not attacked and unload a C-5, go to an alternate base where a 747, there would be no equipment waiting for it there whatsoever. See, I am trying to say, fine, the military wants to prevent war and you hope you never have it. But if it occurs you want equipment that responds to war.

Mr. SKEEN. It appears under the secnario you are saying, you want a tactical airlifter, not strategic?

Senator GARN. No, no.

Senator STEVENS. Will the Senator yield?

If you are right, why do we need the 747's and CRAF at all? Why do we have a program to try to get them in CRAF and why is the answer that they will be all right if we can get them in CRAF? Why do we need them at all if your point is correct that they can't be unloaded?

As a practical matter, we are fighting to get them into CRAF?
Senator GARN. We are trying to add to the CRAF program.
Senator STEVENS. For the same purpose.

Senator GARN. To expand the airlift capabilities. Senator, there is a wide variety of airlift requirements at any one time, from tactical to strategic airlift requirements. Different missions, different types. You certainly expect to have a variety of airlift capability. You have C-141's now. And we were using C-797's for a long time, 797G's as supplements to the airlift command to haul cargo.

We were not hauling outsize cargo in a C-797G. I am talking about the instance of getting division size equipment and all of that transported overseas and the capability to off-load and on-load that in a wartime situation. You need this capability.

That is not saying we cannot use 747's in the CRAF program to haul other cargo, as a backup, and to different bases.

Mr. BOYCE. Mr. Garn, in the requirement that we analyzed, which is the requirement stated by the DOD, moving the RDF to the Middle East, you should be aware that the massiveness of the airlift operation is substantial. It would require 24 hours a day, 27 days in a row for an airplane to land and take off every 4 minutes to destination airfields.

That is a substantial airlift operation. Included in that operation are C-5's, C-141's, KC-10's, 747's, and the DC-10's from the civil reserve air fleet. This is the scenario that has been put forth by the Defense Department.

The C-5's and C-141's haul a lot of equipment that has to be offloaded by special equipment, by K-loaders. So really the situation in that environment is the same for the C-5 and 141 as it would be for the 747 as far as requiring ground support equipment. That is really fundamentally what our position is, that we don't believe the 747 has any different handling problems of this kind of move than the C-5 has.

Senator GARN. Well, my time is up, I am sure. But it is simply having watched them load and off-load, the difference in that and the size of the opening and compared to going in the side and turning equipment, is really a very different problem. I hope you will not gloss over that. I am not trying to knock the 747, I am talking about a particular set of conditions that the 747 cannot perform as well as the C-5.

Somebody could tell me we are never going to have a war; if they could tell me that, I would be tickled to death for a large number of other reasons and say, fine, we don't need the additional C-5 capability. But military is designed for wartime uses, not a day-to-day operation of 747's, with a 97.5, or whatever its capability. I am sure that is true. It is a fantastic airplane.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Mattingly?

C-5 AVAILABILITY

Senator MATTINGLY. We've all seen many presentations by aircraft companies on military airlift so I guess we all have most of the information we need.

The only question I have is on the accuracy of your comment that there are now enough C-5's to do the job.

That is where I disagree. There is a well-documented requirement for additional C-5's.

Just to follow up on what Senator Garn said about combat situations, we have heard a lot about how well the 747 can perform, that all of these loaders and support equipment are out there for the Air Force to use. But, the fact is that last week, on June 19, the Army chartered a 747 to fly a National Guard unit from Puerto Rico directly to Fort Gordon, Ga., for a 2-week training exercise. However, they found that they could not offload the troops at Fort Gordon due to a lack of ground support equipment. These are troops, not cargo.

The Army then decided to fly the 747 to the Atlanta Airport, offload the troops and take buses to Fort Gordon. Total flight time from Puerto Rico to Atlanta is about 3 hours. A bus ride to Fort Gordon from Atlanta is over 10 hours. The other alternative was to fly an offload ladder and a fire truck large enough to handle a 747 into Fort Gordon. That would have required a C-5.

