Evaluation.-The Technical Review Group has no data on whether electrical interference from degaussing might influence radiation monitoring equipment. During the May 11-12 tests in Sasebo, the U.S. Navy ships involved did not operate degaussing equipment.

Findings. The possibility that degaussing testing aboard USS Peacock may have caused the abnormal readings has not been eliminated.

G. Other Causes

The Technical Review Group evaluated other potential causes of abnormal readings as follows:

1. Signals from radio transmitting equipment may cause interference with radiation monitoring equipment. Interference on the morning of May 6 could have been caused by a low-powered radio transmitter operating in or near the Japanese monitoring boat, or a high-powered radio transmitter operating at a greater distance. The Technical Review Group does not consider radio interference a likely cause of the abnormal readings reported on May 6. However, since it is not known what civilian or military radio transmitters were operating in the vicinity of Sasebo harbor, radio signals cannot be eliminated positively as a source of interference.

2. The possibility that radioisotope sources might have been accidentally dumped in the harbor was investigated. In Sasebo the largest U.S. Navy radioisotope sources, which are used to check radiation survey meters on the Ajax, contain only a few microcuries; none of these sources is missing. The U.S. Army oil depot on the west side of Sasebo harbor does not have radioisotopes nor do the tankers. Japanese Government authorities have confirmed that no Japanese radioisotope sources have been lost. The accidental dumping of a radioisotope source into Sasebo harbor is not considered a probable cause of the abnormal readings.

3. Radiography.-If a 100 curie radiography source were removed from its shield, the radiation level at a distance of 700 meters would be of the order of 0.2 mrem/hour. This radiation level corresponds approximately to the peak 1441 counts per minute indicated on the Geiger-Mueller detector in the monitoring boat. In U.S. shipyards sources as large as 100 curies are common. The U.S. Navy did not have radiography sources aboard USS Ajax, the Ship Repair Facility in Sasebo, or in any other U.S. Navy ship present in Sasebo May 6, 1968. Japanese authorities have confirmed that the largest radiography source available at the Sasebo Heavy Industries shipyard is 4.3 curies of cobalt 60 and this source was located more than 1000 meters from the point of abnormal readings. Therefore radiography sources are not considered a probable cause of abnormal readings.

4. Dental X-rays were being taken aboard USS Ajax at 10:15 A.M. May 6. The X-ray machine is located forward on the port side of the Ajax; the head of the machine points through a porthole directly toward the location of the monitoring boat where peak abnormal readings were observed. However, attenuation of the X-ray beam through 100 meters of air and through a porthole cover eliminated radiation from this source at the monitoring boat.

5. Medical X-rays were being taken aboard USS Ajax shortly after 10:00 A.M. on May 6. However, the beam from this X-ray machine was not pointed outboard and could not have penetrated outside the Ajax hull.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The Technical Review Group has concluded without reservation that USS Swordfish did not at any time while in or near the port of Sasebo during the period May 2 through 11 discharge radioactivity of any kind to the atmosphere or to the surrounding waters. The Technical Review Group has further concluded that the abnormal instrument readings recorded in Sasebo harbor on May 6, 1968 were not caused by radioactivity from USS Swordfish.

The Technical Review Group could not conclusively determine the actual cause of the abnormal readings noted in Sasebo harbor on the morning of May 6. A number of possible causes were considered by the Technical Review Group, some of which were evaluated by the Japanese Radiation Experts Council. Based on the information provided the Technical Review Group, it would appear that further investigation by the Japanese authorities is warranted.

A number of conditions prevailing in Sasebo harbor on May 6 are well-recognized by experienced technicians in the radiation instrument field as common causes of erroneous detector readings. Although some of these possibilities were examined on May 11 and 12 by the Japanese authorities in a series of tests conducted at Sasebo with the cooperation of the U.S. Navy, the Technical Review

Group does not consider these tests were performed under optimum conditions. Other possible causes have not, to the knowledge of the Technical Review Group, been completely examined by the Japanese authorities.

