Hearings, Reports and Prints of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

• restricting the transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear nations;

⚫ inducements to such nations to refrain from independently developing nuclear weapons; and

• a safeguards program to protect against the diversion of materials to unauthorized purposes.

The safeguards program is designed to detect promptly, and thereby deter, diversions of special nuclear materials from peaceful programs to weapons applications. In the United States, the "safeguards" program is also expected to detect any diversion to unauthorized purposes of military materials, weapons, and weapons components, at least until they are transferred by the AEC to the Department of Defense.

The objectives of the safeguards program, properly implemented, can compel nations seeking nuclear arsenals to follow more expensive, and therefore less attractive, routes to nuclear weapons than would be the case if plutonium, for example, were acquired for military purposes as a by-product of a civilian nuclear power program.

Safeguards programs should also be designed in recognition of the problem of terrorist or criminal groups clandestinely acquiring nuclear weapons or materials useful therein. Although such illegal groups are more likely to steal finished components or weapons than divert materials from peaceful programs, criminal organizations may be attracted to divert such materials if a black market develops, as it is likely to. It should be recognized that political and social restraints would not influence terrorist, insurrectionist or criminal groups. Therefore, criminal sanctions, e.g., fines and prison terms, are essential elements of an effective safeguards program.

An international safeguards program can help reduce tensions and perhaps contribute useful precedents for effective disarmament and other peace keeping arrangements.

The Panel recognizes that even if successfully put into practice on a world-wide basis, the safeguards program by itself cannot effectively assure that this country's non-proliferation objectives will be attained. Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed above, the safeguards program is worthy of the active support of all interested governmental agencies.

The Panel believes that the AEC generally has been responsive to its obligations, under the Atomic Energy Act, for safeguarding special nuclear materials. Over the past twenty years there has evolved a safeguards system applicable to AEC cost-type contractors which incorporates most of the essential elements for safeguarding special nuclear materials. The Panel notes that the AEC has recognized the need for modification of its safeguards program in the light of changing activities. The Panel generally concurs with the actions taken and contemplated. The Panel has noted and recommends steps which the AEC can take to improve its programs. These recommendations are intended to promote a well coordinated, comprehensive safeguard system capable of coping with the rapid escalation in the distribution of nuclear technology and special nuclear materials. Recommendations

1. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955 should be modified to provide severe criminal penalties for unauthorized diversions of special nuclear materials and to provide rewards for information about such diversions. AEC regulations should require that these provisions be publicized and prominently posted at all installations handling significant' quantities of special nuclear materials.

2. (a) Responsibility for policymaking and overseeing the safeguards program should be vested in a single AEC office at a level sufficiently high that it can efficiently and economically coordinate this nation's domestic and international safeguards program.

(b) An Interagency Committee composed of representatives of sufficiently high stature from the AEC and such agencies as the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, Commerce, Treasury-as well as the Central Intelligence Agency and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency-should be established to formally involve these agencies in the safeguards program.

(At the Commission's request, the Panel transmitted on January 20, 1967, its specific and detailed suggestions for an organizational structure designed to achieve these objectives.)

3. All persons having access to significant quantities of unclassified special

1 As used herein, significant quantities of special nuclear materials refer to quantities in excess of 5,000 grams of contained uranium-235, uranium-233, plutonium, or any combination thereof. 2 For classified materials, special clearances are required by AEC.

nuclear materials should have a clearance equivalent to "L" clearances which are used in the AEC Classified Information Access Program.

4. The AEC, in cooperation with its licensees, should develop minimum physical protection standards applicable to licensees for the safeguarding of special nuclear materials. These standards should take into consideration the strategic importance of special nuclear materials as well as their high dollar value.

5. There should be provisions made for a review by the AEC of the design and construction of facilities that handle significant quantities of special nuclear materials to determine their adequacy for safeguards purposes.

6. Criteria should be established for acceptable limits for shipper-receiver differences, materials unaccounted for, quantities discarded or lost, and maximum quantities of special nuclear materials permitted on inventory in forms of unmeasurable or which can be measured only with a very large error, with due regard for the quantities, form and accessibility of the materials involved. In the event these limits are exceeded, the AEC should require an investigation and report. 7. The quantities and forms of special nuclear materials handled should be principal determinants in establishing the safeguards program. There should be established minimum quantities below which no special safeguards provisions are made.

