to Colombia in the interim.

Question 2. (a) What are some of the "other purposes" for which special nuclear materials could be transferred under the amended Article IV of the Australian agreement?

(b) Are the transfers of these materials subject to any quantity limitations! Answer. Purposes other than fueling for which special nuclear materials could

be transferred under Article IV would pertain, at least in the immediate future, to research and industrial requirements. Examples of such purposes include plutonium as metal for neutron sources (e.g., in oil well logging, cross-sectional measurements, instrumentation) and for fission foils and standard counting discs; enriched uranium as UF 6 for fission chambers, foils, and standard counting discs, and depleted uranium as UF 6 used as counterweights. Additionally, materials such as transuranic elements and highly-purified National Bureau of Standards samples containing plutonium metal and enriched uranium oxides would be transferred under this article.

Such transfers are for specialized purposes and would not involve large quantities of fissionable material. The enriched uranium would come within the quantity limitation in Article VIII. The very specialized materials would be limited largely by availability.

Question 3. Has the Indian Government offered to make its reprocessing facility available to Australia and other countries in that part of the world?

Answer. India has made such an offer. In his speech in January 1965 at the dedication ceremonies of the Trombay plutonium plant, Dr. Homi Bhabha said that India "would be quite willing to reprocess used fuel elements for countries in the region and for the International Atomic Energy Agency provided it is ensured that the plutonium so produced is used only for peaceful purposes."

Question 4. What is intended by Paragraph C of the proposed new Article II of the Australian agreement, which provides that "This Agreement shall not require the exchange of any information which the Parties are not permitted to communicate"?

Answer. The prohibition in Paragraph C of Article II is intended to cover situations in which either of the Parties has received information from another source whch has requested that it not be disseminated for such, reasons as proprietary interest, considerations of busines confidentiality or receipt on a restricted basis from another Government.

Question 5. Please furnish a summary report concerning the information cxchange that has been going on with Australia on high-temperature gas-cooled reactors.

Answer. In August 1962, the USAEC and the Australian AEC concluded a special exchange arrangement on high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and related subjects. The High Flux Australian Reactor (HIFAR), having reached criticality in 1958, was being used to test materials, and the AAEC was interested in performing research and development work on the high-temperature gas-cooled reactor concept.

The information exchanged has been unclassified and has been implemented by coordinators on each side. Reports, correspondence, visits, and assignments have been utilized to promote the cooperation.

Information exchanged has involved the following topics:

1. Basic chemical and metallurgical properties, irradiation behavior, fabrication techniques, and compatibility with other materials of (a) beryllium and beryllium oxide, (b) uranium and thorium dioxides and their dispersion in beryllium oxide, and (c) dispersion of oxides and carbides of uranium and thorium in graphite.

2. Nuclear physics data on reactor materials, particularly Be and BeO, including studies of neutron physics.

3. Coolant circuit technology.

4. Waste disposal development and management.

5. Design, manufacture, and operation of loops in high-flux reactors.

6. General information and hazards summary report on the Mobile Low Power Plant No. 1 (ML-1), a gas-cooled light-water moderated reactor, operated at NRTS, Idaho, 1961-1965.

7. Technical reports on the Experimental Gas-Cooled Reactor (EGCR) at ORNL dealing with the design, analysis, safety, control, etc., of the reactor. 8. Health and safety, and accident and fire prevention information; organization for handling emergencies at AEC establishments; radiological safety manuals; radiation incidents; etc.

Since the inception of the 1962 arrangement, and pursuant to it, the USAEC has assigned three ORNL men consecutively to work at Lucas Heights, Australia, and the AAEC has assigned one man to ANL and one to BNL.

Sincerely yours,

R. E. HOLLINGSWORTH, General Manager.

Representative YOUNG. The hearing is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 3:40 p.m., Monday, March 20, 1967, the subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)