Since no other measurements taken at the time of the abnormal readings or subsequently have confirmed the high readings, it is difficult if not impossible explicitly to determine the cause. There are many phenomena which can cause momentary abnormal instrument readings of similar characteristics. Even though additional detailed tests under idealized or laboratory conditions might establish the existence and degree of interference such external causes could have on radiation detection instruments, it is the opinion of the Technical Review Group that it is extremely unlikely that the actual cause of the May 6, 1968 abnormal readings will ever be determined.

The Technical Review Group recognizes that the primary concern of the Government of Japan is for the health and safety of the Japanese public. Regardless of the cause of the abnormal readings, it is considered essential that the effect of the levels noted upon the health and safety of the general public be viewed in proper perspective. If one assumes that the abnormal readings were, in fact, caused by some form of radioactivity, the radiation levels and radioactivity concentrations would be of the order of one thousand times less than those considered acceptable for the general public by such recognized authorities as the International Commission on Radiological Protection and the U.S. Federal Radiation Council.

W. WEGNER.
M. E. MILES.
W. L. GIVENS.

Representative HOSMER. I think it should be pointed out for the record that in addition to radar interference which Dr. Tape mentioned as a possible potential cause of these abnormal readings, the potentialities also include welding interference, monitoring instrument problems, medical isotopes which might have found their way to the water, rainfall, the conduct of degaussing tests in the vicinity at that time and miscellaneous other causes.

Dr. TAPE. There are a variety of machines which involve electrical interference problems which might have given cause to erroneous readings.

If one looks at the actual original data showing the course of the monitoring boat and the way in which the counts went up and dropped off and they could not repeat when they went back over the same area, I think there is a real question as to whether or not this could have been a radioactivity pickup.

Representative HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I also ask unanimous consent that the appendixes to the report of May 25 be included in the appendix of the hearing record.

Senator GORE. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See app. 5, p. 154.) Representative HOSMER. I have no further questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GORE. Do you have something further?

Then we will hear from Mr. Pollack of the State Department.

STATEMENT OF HERMAN POLLACK, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. POLLACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

JAPANESE AGREEMENT

The Department of State has participated fully in the negotiation of the agreement with Japan which lies before the committee. We concur in its objectives.

This agreement provides additional evidence of the intentions of both the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States to continue into the future the cooperation which has already begun in the application of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes.

NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM IN JAPAN

The agreement provides for enriched uranium fuel for 13 nuclear power reactors which will be placed under construction within the next 5 years.

Successful experience with this type of reactor in Japan might well prompt both countries to look ahead to even larger quantities of fuel for additional enriched uranium reactors. This should be economically advantageous to both countries.

Any increase in the quantities specified in the agreement; that is, 161 metric tons of U235 and 365 kilograms of plutonium would, of course, require a formal amendment to this agreement.

It would not be possible for the U.S. Government to transfer any quantities exceeding those figures without complying with our own statutory procedures as specified in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

TERM OF AGREEMENT

The 30-year term of the proposed agreement underscores the intention of the United States to stand firmly behind its reputation as a dependable supplier of enriched nuclear fuel for civil uses.

The enrichment services authorized by this agreement were calculated to satisfy the requirements of these 13 reactors for their anticipated economic life. This is an important consideration.

It is particularly important for countries which are stepping up their development of nuclear power stations to meet their long-term domestic energy requirements. Both the United States and the other country concerned benefit by having this assurance of long-term fuel supply pinned down.

QUANTITY OF U235 AND PLUTONIUM TO BE PROVIDED

During the 30-year term of this new agreement, the Japanese will be able to obtain from the United States uranium enrichment services for a total of 161,000 kilograms of U235.

The value of these services, together with the 365 kilograms of plutonium authorized by the agreement, will produce a very substantial balance-of-payments benefit to the United States.

IAEA SAFEGUARDS

Consistent with our standard policy, the International Atomic Energy Agency will continue to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear materials and facilities which are transferred under this agreement.

The Government of Japan fully agrees with this policy. As a matter of fact, we jointly obtained approval by the Board of Governors of the IAEA in Vienna just the week before last for a revised trilateral safeguards agreement which would insure continuation of international safeguards over the material covered in this agreement.

21-713 069- 5

EXTENSION OF AGREEMENT WITH DENMARK

Mr. Chairman, I should also like to express the support of the Department of State for the proposed 5-year extension of our bilateral agreement with Denmark. This agreement will have its language brought up to date by the amendment which was signed at the State Department on June 7.

