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Washington, D.C. The subcommittee et at 10:05 a.m, in room 1224, rett McKinley Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Stennis, Andrews, Rudman, and Eagleton; also present: Senator Mattingly.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES R. ALLEN, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MILITARY
VELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION
AIRLIFT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM
BUDGET REQUEST Senator STEVENS. Gentlemen, this is the time scheduled for this committee to examine the airlift enhancement program of the Air Force and all that this program entails.
Acting on information developed in a mobility study, the Air Force has now proposed to Congress that 50 new C-5B and 44 new KC-10A aircraft be purchased over the next 5 years at an estimated total cost of $11.5 billion.
In addition, the information we have is the Air Force is not giving up the CX concept and wants funding to continue research and development on the C-17 aircraft.
The Air Force also has indicated that it wants to complete rewinging the existing 77 C-5 aircraft at a total cost of $1.5 billion, along with improvements to other existing aircraft.
For the upcoming fiscal year, the acquisition request for the C-5 is just over $1 billion, including $200 million for rewinging existing aircraft, and $829 million for KC-10's. The total for that part of the acquisition is $1.9 billion for fiscal year 1983.
We also have a request for $97 million for reprograming pending on the C-5 for the fiscal year 1982, along with a supplemental budget request of $219.1 million for the fiscal year 1982 aircraft procurement, most of it for C-5 and KC-10 acquisition.
SUMMARY TABLE ON AIRLIFT ENHANCEMENT PROPOSAL For the record, I would like to ask the Air Force to supply a summary of the entire airlift enhancement proposal beginning with fiscal year 1982 and extending through the fiscal year 1988. We would like this summary to detail by appropriation account the total costs of modifying, acquiring, and operating the expanded airlift. We would like to have both budget authority and outlay estimates. [The information follows:]
SUMMARY OF ENTIRE AIRLIFT ENHANCEMENT PROPOSAL Attached are budget authority and outlay estimates of the acquisition, peacetime operations and maintenance, and required military construction costs for the 50 C5Bs, 44 KC-10s, and Civil Reserve Air Fleet enhancement in the airlift enhancement proposal. Budget Authority figures are based on the fiscal year 1983 President's Budget and therefore extend only through fiscal year 1987.
(3010) MILCON (3300) 0&M (3400). KC-10 procurement
(3010) MILCON (3300).
284.0 18.9 72.9
0&M (3400). CRAF procurement
Reflects multiyear proposal transmitted from OSD to congressional committees on 21 April 1982.
INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES Senator STEVENS. General Allen, I am happy to see you here, sir, with General Burke, General Vogt, and General Parker. We would like to put your statements in the record and have you summarize them. All the statements will be printed in the record in full.
I understand from the staff, General Burke, that you have a slide presentation.
General BURKE. Yes, sir.
Senator STEVENS. I will be happy to have that. We will have a day for hearing outside witnesses on this issue alone sometime before we report the bill to the floor.
Would you please proceed as you wish, General.
MOBILITY BALANCE WITHIN MILITARY FORCES General ALLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.
I welcome the opportunity to be with you today to discuss airlift requirements. I have provided a detailed statement for the record. In the interest of time I would like to highlight a few points from that statement which has been submitted.
Within our military forces we need a mobility balance and that balance needs to be considered in two fashions. First, we need a balance between the air and land combat forces that have to be moved in the event of a contingency or emergency and the mobility forces that are available to move them.
As I have pointed out on a number of occasions, the best trained 101st Airborne Division in the world, for example, is not going to be very effective in its role of deterrence or countering aggression if it is unable to fight outside the confines of Fort Campbell, Ky. And similarly, the best trained F-15 wing that one could imagine is not going to be very effective if it cannot fight outside its radius from Langley Air Force Base. We need a balance between our combat forces and the mobility forces which are required to deploy them.
In a second context within our mobility forces we need an appropriate balance between airlift, sealift, prepositioning and intratheater transportation resources. The key factors in determining that balance are the issues of time and volume.
Airlift, on the one hand, is responsive, it is flexible, but it is limited in volume. Sealift provides great volume, but is unable to get there in the critical early days. Prepositioning assists both timing and volume, but it reduces flexibility, and to some degree prepositioning also increases the requirements for airlift. The intratheater transportation, both air and ground, of course, is the mode which links together the other three, the airlift, the sealift, and the prepositioning and it cannot be ignored.
MILITARY AIRLIFT COMMAND READINESS The Military Airlift Command deploys and supports the employment of nearly all fighting elements within the U.S. military structure. We provide airlift, aeromedical evacuation, rescue and recovery forces, global weather support, and audio-visual support.