Isn't this precisely the type of difficulty that DOD and the military witnesses have been describing?

Mr. SKEEN. I don't think so, Senator, for this reason. This is a strategic airlift mission that goes into well-equipped major airfields around the world, which in this case there were some bad findings there obviously. But, it seems quite clear to me that on any of the fields to which we understand the scenario, one that the RDF would be transported in as Mr. Boyce stated, it would be a MAC activity, there would be plenty of these type of equipments around because you are flying the KČ-10's, it needs it. Much of the equipment that you fly on the C-5 and C-141 needs a loader, which I pointed out.

Senator MATTINGLY. The fact is that there wasn't offloading equipment for the 747 in Fort Gordon, Ga.

Mr. SKEEN. Perhaps.

Senator MATTINGLY. Not perhaps; there was not. I see many other significant C-5 capabilities that the 747 does not have. Does the 747 have integral self-deploying loading ramps at both ends of the aircraft?

Mr. SKEEN. The 747F has a nose door. It does not have a rear-end door.

Senator MATTINGLY. Does it have doors fore and aft that open up as large as the interior of the aircraft?

Mr. SKEEN. Major cargo doors on the left side of the airplane,

yes.

Senator MATTINGLY. Not as large as the interior of the aircraft? Mr. BOYCE. The dimensions of the doors are smaller than the dimensions of the interior cargo department, but the dimensions of the doors are certainly adequate to load all of the equipment we have stated it can carry.

Senator MATTINGLY. But it does not open up as large as the interior of the aircraft?

Mr. BOYCE. That is correct.

Senator MATTINGLY. Does it have a strong cargo floor capable of loading large military combat equipment?

Mr. SKEEN. Yes, oversize combat equipment, yes, sir.

Mr. BOYCE. That is correct. Everything we have loaded in this analysis and everything we have shown we can carry in the 747 and can be flown in the 747.

Senator MATTINGLY. Can it land on unpaved surfaces?

Mr. BOYCE. No, sir.

Senator MATTINGLY. Can it land on short runways?

Mr. BOYCE. The landing field length of the 747 as well as the take-off field length is essentially 800 feet longer than a C-5, in any constant condition, 800 feet.

Senator MATTINGLY. Can it be serviced without special support equipment? I think that was answered by the experience in Fort Gordon, Ga.

I have other questions I would like to ask, but I know my time is up.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Rudman.

FLEXIBILITY OF C-5

Senator RUDMAN. I have one comment and one question, Mr. Skeen.

What we are all grappling with, as I understand it, is if we don't care about money, and want total flexibility, we will buy the C-5's. That is obviously the more flexible airplane. You can't argue that. If money was no object, the C-5 has more total flexibility than the 747. Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. SKEEN. I think if you would define flexibility and I don't want to be a lawyer about it, but on balance I would agree with you.

Senator RUDMAN. Fine. The question really comes down to whether or not the load management and problems that Senator Garn raises can be handled for $7, $8, or $9 billion, over 20 years. How much trouble will we go to and primarily can we do it? I think that is the issue.

Each of us will have to decide that for ourselves as we did 2 weeks ago. But I have a question for you. I am disturbed by one of your opening comments. That is, after your long relationship with the U.S. Air Force, you seem to indicate that you never really got a

chance to tell your story at the highest levels of the Air Force and Defense Department. Is that accurate?

Mr. SKEEN. That is correct.

Senator RUDMAN. Can you just briefly, in the limited time I have, tell me what you tried to accomplish in terms of presentation and what the response was?

Mr. SKEEN. The response was simply this, we did not have-we were not able to get the appointments that we were asking for, to discuss our proposal. And just that simple.

Senator RUDMAN. Were you ever able to make a presentation to the Department of Defense, at any high level, such as you made here this morning?