The new amendment also increases to 200 kilograms the quantity of uranium authorized for transfer to Denmark. IAEA safeguards will prevail. The Department concurs fully in the proposed changes.

PHILIPPINES AGREEMENT

Similarly, we endorse the proposed agreement with the Philippines which expands our current cooperation agreement from research alone to both research and power.

This also establishes a framework for assuring the long-term supply of enriched uranium for two power reactors planned to be under construction by 1975. As in the case of the proposed Japanese agreement, the 30-year term reaffirms the position of the United States as a dependable supplier of enriched uranium fuel.

We are pleased to note that the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors, in response to a joint request of the two Governments, has recently approved a revised safeguards agreement which insures continuation of IAEA safeguards over nuclear materials and facilities covered in this agreement with the Philippines.

EXTENSION OF AGREEMENT WITH IRELAND

Mr. Chairman, the Department is also pleased to express support for the proposed 10-year extension of our nuclear research agreement with Ireland. Although Ireland is not a member of the IAEA, this amendment provides that the IAEA will be requested to assume safeguards responsibility in the future for nuclear material transferred to Ireland by the United States.

That, sir, completes my statement.

I shall be glad to answer any questions that the committee may have.

JAPANESE AGREEMENT

Senator GORE. Mr. Pollack, this is an important agreement between the United States and Japan, is it not?

Mr. POLLACK. Yes, it is, sir.

Senator GORE. It strikes me as strange that agreements of such major proportions as this are consummated between the United States and Japan and yet I see news articles appearing which indicate that there might be some drifting of the two great nations apart.

The flareup regarding the radiation discovered from some source in the waters to which reference has recently been made is an example of small exasperating incidents while fundamentally these programs of vast importance calling for bilateral cooperation continue to be concluded.

Would you comment on this?

Mr. POLLACK. I think you correctly assessed some of the things that have been making the newspapers as small, although exasperating,

incidents. Basically, the relationships between the United States and Japan over the long term are unchanged by these minor perturbations of reactions to individual incidents.

Our relations with Japan are really based on three major building blocks. They are mutually reinforcing and we continue to consider them essentially very solid.

One is the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which will be subject to renunciation in 1970. With respect to this, the Japanese Government has stated that it continues to consider that treaty as a treaty of value and one which it proposes to continue beyond 1970. We concur in the basic value of that treaty.

The second building block is the very substantial United StatesJapanese trade amounting in 1967 to some $5.7 billion. They are at this time our largest customer for agricultural products. There is no prospect in the future, foreseeable future, for any change in that relation ship. Nor is there any prospect for a change in the third building block, which is the fact that we have both very significant common interests in promoting stability and economic development in Asia. These are the kind of fundamentals on which the relations between the United States and Japan are based. An incident such as the Swordfish at Sasebo and some of the others I think are properly described as small.

I do not want to diminish their significance but they are not going to affect the basic health of our relations with Japan. Senator GORE. Congressman Hosmer?

RELIABILITY OF U.S. ENRICHMENT SERVICES

Representative HOSMER. Mr. Pollack, about 5 years ago, or a little bit longer, the Japanese seemed quite uncertain that they could rely upon us for a source of enriched uranium to support their long-term power reactor industry.

As a matter of fact, I think they even purchased a natural uranium reactor from the British about the same time they experimented with one of our enriched uranium reactors.

Can you tell me what, if anything, has changed the minds of the Japanese as to the reliability of the American source of enriched material?

Mr. POLLACK. I am not sure that there was a change of mind involved with respect to the dependability of the United States as a source of enriched material as much as, I suspect, an assessment of the technical and economic merits of the type of reactors that make use of enriched nuclear material for civil power purposes.

Representative HOSMER. You mean they did not have very good experience with this British thing?

Mr. KRATZER. It is certainly correct, Mr. Hosmer, that the vast majority of the reactors that have been sold around the world in foreign trade, in other words, outside the country of their manufacture, over the years have been reactors of U.S. types employing enriched uranium, this notwithstanding the fact that many Governments continue to feel that, other things being equal, it would be to their advantage to employ natural uranium reactors and thereby have the advantage of a source of fuel that can be obtained from many different places.