configuration and adding the extra floor weight and the bigger door so that they could be convertible to a cargo role. The idea being that in peacetime they would carry passengers in service for United or whoever, but in an emergency they could come to General Allen and be modified to carry freight.

Unfortunately, by the time we got around to implementing this, there were no new production wide-bodied aircraft available. Those lines were fairly well stopped at that point. So we then looked at the prospect of modifying in-service airplanes that were already flying. When the bids came back on that they were quite disappointing because when you paid the penalty for the additional time out of service, the costs got to a level that we thought were not affordable.

Nonetheless, we aspire to go back to that. That is still the least cost alternative. We are hopeful that there will be new production aircraft in 1984 and beyond and we have budgeted in the outyears for additional CRAF aircraft.

We also looked at just buying ourselves new 747's or DC-10's, and we compared that with the idea of buying more of the KC-10's. We had already conducted a competition, which we called the ATCA, the advanced tanker cargo aircraft, and selected the DC-10 over the 747 for that role. We had made it an air refueling aircraft as well as a freighter. They are coming into service and we are very satisfied with them.

So from these two it just seemed desirable to continue with that buy of KC-10. We had competitively derived options on an additional 44 aircraft at favorable prices and the recommendation was to exercise those.

COMPARISON OF C-17 TO C-5B

Looking in the second area, the choice was between the C-17 and C-5B. The C-17 is a newer aircraft and a better aircraft. We prefer it, other factors being equal. Looking at it with the funding that was available for this purpose until a few months ago, there was not a great deal of difference in the time that either would be available, on the order of 12 to 18 months. We thought the advantages of the C-17 more than offset the early availability of the C5B.

In considering the whole airlift question late last year, the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense concluded that airlift was indeed an urgent and compelling need, that it ought to have a higher priority and ought to be funded at a higher level.

After doing that they asked us then which would be our preference and we then found that with increased funding for this purpose it was possible to get delivery on a C-5 much quicker than on a C-17. The C-5 was amendable to acceleration in ways that the C17, the new airplane, simply was not. Then we found that the differences in availability was more like 4 years and we thought it was not worth waiting the additional 4 years for a better airplane. On that basis we recommended that we procure 50 C-5's for which we had a firm fixed price proposal by Lockheed.

Those were our recommendations, continue CRAF when available, buy the 50 C-5's and the 44 KC-10's. When that was done, it would add 17 million ton-miles of cargo to the airlift force. It would be 4 million in CRAF, 5 million in the KC-10, and 8 million in the C-5B. So this is 9 million ton-miles per day non-outsize and 8 million of outsize, still leaving, as General Allen pointed out, a gap, a deficiency, and a deficiency that will increase as the older aircraft reach their retirement age.

Availability;
Cost; and
Military value.

(CHART 6)

COMPARISON OF C-5B TO 747

I think the major question that the committee is interested in is the proposal of fairly recently, although we had considered 747's earlier. That was highlighted in the last few months. I would like to talk about a comparison of the C-5B approach to that of buying 747's, and I will talk about it in terms of availability, the cost, and the military value of the two airplanes.

Just a word on availability. We would calculate that the 747 is available about a year earlier than the C-5. The C-5 proposal would provide for the delivery of the first airplane in 38 months.

The 747 would be available in 12 months, and that is, of course, a difference of 26 months.

But to that we would first have to allow a period of time to compete the 747 with the DC-10. We don't believe that we can procure the 747 under existing regulations without competition against the DC-10 which is equally available. That would take about 6 months. Then we would think that once we had the-

Senator STEVENS. Did you have a competition on the C-5B?

General BURKE. We did not have a competition on the C-5B because there is no alternative to the C-5B in terms of outsize cargo capability, but the DC-10 will clearly do the same sorts of things that the 747 can.

Additionally, the C-5 would go directly into operational service. It would just add to the force we already have. The 747 will be new and require a period of time for training and developing the supporting infrastructure. When we brought KC-10's in a couple of years ago, it took 9 months. We would think that for the 747 it would be about the same. So those 15 months then would reduce the difference in time to about 11 months and we think that would be the difference in operational availability.

I have a few charts on cost and a few more on military value.

The proposal that Boeing made to us was that instead of buying 50 C-5's we would buy 48 Boeing 747's. They did a calculation based on the CMMS scenario I which showed that at the end of 28 days these forces had done the same job. So in their view they were equally capable. We don't agree with that and I will explain why in a minute. But accepting the Boeing conclusions, the relative cost difference would be as shown. In acquisition about $2.6 billion and in 20-year life cycle costs about $2.8 billion less for the Boeing aircraft.

CMMS LOADINGS IN COMPARISON TO BOEING'S

We took the Boeing loading assumptions. We took the actual CMMS loadings that were in the study and ran that through our computer model and compared that to the Boeing. Boeing did these calculations with a different computer model and an assumed CMMS loading which differs in some ways from the actual one.

When we did that, rather than 48 we came out with 55 to reach equivalent deliveries at the end of the 28-day period. That changes the numbers and would lower the difference to about $1 billion in life cycle cost. But we think that is not the right way to look at the problem. That is a snapshot taken on day 28 of what you had been able to deliver and it does illuminate what took place between day 1 and day 28. I will show a measure that does look at that a bit later and that will point us to a very different conclusion.

Flexibility and responsiveness.

Outsize carriage capability.

MILITARY VALUE

(CHART 9)

MILITARY VALUE OF AIRCRAFT

Military value, if we could talk about flexibility and responsiveness, which may sound like buzz words, but they are very important things. By that we mean the ability to operate these aircraft in and out of airfields where we had not pre-positioned equipment and that we didn't even know that we were going to need to go into, to get them in and offloaded quickly with the equipment in the right condition and be on their way.

That outsize carriage capability of course is the ability to carry the very large things which make up the muscle and firepower of the modern Army and also the Marine Corps.

COMPARISON OF COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY AIRLIFTERS

To talk first about the flexibility and responsiveness, the ways to operate airplanes into places that you haven't planned ahead for and to do things that you haven't necessarily anticipated. There is a fundamentally different design philosophy in the way commercial airlifters are built and the way military airlifters are built, and that is because it is assumed that a commercial airlifter is going to operate from major terminal to major terminal and that it will have whatever equipment is there and whatever trained people are necessary for that purpose.

Hence, you will note that all of them will have a low wing and the body of the airplane will be considerably higher off the ground.