QUESTION: when i take a step back and look at the arguments that have raged on this C-58-vs-/47 issue, it seems to me that it's basically an argument between the Boeing analysts and the analysts of the Air Force and OSD. Do you feel that your analysts have better information than the experts at the Pentagon? Is there any reason why we should believe your analysis over that of the DOD? ANSWER QUESTION: Boeing analysts have the same information regarding the airlift requirement and the same capability to analyse potential procurement options to meet the airlift requirements. The Boeing analysis has been reviewed with Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division, Military Airlift Command, Air Force Systems Analysis, Air Force Research and Development, OSD, and CBO analysts. In those reviews, conducted after announcement of the C-58 decision we found that no one other than Boeing had made an analytical assessment of the impact of the C-58 decision relative to the criteria of reducing RDF closure times to southwest Asia. Closure time reduction has been accepted by DOD and Industry as the primary criteria, along with cost, against which the airlift decision would be made. We also found in those reviews no disagreement which would change the fundamental results of the Boeing analysis. Additionally, it is apparent to us that 747F cost and capability information held in the Pentagon is incomplete and incorrect despite our attempt to clear the record regarding that information. In comparing the military utility of the 747 and the C-5, you advocates of the 747 like to speak of the C-5 as only an outsize carrier. As I see it, there are many other significant C-5 capabilities that are absent in the 747s. I'd like to ask you about the capabilities of the 747. 1. --Does it have integral, self-deploying loading ramps at both ends of the aircraft? 2. --Does it have doors fore and aft that open up as large as the interior of the aircraft? 3. --Does it have a strong cargo floor capable of loading the large military combat equipment? Answer - The cargo floor strength will support the oversize and bulk 4. --Coes it provide truck-bed height loading at both ends of the aircraft? Answer No 5. --Does it have drive on/drive off vehicular loading? Answer - 747F landing performance using normal military rules is comparable to the C-5. Assuming consistent performance rules. the 747 landing distance is 800 ft. longer than the C-5. 8. --Can it be serviced without special support equipment? Answer - It can be serviced by the same equipment used to service existing CRAF airplanes and the KC-10. GENERAL The C-5A has unique capabilities such as those alluded to in these questions. Boeing does not deny this. Our assessment of the requirements developed by DoD in the CMMS is that the Air Force has enough C-5As (77) to accomplish the outsize movement required in the CMS, considering the DoD proposed program. Our analysis shows that adding either 50 C-5Bs or 48 747F aircraft to existing airlift resources has an identical operational result. 1) As a Senator, Mr. Mattingly, you must know that one person does not write a bill. Senators and Congressmen do not have the expertise in the many areas that bills they present cover. In order to handle such large ranging subjects, each office has staff members with the expertise needed for their committee positions. In the same way, the Project on Military Procurement relies on people with military weapon and procurement expertise to evaluate DoD practices. These men and women have worked their whole professional lives either in the DoD or under contracts with the DoD. Combined, their time in service to this country is well over 100 years. These are the people I work with and who provide the data the Project bases its testimony and reports upon. I would be the first person to agree that I do not have a strong background in strategic mobility planning. But then I have never portrayed myself as having such. Instead the Project speaks for those who who cannot speak for fear of reprisal. With the data provided by these closet patriots, which is extracted from the DoD's own internal documents, the Project presents an alternative view of defense spending which the Congress needs to hear. Since other Congressmen and their staff have also questioned the CMMS results, I think you will see that everything the DoD states should not be taken blindly by the American public and the Congress. 2) Since your question is not specific about the data you and Mr. Mosemann feel are misleading and incorrect, I may not be able to answer as you wish. Instead, I will say that all of the Project's statements and reports have been based upon official Air Force, Military Airlift Command, Lockheed, MacDonnel-Douglas, and Boeing data. The Project has documents that show the decision to buy more C-5's was highly political. On January 8, 1982, Mr. Orr briefed Mr. Carlucci on all the reasons not to buy the C-5. Some of the reasons were Lockheed's limited cost and schedule visibility, tentative aircraft performance specifications, no enforceable reliability or maintainability, the C-5's low mission capable rating, and its high maintenance manhours required per flying hour. Is Mr. Mosemann saying that this report which was prepared by the U.S. Air Force for Mr. Orr contains "misleading assumptions, and incorrect statements and comparison?" Mr. Orr's recommendation in this briefing was to use CRAF, KC-10's and B-747's in the short term, and the C-17 in the long term. He did not recommend the C-5 at all. (I will be happy to supply a copy of this briefing for your inspection.) On April 1, 1982, Major General Robert Rosenberg, USAF Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analysis, sent an analysis of the 747 proposal to AF/RD and said, "SA analysis does not dispute the Boeing claim of equality between the DoD program and their alternatives." Does Mr. Mosemann think the AF/SA is misleading the Air Force with such a statement. In April, 1982 the Military Airlift Command sent a cable to the Pentagon saying the C-5 option is preferable from the standpoint of "pure military utility," but that either the 747 or the C-5 could effectively reduce the airlift shortfall. Is MAC incorrect in its comments to the Pentagon? These documents, plus others I have, show that it was not a unified decision to go with the C-5. Again, if you will provide specific examples of where you and Mr. Mosemann feel the Project's data has been incorrect, I will be happy to look at them. SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS Senator STEVENS. The subcommittee stands in recess this issue, subject to the call of the Chair. [Whereupon, at 2:10 p.m., Thursday, June 24, the subcommittee was recessed to reconvene at the call of the Chair.] DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1983 WEDNESDAY, MAY 12, 1982 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., in room 1114, Everett McKinley Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Stevens, Schmitt, and Andrews. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. ROBERT C. KINGSTON, USA, COMMANDER, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE ACCOMPANIED BY: CHARLES W. GROOVER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PROGRAM INTEGRATION, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER, RESERVE AFFAIRS AND LOGISTICS) LT. GEN. JAMES R. BRICKEL, USAF, DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. READINESS COMMAND COL. JOSEPH V. RAFFERTY, USAF, HEAD OF FORCE PLANNING AND PROGRAMING DIVISION, PLANS AND POLICY DIRECTORATE, J-5, ORGANIZATION OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE READINESS ARMED FORCES READINESS Senator STEVENS. Gentlemen, we apologize for the problem regarding the hearing this morning. We had originally set it for 9 a.m. and changed it to 10 a.m. It is apparent that I am involved in convening the Senate more days than not now. I regret the inconvenience. We will try to see that it doesn't happen again. I extend my apologies to Senator Stennis, also. The principal subject of our inquiry today is the Rapid Deployment Force. I have also requested that the Department witnesses be prepared to discuss the general readiness of our Armed Forces. Our current military force levels stand at over 2 million personnel, most of which would be dedicated to an overseas location in the event of conflict. |