Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

QUESTION: Assuming a worst-case threat, what size Rapid Deployment Force would be necessary to execute Southwest Asia contingency plans?

ANSWER: This is a complex question.

[Deleted.]

This is the major reason why your support is

needed for the FY 84-88 program.

QUESTION: I assume the size force required would be in excess of your current capability. Have you planned to expand the RDF to the size necessary to counter the worst-case scenario?

ANSWER: Yes. Additional forces are included in the FY 84-88 Program. I would appreciate your support of this Program.

QUESTION: Are a number of the forces assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force also committed to reinforcing NATO or Northeast Asia? Do you consider this a major problem?

ANSWER: Yes. problem. [Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

Yes, it is a major

QUESTION: Many of the ships located at Diego Garcia have been there since 1980. What has been our experience regarding the condition of the equipment and cargo prepositioned aboard these ships?

ANSWER: The results of four equipment maintenance cycles indicate that the preventive maintenance program exceeded our expectations (d). There has been virtually no degradation or deterioration of equipment or supplies during the extended periods of maritime storage.

Contractor Services for Maintenance

QUESTION: What are the cost implications of shifting work to contractor services under the Commercial Industrial Services (CIS) program when Navy Intermediate Maintenance Activity facilities are overloaded? How does this compare with the cost of premium or overtime compensation at the in-house facilities? ANSWER: The shifting of work to contractor services under the CIS program is generally less expensive than other types of contractor maintenance. The CIS workload is typically small and repetitive and thus involves lower overhaul rates than with private ship overhaul contractors.

Navy intermediate maintenance activity personnel are military and therefore do not receive overtime or premium compensation. Public shipyard personnel perform more complex tasks typical of a depot maintenance activity. The CIS and public shipyard workloads are thus distinct and different from each other. The cost of CIS vice the cost of premium or overtime compensation at in-house facilities is not comparable.

Mission Capable Rates

QUESTION: Your statistics on mission capable rates indicate that the Air Force apparently achieves a relatively higher rate than the Navy even after the projected additive funding. Why is this?

-

ANSWER: The impact of increased funding in the readiness accounts does not occur instantly. Procurement leadtimes of about two years have a significant impact on being able to fix

quickly our readiness problems. The more immediate impact can be seen from maintaining a zero backlog of depot maintenance for the repair of engines, airframes, and components. Navy MC rates remain relatively lower than Air Force rates because they start from a lower readiness state, and in some cases, the inherent reliability of the weapons system is less. Also we must recognize that our ability to project mission capable rates is in its infancy. Thus mission capable rate projections serve more as an indicator of the health of the logistics and support system. Even more important than the absolute numbers during any one time period, historical and projected trends in MC rates warn us of problems or satisfy us that the support systems are working as they should.

QUESTION: Would you comment on the difference between an aircraft being mission capable and fully mission capable?

ANSWER: The definitions of full mission capable rates and mission capable rates are as follows:

Full Mission Capable (FMC): A system or equipment is considered FMC when it is safely useable and has all missionessential sub-systems installed and operating as designated by a Military Service. For equipment with a single mission FMC is synonomous with MC, and therefore not used.

Mission Capable (MC): A system or equipment is considered MC when it can perform at least one (and possibly, but not necessarily, all) of its assigned missions. MC is used as the sole rating indicator for single mission equipment.

A more detailed explanation of these and other materiel conditions indicators is found on pages B-7 and B-8 of Volume II of the DoD Force Readiness Report submitted to the Congress on February 15, 1982.

Improved Reliability and Maintainability

QUESTION: Only three aircraft types of the Air Force are projected to meet their mission capable rates by FY 1985. This is after substantial sums are programmed for improved reliability and maintainability. What more is required?