8. Increased emphasis should be given to systems of internal management control within all organizations handling special nuclear materials in order to minimize the risk of diversions to unauthorized purposes.

9. The United States should intensify its efforts to establish an effective universal safeguards system under the International Atomic Energy Agency. Toward this end the U.S. should encourage:

(a) Euratom and IAEA to arrange for appropriate surveillance by IAEA of the Euratom safeguards program, including active participation as appropriate in inspection of facilities;

(b) Voluntary acceptance by other nations, especially the major powers, of the IAEA safeguards inspections;

(c) The assignment by member nations of qualified personnel to the IAEA safeguards program for terms of at least five to seven years;

(d) International pooling through the IAEA of information regarding diversions (actual, attempted, or potential) of special nuclear materials to unauthorized purposes.

10. (a) The AEC should continue the present safeguards policy as provided for in the US-Euratom agreement for cooperation until Euratom and IAEA agree to surveillance by IAEA of the Euratom safeguards system.

(b) The AEC should improve its evaluation of the effectiveness of the Euratom safeguards program.

11. The AEC should increase its research and development effort on safeguards techniques and should encourage and support other national and international efforts to improve safeguards.

12. The United States should encourage the International Atomic Energy Agency and other interested nations to establish an International School of Safeguards to train inspectors, develop research programs, and accumulate and distribute information relating to safeguards.

13. There should be an independent review of the safeguards currently ap plicable to materials and weapons transferred to the Department of Defense under Section 91b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., March 10, 1967.

Dr. GLENN T. SEABORG,

Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,

Washington, D.C.

DEAR DR. SEABORG: The ad hoc Advisory Panel on Safeguarding Special Nuclear Material is pleased to transmit its report herewith.

I am pleased to report to you the concurrence of all Panel members in the substance and recommendations of the report. I trust that you will find it adequately discharges the review anticipated in your letter of July 20, 1966, which delineated the Panel's charter.

If I can be of further assistance, please advise.

Sincerely,

R. F. LUMB,

Chairman, Ad Hoc Advisory Panel on Safeguarding Special Nuclear Material.

REPORT TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION BY THE AD HOC ADVISORY PANEL ON SAFEGUARDING SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

March 10, 1967

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This report represents the conclusions and opinions of the seven Panel members but was, in fact, dependent upon the efforts of a great many people. Considerable assistance was given by Mr. J. V. Vinciguerra, Assistant General Manager for Administration, and Mr. C. L. Henderson, Assistant Director of Regulation for Administration. Most helpful were the efforts of the Executive Secretary, Mr. V. C. Vespe, and Mr. R. G. Page, Panel Secretary. Many other individuals, too numerous to single out, within AEC and in private enterprise contributed considerable time and effort providing useful information to the Panel. The Panel is deeply indebted to all those who assisted in this complex study. CONTENTS

I. Introduction and Abstract of Recommendations.

II. Appointment and Charter.

III. Approach.

IV. The Domestic Program.

V. The International Program.
A. The Bilateral Program.

B. The IAEA Program.

C. The Euratom Program.

VI. Special considerations.

A. Recent Amendments to 10 CFR 70.

B. Strategic Importance.

C. Resident Inspectors.

D. Certified Public Accountants.

E. Standards and Criteria.

VII. Recommendations.

VIII. Appendices:

Appendix 1. Organizations Represented by Persons Interviewed by Panel.
Appendix 2. Nuclear Sites Visited by Panel.

Appendix 3. Essential Elements of an Adequate Safeguards System.

Appendix 4. Domestic Safeguards Program.

Appendix 5. International Distribution of Special Nuclear Materials.

Appendix 6. Euratom Safeguards.

Appendix 7. Comparison of IAEA and Euratom Safeguards.

Appendix 8. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Program for the Safeguarding of Special
Nuclear Materials.

Appendix 9. Excerpts from the Report of the Committee on Auditing Procedures-American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

IX. Bibliography.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY PANEL ON SAFEGUARDING SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL

I. INTRODUCTION AND ABSTRACT OF RECOMMENDATIONS

With the inception of the nuclear age, the foreign policy of the United States crystallized on the objective of limiting the number of nuclear powers. The Baruch Plan to control nuclear weapons and to assure that special nuclear materials would be used principally for peaceful purposes was submitted to the United Nations in 1946, though it was never adopted. The Atoms for Peace Program was conditioned on, and recognized the need for, assurances that the materials transferred under the program would not be diverted to military pursuits. The incorporation of safeguards requirements in bilateral agreements for cooperation, and the systematic transfer by the United States of its bilateral safeguards responsibilities to the International Atomic Energy Agency is consistent with this objective. The United States ratification of the Moscow Treaty of 1963, the so-called "Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," was the lineal descendant of this policy objective. Thus it has been, and continues to be, a basic foreign policy objective of the United States to strictly limit the proliferation of nations with nuclear weapons capability.

The accelerating introduction of nuclear power on an economically competitive basis in this country and abroad during the last two years has resulted in dramatic forecasts of nuclear power growth during the next decade or two. While the benefits of abundant and economic nuclear power are many and generally well-known, this development will inevitably result in the availability of large quantities of special nuclear materials. If uncontrolled, nuclear weapons development and production programs could be initiated in many countries. By 1980, it has been forecast (9), plutonium will be produced throughout the world at a rate of more than

100 kilograms a day. Such quantities of material contain the potential for production of a substantial amount of the world's electric power. Alternatively, however, they are sufficient for the daily production of many nuclear weapons.

While it is unreasonable and unrealistic to terminate the nuclear power program because of its potential for contributing to the spread of nuclear weapons, the forecast by-product production of plutonium makes it essential that an effective world-wide international safeguards system be established quickly.

There are obviously a number of ways for non-nuclear nations to obtain a nuclear weapons capability, e.g.,

the indigenous development of a technology capability;

the acquisition of materials or finished weapons supplied for such purpose by a nuclear power;

the theft of finished weapons components or assembled weapons; and

the diversion of materials developed in, or supplied for, peaceful application of nuclear energy.

Attainment of the objectives of the non-proliferation policy accordingly involves a multifaceted program of formal and informal understandings, including:

restrict the transfer of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology to non-nuclear nations;

• inducements to such nations to refrain from independently developing nuclear weapons; and • a safeguards program to protect against the diversion of materials to unauthorized purposes.

An international safeguards program can help reduce tensions and perhaps contribute useful precedents for effective disarmament and other peace keeping arrangements.

The Panel recognizes that even if successfully put into practice on a worldwide basis, the safeguards program by itself cannot effectively assure that this country's non-proliferation objectives will be attained. Nonetheless, for the reasons discussed above, the safeguards program is worthy of the active support of all interested governmental agencies.

The Panel has noted and recommends steps which the AEC can take to improve its programs. These recommendations are intended to promote a well coordinated, comprehensive safeguard system capable of coping with the rapid escalation in the distribution of nuclear technology and special nuclear materials.

21-713 0-69—22

Recommendations

2. (a) Responsibility for policy making and overseeing the safeguards program should be vested in a single AEC office at a level sufficiently high that it can effciently and economically coordinate this nation's domestic and international safeguards program.

(At the Commission's request, the Panel transmitted on January 20, 1967, its specific and detailed suggestions for an organizational structure designed to achieve these objectives.)

3. All persons having access to significant quantities of unclassified special nuclear materials should have a clearance equivalent to “L” clearances which are used in the AEC Classified Information Access Program.

7. The quantities and forms of special nuclear materials handled should be principal determinants in establishing the safeguards program. There should be established minimum quantities below which no special safeguards provisions are made.

9. The United States should intensify its efforts to establish an effective universal safeguard system under the International Atomic Energy Agency. Toward this end the U.S. should encourage:

(a) Euratom and IAEA to arrange for appropriate surveillance by IAEA of the Euratom safeguards program, including active participation as ap(b) Voluntary acceptance by other nations, especially the major powers, of the IAEA safeguards inspections;

(c) The assignment by member nations of qualified personnel to the IAEA safeguards program for terms of at least five to seven years;

propriate in inspection of facilities;

(d) International pooling through the IAEA of information regarding diversions (actual, attempted, or potential) of special nuclear materials to unauthorized purposes.

(b) The AEC should improve its evaluation of the effectiveness of the Euratom safeguards program.

1 For classified materials, special clearances are required by AEC.

2 As used herein. significant quantities of special nuclear materials refer to quantities in excess of 5000 grams of contained uranium 235, uranium 233, plutonium, or any combination thereof.

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