Mr. SKEEN. No, not to the Secretary of Defense, not to the Deputy, Secretary Carlucci or Mr. Orr, all of whom we requested. Senator RUDMAN. I have to tell you I am in support of the defense program. But I think it is a pretty sad commentary that a company like Boeing or Lockheed or anyone that has had the record they have had serving our Government with equipment, can't even get the forum to present it.

Whether right or wrong, it seems to me our highest defense officials should at least make an effort to save a little money.

Senator STEVENS. I would say the failure of someone over there to give to Boeing a couple hours has led to at least four or 5,000 hours for Senators and maybe the balance is right in their minds, but not in mine.

Senator RUDMAN. Maybe that is the right proportion.
Senator STEVENS. We will now turn to the next witness.

Thank you very much.

We will now turn to Lockheed Corp., Mr. Ormsby, the president of Lockheed-Georgia Co.

LOCKHEED-GEORGIA CO.

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT B. ORMSBY, PRESIDENT, LOCKHEED-GEORGIA CO.

ACCOMPANIED BY CHARLES L. RAY, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE LOCKHEED-GEORGIA CO.

INTRODUCTION OF WITNESSES

Mr. ORMSBY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. We are pleased to be here before you today.

My name is Robert B. Ormsby and I am president of the Lockheed-Georgia Co.

I have with me Charles L. Ray, who is the vice president of Lockheed-Georgia Co.

We have provided a formal statement for the record. I would like now to present a shortened version of that material.

CARGO AIRCRAFT INVENTORY OF LOCKHEED

First of all, Lockheed designed and produced for the U.S. Air Force all of the military cargo airlift aircraft in the current active inventory, the C-130, the C-141, and the C-5, all of these airplanes have demonstrated their capability in crisis situations from Viet

nam to Israel. Thus, with three decades of intensive experience in support of this Nation's military airlift needs, I am grateful for the opportunity to address your committee. National security is the issue, and like you, I want the facts available for your consideration.

MILITARY AIRLIFT NEED

The proper place to begin, of course, is with the assessment of the military need-its size, character, and timing. This assessment must come from the Nation's Defense Department professionals, not from industry spokesmen like me.

First of all, let me remind you of what has been said specifically about the military airlift need.

On May, 13,1982, Deputy Secretary of Defense Carlucci said:

The DoD decision was made after examination of numerous alternatives, such as proposed procurement of lower-cost commercial wide-body cargo aircraft in lieu of C-5s. A reexamination of the data from the congressionally mandated mobility study has confirmed the validity of its conclusion that the shortfall of outsize cargo capability is our most immediate problem. This shortfall is at least 10 million tonmiles per day.

On March 24, 1982, Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Lew Allen said: Of particular concern is the inadequacy of airlift capable of carrying outsize cargo. This type cargo includes the bulky items-helicopters, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and so on-that comprise the bulk of the fire power of our ground forces.

The congressionally mandated mobility study, reaffirmed this shortfall of intertheater airlift to include at least 10 million ton-miles per day of outsize capable airlift.

On April 12, 1982, Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Edward C. Meyer said:

The most difficult of these airlift requirements is how to transport outsized cargo. Quite frankly, we would like all of our equipment to drive on and drive off the airplane with minimal pre- or post-shipment preparation.

I would reiterate that the more ready to fight configuration possible during movement, the greater flexibility we have to respond across a full spectrum of scenarios.

OUTSIZE AIRLIFT STATUS

Reflecting on these statements, I hear them saying:

First, there is an immediate shortage of military outsize airlift capability, ranging from 28 to 80 percent, depending on the particular scenario of the congressionally mandated mobility study.

I should point out there are four scenarios in that congressionally mandated mobility study having differing requirements.

Second, increasing the capability to haul oversize cargo-that which might fit into a converted commercial transport-only increases the imbalance between outsize and oversize airlift capability, an imbalance that doesn't permit, what the military people call, unit integrity.

In plain language, without unit integrity, you have placed our fighting men on the field of combat without everything needed to do the job. You are asking the battlefield commander, "Which would you rather have, the howitzer or the shells; the missile launcher or the missiles?"