We, therefore, come to the same conclusion which we have already seen, namely, that moral evil must be confined within the boundaries of the moral law; that this law must be confined to a state of probation, that probation is confined to the present life, and that retribution lies beyond the grave.

What the physical nature of moral evil is, when abstracted from man, I take not upon me to say; neither do I presume to determine in what manner it applies to other lapsed intelligences. Man is the subject of our inquiries, and "the proper study of mankind is man." Of this truth, however, we may be assured, that moral evil, as it applies to man, must apply to him as such; and therefore must exclusively apply to him in his compounded condition. It was to man, in his compounded state, that the laws of God, both natural and revealed, were exclusively given; and to him in this state those laws which distingush vice from virtue, must exclusively apply. But when this compounded mode of man's being shall be dissolved, and we shall enter into another condition of existence, I can have no conception how those laws, which were given to man in his probationary state and compounded condi tion, can be applicable to him in another, where probation, and (if the body rise not) compound must be alike unknown.

From these sources of argument, in conjunction with others, we cannot avoid inferring, that moral evil must be confined to a probationary state. And therefore, when this probationary state shall cease, even moral evil shall be no more.

That death shall terminate our probationary condition of being, is too obvious to require further proof. The separation of soul and body, together with the changes which present themselves to our senses, plainly mark the awful moment as an important epoch in existence; an epoch which launches the disembodied spirit into a future state, and commences that retribution which shall never end. And, since death must be considered as a natural effect of moral evil, which must be confined to our probationary state; when the cause expires, the effect must necessarily discontinue. For, as the existence of death is not real and personal, but rather negative, relative, and dependent; it can no longer continue in being than while that cause on which it is dependent is preserved. And, since moral evil is the primary cause from which it sprang, and is exclusively confined to a probationary state which death must terminate, the consequence is evident, that death, and moral evil, and a probationary state, must expire together.

As death has passed upon all men, because all have sinned, these arguments will apply individually to every victim of its gloomy power. The natural effects which finally terminate in the dissolution of the component parts of our bodies, may appear indeed to continue for a season; but when that cause which produced these effects shall be totally subdued, these effects must forever cease. Then that principle, which we shall soon consider, which constitutes the identity of the body, under all its changes, both in life and death, removed from

those oppressions which retarded the energies of its active nature, shall begin to put forth its infant powAnd, sufficiently ripened, through the recess which the grave affords, for a future state, this principle, when the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed, shall put on immortal life.

With the natural effects of moral evil, the moral consequences of human actions can, however, have but little or no connection. These moral consequences depend upon distinct causes, and must stand or fall with the moral attributes of God. His justice must proportion rewards and punishments in the great day of retribution, with impartial equity, and give to every man according to his works. But, when death shall be destroyed, the natural effects of death must perish; and the human body, liberated from its cold repository, must come forth into newness of life, and begin a state of existence which shall never end.

SECTION V.

On the Difference between the natural Effects and moral Consequences of moral Evil; with Arguments tending to prove that the former must ceuse, while the latter will continue for

ever.

In the preceding Section I have contended, that our present state of existence is a state of probation; but, that beyond the grave a continuence of this probationary state must be inapplicable, and therefore will be unknown. And, from hence I have concluded, that those laws which were applicable to a probationary state, cannot be presumed to retain their present operative power, in that state where probation must be swallowed up in retribution, and can have no existence.

From common observation, we cannot avoid learning, that, whatever modes of existence, moral evil may assume, its principal branches must consist in those actions to which the existence of the body, as well as that of the soul, is absolutely necessary. And certain it is, that these branches of moral evil can no longer be repeated, than while the body remains in union with the soul, and retains the power of muscular action. Now, we well know that in the hour of death, these powers of bodily action are quite suspended, and consequently, the body can be no longer subjected to those laws,

which are of a moral nature, and which distinguish vice from virtue. And hence it is we learn, that through the important change which death occasions, the body, while in a state of torpor, can be subject to no more law, because its alliance with the conscious spirit is now dissolved. And since the body when united to the soul was the subject of a moral law, and is now, through the disunion which has taken place, a subject no longer, this law must discontinue its operations, through a kind of necessity which is implanted in the natural constitution of things. As, therefore, the present constitution of man must be dissolved in the hour of death, we cannot, beyond the boundaries of the present life, be capable of those actions which constitute moral evil in our present state; consequently, retribution must succeed to the present life, and we must hereafter, either enjoy those rewards or suffer those punishments, which justice shall annex to our moral actions here below.

But, though moral evil, confined to the violation of those laws which are only appropriate to the present probationary state, must cease, together with its natural effects, when this life shall be no more, it will not follow that the moral consequences of our present actions must therefore expire. All effects have a necessary dependence upon their causes; and the same modes of reasoning, which will convince us that death must cease when moral evil shall be done away, will assure us that the moral consequences of moral evil must continue in existence,