from which the particles exhale; why may not a much greater change take place, while the identity remains entire? When the body of a corpulent man has been reduced to a mere skeleton by a fever, we may ask is that body the same that it was before? In point of identity it most undoubtedly is the same, but in point of real numerical particles, it is undoubtedly much changed, and is become considerably different from what it was before. And, as the loss of particles reduced his body to that skeleton at which I have just hinted; so, when this person shall be recovered from his reduced state, and restored to his former corpulency, it must be by the acquisition of new particles which are now incorporated in the system, in the room of those which the fever had wasted and exhaled. He must still possess the same body, in point of identity, under all the variation of health and sickness; though perhaps not less than one third part of the particles which now compose his system is entirely new. The refined and subtle fibres, which united the identity of his body, to those portions of matter which were occasionally in the mass, were never separated from the immaterial principle within. The adhesion must have continued through all those changes which the body had undergone; and therefore those parts, which were capable of being removed, could have formed no part of its identity.

That the identity of the man is still the same, will admit of decisive proof, from those successive acts of consciousness, which followed one another in regular order through sickness and health; and which

being the remotest act, anterior to his disease, into immediate contact with the present moment. And, as consciousness cannot be transferred from one principle, or system of atoms to another, it never can become evidence of facts, which, to it, did not exist. But, as he is conscious of those actions which he had already performed; so his present consciousness is not only an evidence of the existence of the fact itself, but a decisive evidence also of the continuance of his identity, during all those changes through which he had previously passed.

We see then the vast alterations which sickness can produce, without affecting the identity of the body. We see also the surprising changes which an infant undergoes, from an embryo in the womb to a maturity of years, and to hoary age; through all the numberless variations to which in every stage of life the body has been exposed. And yet through all those changes, which either sickness or health produces; which respiration, or effluvia, or perspiration can either separately or conjointly occasion, or which the embryo, from infancy to maturity can undergo; the identity is still the same.

A body, which is capable of preserving its identity under such changes as we thus constantly ob. serve, may, without doubt undergo many more, while its identity will still remain; and undergo such changes as will baffle all calculations, on the question of abstract possibility. The changes which it has undergone, and which it occasionally undergoes, are too evident to be denied; and from what we have seen, and what we see, we may safely pre

X

sume that more considerable changes are within the reach of possibility. But, to what extent these changes may take place without affecting the iden tity of that body which undergoes these changes, I will not presume to say. The amputation of many parts may undoubtedly take place, while the iden tity of that body (the parts of which are amputated) remains uninjured and entire. Nevertheless, amputation must be confined in its application; and as I have already observed, there must be some lines and boundaries beyond which amputation cannot pass.

The hairs of our heads may without doubt be cut off; and the nails of our fingers and toes may also be taken away. And even if our fingers and toes were amputated also, I think no question could be made on the subject, that sameness in point of vital union with the immaterial spirit would still continue, though the identity of the numerical particles would certainly be destroyed; and from those partial losses we may proceed to the amputation of legs and arms. If the amputation of these were to take place, I am still inclined to think, that the man' would be the same, i. e. the self same intelligent, animated being, compounded of an immaterial spirit and an organized body, united to this spirit by means which we cannot comprehend, would remain notwithstanding the amputation of legs and arms. And, since the vital union between these two substances must remain, notwithstanding these amputations; it plainly follows, that the identity of our bodies, and the identity of all their numerical parts, must be distinct subjects, as well as distinct ideas, which can

have no necessary connection. For, as the amputation of those parts will prove that the identity of the body still continues; it plainly follows, that our idea of the identity or sameness of the body cannot be constituted by all those particles which had been vitally united to the corporeal mass. From the vital union still remaining, this inference is placed beyond the reach of doubt; namely, that the principle of identity which resides within the body, under consideration, could not have been injured by the partial losses which the body had sustained; although this principle of identity must now retire within narrower confines, than it occupied when the whole corporeal mass was perfect and entire.

It is probable, however, that amputation cannot pass much further, without approaching the secret recesses, where those attenuated fibres are, which unite the different parts of the floating mass, in close and intimate connection with those particles which constitute the identity of the body; and which in all probability form some mysterious contact with the immortal spirit of man. The result of this reasoning will, however, I flatter myself, be fufficient to prove, that the identity of the human body cannot be constituted by that which constitutes the identity of its numerical parts. The identity of the body must be a distinct idea; it must consist in something which remains permanent, amidst the shocks of surrounding changes, and preserves its sameness through all the vicissitudes of human life,

SECTION IV.

The identity of the human Body more immediately considered.

HAVING, in the preceding section, considered the human body in general, as a mass of matter in a state of perpetual change; and having noticed that the amputation of many parts may actually take place, without affecting the permanent principle of its identity; it is a question which now naturally rises before us: In what does the identity of the human body more immediately consist?

That this identity cannot consist in all the numerical particles, which have occasionally been incorporated in the system, I have already hinted; and that it cannot consist either in all those which shall be attached to the body in the moment of its interment, or in the majority of them, I shall hereafter attempt to prove. And that the identity of the body should consist in any mere modification, which all the parts might at any time, either in life or death assume, it would be the height of folly to suppose.

From these circumstances, therefore, equally supported by reason and fact, as well as from the nature and constitution of the human body, we are urged to adopt this opinion, That there must be somewhere lodged within it, some portion of immoveable matter, from which its general identity