ANSWER: This answer assumes that the question refers to Volume II: Materiel Readiness Report of the DoD Force Readiness Report February 1982 (SECRET). The amounts the Air Force has been able to program for reliability and maintainability modifications represent only 76.0%, 41.1%, 26.7%, of the requirement in FY 81, 82, and 83, respectively. It must be recognized that the reliability/maintainability improvement area is a relatively small, yet significant factor in the capability equation. Many other factors also influence mission capable rates (MC). These include such factors as the FY 83 appropriations requests for enlistment/reenlistment bonuses, procurement of secondary items, and depot level end item and component repair. In essence, any factor which influences the people, facilities, and resources necessary to maintain aircraft must be funded to achieve higher MC goals.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECESS

[Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., Wednesday, May 12, the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, May 13, 1982, in room 1318, Dirksen Senate Office Building.]

[blocks in formation]

The subcommittee met at 9:07 a.m., in room S-407, the Capitol, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Stevens, Garn, Schmitt, Andrews, Kasten, and Rudman; also present, Senator Specter.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK C. CARLUCCI III, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF

DEFENSE

ACCOMPANIED BY:

LT. GEN. JAMES E. DALTON, USAF, DIRECTOR JOINT STAFF, OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MAJ. GEN. ROBERT C. TAYLOR, USAF, DEPUTY COMMANDER, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

GEORGE W. BADGER, DEPUTY PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR EUROPEAN AND NATO POLICY, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE READINESS

COSTS, MISSION, AND CONCERNS ABOUT RDF

Senator STEVENS. Gentlemen, we are here to continue our inquiry into the various appropriation requests directed to the Rapid Deployment Force [RDF] concept. We were unable at our initial hearing with General Kingston to pin down the costs of the RDF. We also did not receive satisfactory answers to our questions on the need for the creation of yet another military bureaucracy for this program and all related information. There was, in our opinion, confusion over the precise mission of the RDF and why that mission had been changed from its original global concept to one restricted to Southwest Asia.

We were particularly concerned about the concept that we were forming a new static theater to which the RDF would be attached. With us today is Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Honorable Frank Carlucci. It is our hope that Secretary Carlucci will be able to address the concerns raised by the committee and to help us

identify and analyze all the funding requests that pertain to it. We also hope to receive a more convincing justification on the need to expand the military bureaucracy associated with the RDF.

In order to promote a frank and open exchange, we are conducting this hearing in closed session, and only those with top secret clearances and a need to know should be present. I don't believe that we can or we will accept the concept that the change in this mission role will be classified. It has not been classified to date.

Secretary Carlucci, we welcome you back to the committee. We have your prepared statement and it will be printed in full in the record. I would like to have a declassified version of that statement to be printed in full in the record. Unfortunately, I think members of this subcommittee have a problem with the fact that there is a conference committee going on with the urgent supplemental and we are all members of that. It convenes at 9:30. There may be some members who have completed their section of the urgent supplemental who will be anxious to stay past 9:30, but I think Senator Garn and I have to be there at 9:30.

Proceed as you wish, Frank.

PURPOSE OF RDJTF

Mr. CARLUCCI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the interests of saving time I will be very brief since you do have my prepared statement.

As you are aware, the purpose of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force [RDJTF] is to provide the necessary assurances to our friends, particularly those in Southwest Asia, that we will be able to deter Soviet aggression. To deter such aggression, of course, we do not have to match the Soviets division for division, but we do have to have a credible force that will make them think about the possibility of engaging the United States in conflict and the resultant possibilities of escalation.

We do not believe we should carry the burden of this responsibility alone, and we are urging our allies to share this burden with us. As you are aware, in Southwest Asia, the British and French have a presence which is helpful.

As far as organization is concerned, the RDJTF was established in 1979, and President Reagan has made a decision that we should establish a unified command by January 1, 1983. The focus of the planning of this command will be on Southwest Asia, and it will have the normal responsibilities of any regional command.

Additional planning could be assigned to it in the future. The forces available to this command, both for operational control purposes and for planning purposes, are also ready and trained to be deployed to other parts of the world. This is an important distinction to make along the lines that you suggested, Mr. Chairman.

RDJTF COSTS

The costs for the RDJTF are embedded in our overall force structure, but we have broken those out to present to the committee. They are in two categories. First, for Southwest Asia specific programs, total $809 million in fiscal year 1983. Examples include water support equipment, regional military construction projects,

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »