TRANSFERS OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR RESEARCH With respect to transfers of special nuclear material for research purposes, the quantities involved would be, obviously, much smaller than those required for power purposes, and the agreement allows greater flexibility for transfers of research quantities. At the same time, however, the agreement provides the Commission the option of limiting to toll-enrichment those arrangements in which there would be a title transfer. INVOLVEMENT BY PRIVATE FIRMS The superseding agreement with Japan very appropriately recognizes the extensive involvement expected by private firms in the cooperation to be carried out under the agreement. As we have regularly provided in our other recent agreements and amendments, privately arranged transfers, including exports of special nuclear material, will be permitted. Such transactions would be subject to the ceiling limitation on the quantity of U235 and plutonium which may be transferred to Japan under the agreement, as well as license requirements and contracting policies generally applicable to private transactions which the parties may adopt. Mr. Chairman, other features of the agreement were specifically noted in the letter under which the agreement was sent to the committee and I shall not take the time to repeat them but shall be glad to answer any questions pertaining to them. (See app. 1, p. 104.) TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENT WITH JAPAN AND IAEA For the moment, however, I would like to comment on the safeguards pertaining to the agreement. Japan was the first nation to enter into a trilateral agreement with the IAEA and the United States for the Agency to assume safeguards responsibilities under a bilateral agreement. That was in 1963 and the Agency has been safeguarding transfers under the current bilateral. The new agreement would provide for the continued application of IAEA safeguards to items transferred thereunder. This will be accomplished by a new trilateral safeguards arrangement among the Agency, Japan, and the United States which has been negotiated and was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors at its meeting earlier this month. It will be brought into effect at the same time as the new bilateral. Mr. Chairman, we feel that the new agreement contains the elements of mutual advantage which make for a viable relationship. Japan, of course, is provided the assurance of a long-term supply of enriched uranium for its nuclear power needs. As I have previously mentioned, the United States gains an export benefit from this supply. Equally important, however, is the association which is created with Japan, one of the major industrial nations of the world, in the use and development of enriched uranium reactors and cooperation in the development of future reactors and of other aspects of nuclear energy. These are the significant features of the Japanese agreement. (Subsequently, the following letter concerning United StatesJapanese cooperation was received:) U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, Mr. JOHN T. CONWAY, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, DEAR MR. CONWAY: I am enclosing a copy of the joint communique issued on the afternoon of July 15, 1968, at the conclusion of the Commission's meeting with Minister of State and Science and Technology, Mr. Naotsugu Nabeshima and the delegation of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. I am also enclosing the copy of the record of discussions concerning the fast reactor exchange arrangements, which was initiated by Chairman Seaborg and Minister Nabeshima on July 15. The technical discussions with the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission delegation will conclude today. Sincerely, MYRON B. KRATZER, Assistant General Manager for International Activities. JOINT STATEMENT BY THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSIONS OF JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the Japan Atomic Energy Commission today held the first of periodic meetings to review cooperation of the two countries in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This meeting resulted from a proposal by the Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission to the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission at the occasion of the 11th General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency held in Vienna last September. The meeting today was under the chairmanship of Chairman Glenn T. Seaborg of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The Japanese delegation was headed by Mr. Naotsugu Nabeshima, Minister of State for Science and Technology and concurrently the Chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. The United States Atomic Energy Commission was represented by Commissioners James T. Ramey, Gerald F. Tape and Wilfrid E. Johnson, in addition to Chairman Seaborg. The two Commissions took special note of the long history of close and friendly cooperation which has existed between Japan and the United States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and particularly of the recent conclusion of a new Agreement for Cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. This agreement, which was signed by Secretary of State Rusk, Chairman Seaborg, and Ambassador Shimoda of Japan in Washington earlier this year and came into force on July 10, provides for a comprehensive program of cooperation between the two countries for a thirty-year period, including the supply by the United States of enriched uranium for use in Japanese nuclear energy programs. The two Commissions agreed to continue and intensify their program of cooperation and, in particular, to promote technical exchanges in additional fields which are in the forefront of progress in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. In this regard, they agreed to the development in the immediate future of an arrangement for the exchange of information in the field of fast breeder power reactors, which constitutes the main line of development effort on nuclear power in both the United States and Japan, as well as a number of other nations. They also agreed to the future development of specific technical exchange arrangements in the fields of radiation preservation of foods and the utilization of plutonium in power reactors. In addition, the two Commissions held an exchange of views on a broad range of subjects in the peaceful uses of atomic energy, including their respective programs of nuclear power generation; reactor development and technology, including the development of advanced converter reactors; the utilization of plutonium; the supply of plutonium and enriched uranium; and nuclear desalting. The two Commissions were in full accord on the value of these direct contacts between the responsible officials of the two organizations, and agreed that the second of these periodic meetings would be held in Tokyo. RECORD OF DISCUSSIONS FOR NEGOTIATION OF A TECHNICAL EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING FAST-BREEDER REACTORS The Atomic Energy Commissions of Japan and the United States mutually desire to enter into technical exchange arrangements in certain areas in the field of fast breeder reactors. The Japan Atomic Energy Commission intends to ask the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation to undertake this responsibility. This arrangement would be subject to the provisions of the Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy between the Governments of Japan and the United States signed February 26, 1968. The technical scope of this arrangement would include topics or sub-topics in which both parties have reasonably comparable program efforts; or where information in areas of strength in one party's program are exchanged for comparable information in different areas of strength in the other party's program. The specific areas and details of implementation are to be agreed upon by our respective staffs recognizing that the patent laws and the use of private funds in joint development efforts will require special attention. IAEA FEASIBILITY STUDY OF NUCLEAR PLANT FOR LUZON GRID Dr. TAPE. I would like now to turn to the Philippine agreement. (See app. 1, p. 132.) The proposed superseding agreement with the Government of the Philippines reflects the emergence of that country as one of those taking specific steps for the introduction of nuclear power. The agreement is, of course, not the first step taken by the Philippines. In early 1964, at the request of the Philippine Government, the IAEA began a feasibility study of the desirability of building a nuclear plant for the Luzon grid. This study investigated the hydro- and thermal-power-producing potential of the Philippines, the load demand expected over the 196575 period, and the local resources available to meet projected power needs. The study was concluded in 1966 and recommended for an optimum program-the addition of 1,000-megawatt nuclear capacity in the period 1971–73. LONG-TERM POWER AGREEMENT With this background of planning, the Government of the Philippines, in considering the extension of cooperation with the United States after expiration of the current agreement on July 26 of this year, requested a long-term power agreement to provide for the fueling of two power reactors. Over the 30-year term established for the agreement, the quantity of U235 in enriched uranium estimated to be necessary for these projects is 17,500 kilograms. An additional 100 kilograms will be available for various research purposes, bringing the overall net ceiling of U235 in article X which may be supplied to the Philippines to 17,600 kilograms. The framework in the Philippine agreement for supplying enriched uranium, as well as other features, are common to our other long-term power agreements. As in the Japanese agreement, for example, fuel supply for power projects will be through toll enrichment after the end of this year with the Commission having an option to sell in response to a request. The Philippine text also contains the standard assurances concerning comparability with domestic users of uranium prices and service charges under the agreement and of delivery notices. Current provisions respecting the "private ownership" authority are also included. IAEA SAFEGUARDS Safeguards under the current bilateral with the Philippines are applied by the IAEA under the trilateral agreement signed in 1964. An appropriate superseding trilateral has been negotiated and approved by the Agency's Board of Governors; it will be signed shortly. Our safeguards rights will continue to remain suspended while IAEA safeguards are in effect. If I may, I should like to continue and discuss briefly the Danish and Irish amendments. (See app. 1, p. 116, and app. 1, p. 124, respectively.) EXTENSION OF DANISH AGREEMENT The current agreement with Denmark will expire on September 7 of this year. It is a research-type agreement which became effective July 25, 1955, and has been amended twice. Denmark is looking toward the introduction of nuclear power, but as yet has no plans to undertake construction of a plant for which it wishes to obtain fuel. At the request of the Government of Denmark, therefore, the current agreement is being extended for a further period of 5 years. The two previous amendments to the agreement were made in 1956 and in 1958. We have on this occasion updated the various provisions of the agreement in order to keep it comparable to other such agreements. REVISIONS IN DANISH AGREEMENT Among the revisions made, I would like to mention those which are of substantive importance. First, the quantity of U235 which may be transferred under the agreement has been increased to 200 kilograms in order to accommodate the fueling requirements of three Danish research reactors and other research requirements, as well as for conversion and fabrication services which Denmark may provide to third countries. In order to accommodate this last purpose, a new provision permitting the transfer of special nuclear material for the performance of conversion and fabrication services for third countries has been added in article II. Secondly, the current agreement limits the enrichment of uranium which may be transferred to 90 percent. This limit would be removed. However, as has been done in other agreements, the transfer of material enriched to more than 20 percent would require a technical or economic justification. Thirdly, we have added to the agreement, as in the Japanese, Philippine, and other agreements, the provision permitting authorized private persons to make arrangements directly for the transfer of special nuclear material and the performance of related services. IAEA SAFEGUARDS As is indicated in article VII of the amendment, an agreement was signed on February 29, 1968, by the IAEA, Denmark, and the United States for the application of Agency safeguards to transfers under the bilateral agreement. IRISH AMENDMENT Turning to Ireland, one of the two main purposes of the proposed amendment to our Agreement for Cooperation with Ireland is to extend the agreement for an additional 10 years. In extending the agreement for this period of time, we have taken into account the possibility of Ireland's acquiring a research reactor and have provided for a larger quantity of U235 in order to permit flexibility in meeting needs for enriched material over the life of the extended agreement. The current net ceiling is thus raised from the present 6-kilogram level to 25 kilograms. Provision is also made for the enrichment of material to be greater than 20 percent if the Commission determines there is a technical or economical justification for permitting it. Research reactor fuel would be one such possibility. As you are aware, this provision is incorporated in other agreements. "PRIVATE OWNERSHIP" AUTHORITY Also, as regularly incorporated in our agreements, the "private ownership" authority would be reflected in the proposed Irish amendment. Authorized private persons would be able to make arrangements directly for transfers of special nuclear material and an authorized private party in one country could also deal directly with the government of the other. SAFEGUARDS RIGHTS Of the remaining provisions of the proposed Irish amendment, U.S. safeguards rights would be expanded as a direct consequence of inclusion of the provision for transfer of material enriched beyond 20 percent in U235. Further, the amendment provides that, before transfer to Ireland of materials and facilities which would be subject to safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency would be requested to assume safeguards responsibilities. The other provisions of the proposed amendment are designed to update language and bring various aspects of the agreement in conformity with current usage and scope, and, in this respect, are like those in the proposed Danish amendment. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. Should there be any questions, I shall be pleased to answer them. Senator GORE. Congressman Hosmer? PRIVATE ENRICHMENT CAPABILITY IN U.S. Representative HOSMER. These provisions in all these agreements which pertain to the permissibility for private persons to supply enriched uranium-is that in contemplation of a private enrichment capability in the United States at some later time? Dr. TAPE. No, Mr. Hosmer. |