Mr. WEITZEL. Mr. Chairman, if that were to be done, I am afraid it would necessitate a lot of piecemeal legislation.

Mr. HOFFMAN. We have enough of that, so that a little more would not hurt.

Mr. WEITZEL. It would require authority to discontinue 10 accounts for a certain bureau.

Mr. HOFFMAN. But what you are asking for under section 116 is what you might say is almost unlimited power to determine the kind of accounts you are going to keep.

I am no more disposed to give the Comptroller General a blank check on authority-and I am sure he does not want it; I do not believe he does than I am any other agency of government. I did not believe that when he was in Congress, and I have never seen any evidence of it since. I think somebody else helped him write this.

Mr. WEITZEL, Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Warren wrote this himself. Mr. HOFFMAN. Well, you are speaking for him here, and I never knew him to be tongue-tied.

Mr. WEITZEL. This bill is all tied together on the basis that the agencies' accounting systems, under requirements prescribed by the Comptroller General, are going to be the basis of the controls of Congress, as well as of those which the Secretary of the Treasury needs to exercise, and which the Director of the Budget needs to exercise.

In line with that, we want to eliminate overlapping and duplication, and I am sure you do.

Your bill provides for it, too, except that we think the bill on this joint program provides for it in a realistic and a practical way. We want to provide for eliminating overlapping and duplication of controls so that you do not have to have accounts in six different places to reflect the same transaction when everybody can use the same information from the same place.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Let me say now: You are now getting into the realm of these professors. You are a young man coming here with the idea, as so many young men have, that you know all about everything. That may be true, but nevertheless, I think our Congress should have a little authority as to what they want the agencies to do. I can only tell what you think by what you say.

Mr. WEITZEL. I would like to call your attention to a provision in your bill, which I will not specify, but which goes much further than this.

Mr. HOFFMAN. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bonner, do you have any questions?

Mr. BONNER. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Burnside?

Mr. BURNSIDE. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bolling?

Mr. BOLLING. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Warren, I take it that since the point was being made, from your point of view adequately, you did not feel that there was any necessity of your saying anything further about section 116.

Mr. WARREN. No. We think it is necessary to carry out this joint accounting program, very necessary.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement along that same line?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Will you identify yourself, sir?

Mr. YATES. Frank L. Yates, Assistant Comptroller General. There is a point, Mr. Hoffman, that I think has not been brought out earlier. I am not a young professor. I have been with the Government 33 years, and I have seen these things flow along and these problems arise. The real reason for section 116 being included by the Comptroller General and why he has asked that he be given that authority is that under the joint accounting program it is the purpose of the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Budget, the Comptroller General and, indeed, all of the departments of the Government, to proceed in an orderly manner and improve accounting in the administrative departments and establishments, and in improving it to strengthen the administrative controls to be sure that they keep within the limitations enacted by the Congress in appropriation legislation.

Therefore, the purpose of asking that authority in section 116 is in order that the Comptroller General, when the accounting, as the joint program goes along, is adequately strengthened in the department, to enable the Comptroller General then, and only then, to remove what would then be a duplication of bookkeeping by removing these certain ledger accounts in the General Accounting Office; but only when he is assured that the substitute brought about by the joint accounting program is adequate to justify that removal.

Since they are to be removed on an agency-by-agency basis, you can see readily, I am sure, that enactment of legislation removing them all in one package would to that extent interfere with the progress of the joint accounting program and with the orderly way in which we intend to remove those ledger accounts.

Mr. HARDY. May I raise one or two questions on that?

You are proposing to change a good many systems and procedures in the accounting of various agencies; is that correct?

Mr. YATES. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. As those procedures and systems are changed, then your control in the General Accounting Office will have to be changed to conform; is that not correct?

Mr. YATES. And also to prevent unnecessary duplication of bookkeeping in the General Accounting Office.

Mr. HARDY. Might you not have the situation that if you had a system set up in an agency which did not key into the system which you have been using in the General Accounting Office, that you would not be able to change your system in the General Accounting Office?

Mr. YATES. Exactly. It is a part of the Joint Accounting program that there shall be made in the General Accounting Office certain changes to attune its work with the improvements throughout the Government.

Mr. HARDY. So that your own system in the General Accounting Office has to be adjusted from time to time as the agency systems are changed and improved; is that not correct?

Mr. YATES. And as we can, from time to time, rely on the agency systems more heavily than we can now.

Mr. HOFFMAN. This section 116 states that the Comptroller General can discontinue his accounting systems when, in his judgment, the accounting systems of the executive and legislative and judicial agencies are sufficient to enable him to do the job which the Congress has given him. That is what it is, is it not?

Mr. YATES. That is a correct way of stating it, yes.

Mr. HOFFMAN. Assuming that-it probably has happened and will happen again-that the Congress should, because some agency or department has been a little lax in its accounting, direct by statute that such an agency should give an accounting, under this section the Comptroller General could say, "No, we do not want that; we do not need it." He could do that, could he not?

Mr. YATES. No, sir; I do not believe that would follow.

What is involved here, Mr. Hoffman, is merely the present system of ledger accounts that are kept in the General Accounting Office as one of the means, not the only one, of enforcing the limitations imposed by Congress.

As the accounts of the departments become adequate and as the Comptroller General finds that they are faithfully kept-and the General Accouting Office has periodic reviews he may determine that it is unnecessary and unjustified to continue maintaining certain ledger accounts in the General Accounting Office.

Mr. HOFFMAN. What if he does not want to do it again?

Mr. YATES. He feels he can rely on what is happening there, with his review, to be sure that Congress' will is enforced. Then, and then only, it becomes unnecessary for him to keep these ledger accounts in the General Accounting Office, which could not be justified really at that stage since it would be unnecessary expense.

Mr. HOFFMAN. My only thought was that, inasmuch as I agreed with Mr. Warren's viewpoint that Congress should not give up any more of its authority, I was going one step further to say that they should not give any more than is necessary to the Comptroller

General.

Mr. YATES. There is no question about your motives, sir, but I just wanted to be sure you understood the real reason back of it. Mr. HOFFMAN. I realize that Mr. Warren is only going to be here 5

years.

Mr. YATES. I wish he could be here 15 more.

Mr. HOFFMAN. So do I.

Mr. LOVRE. Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lovre?

Mr. LOVRE. Mr. Warren, do you approve all the provisions of this bill, with this exception?

Mr. WARREN. I would say so.

You refer to sections 103 and 201.

Mr. LOVRE. That is the only exception?

Mr. WARREN. Yes. I understand that may come out.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harvey.

Mr. HARVEY. Mr. Warren, this bill, H. R. 9038 is presumed to put into action the so-called performance budget; is that correct? Mr. WARREN. That is correct.

Mr. HARVEY. What is the theory of the performance budget?

Mr. WARREN. I wonder if you would let the Director of the Budget discuss that. I have confined my remarks to the accounting and auditing provisions. The Director of the Budget is here and he will come on shortly.

Mr. HARVEY. Due to your very extensive and thorough background, you certainly have some ideas, and perhaps I can word my question a little differently.

Do you approve of the theory of the performance budget?

Mr. WARREN. Yes.

Mr. HARVEY. Why?

Mr. WARREN. I think it gives more information to the Congress. Mr. HARVEY. In what way?

Mr. WARREN. It spells out the functions to be performed and the cost thereof.

Mr. HARVEY. Could you give me an illustration of that?

Mr. WARREN. Can you give him a good illustration, Mr. Weitzel? Mr. WEITZEL. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Harvey, for example, in the case of an appropriation for the Department of Agriculture-now, this may be a bad example because I think a number of their appropriations are already on what you would call a performance basisthis bill would lay the foundation for the President sending up for that appropriation information as to the programs that were going to be carried out and the work that was to be done under that appropriation rather than just information on the basis of schedules, of positions and appropriation language, so that the Congress would have an idea of what actually was to be done with that money and the basis of measuring the performance after the job was done.

We would have the basis, in the General Accounting Office, for conducting our independent audit on that line also. The accounting provisions of the bill are carefully designed to tie right in with the performance budget basis.

I might say that right now we are carrying on a Government-wide survey, which the Bureau of the Budget is leading, in cooperation with the House Appropriations Committee, in accordance with the suggestions in the committee's report on the general appropriation bill, to see just what changes in classifications in accounting and budgeting are needed to give the Congress information as to the budget on a performance budget basis.

Along the line of simplification of accounts, the House Appropriations Committee has already laid the foundation for that in section 1110 of the general appropriations bill, and the procedures have been designed under the joint accounting program to simplify transfers between appropriations-but only, Mr. Hoffman, where that is authorized by law.

Mr. HOFFMAN. The other members of the committee wanted to know, too.

Mr. HARVEY. You started out to give an illustration and finally wound up with a generalization.

Mr. HARDY. Let me again ask him about the illustration.
Mr. HARVEY. I wanted it tied down to a specific example.

Mr. HARDY. Let me ask this question-I think it will do it: For instance, of the price-support operations. You mentioned the Department of Agriculture. Would the performance budget show the activities and the cost to the Production and Marketing Administration, the Commodity Credit Corporation, and so forth, with respect to price supports?

Mr. WEITZEL. I think, Mr. Hardy, an attempt has been made in the budget to tie that down. I think the people in the Department of Agriculture can verify that for you. I think their budget is more along the classic example that the Hoover Commission used in its report.

For example, the naval hospital at Bethesda received money out of several appropriations, but no Member of Congress could tell how it cost to operate the hospital.

The Bureau of Mines, I believe, received money from 16 appropriations, but you could not go to one place and find out what it cost to operate that Bureau.

It is a question for the Appropriations Committees in Congress as to how detailed they want the information.

But the performance budget idea is along the lines of the cost of the programs. In other words, they want $2,000,000 for a road-building program and they will show you what roads they are going to build and how many miles, and where to.

Or in the case of the Division of Disbursement, they will show you approximately how much it cost to issue every check they issue, with information as to the kinds and quantities of work to be performed. Mr. HARVEY. If I might interrupt you right there, the question I have in mind is this: Will this so-called performance budget give you a breakdown as to the amount of any given program that is expended for personnel, supplies, and the other breakdown that is commonly carried in our budgeting procedure as of now?

Mr. WEITZEL. That depends, Mr. Harvey, upon what the Appropriations Committees want. That breakdown was supplied to them this year by object classification, for supplies, transportation, travel, and so forth.

Mr. HARVEY. I am going to tell you now my impression of the performance budget. My impression of the performance budget is that it is a Mother Hubbard. You are just going to cover everything and make it nice from the outside, but I doubt very much, when you actually come down to it, that it will tie down these appropriations, as Congress has previously done, to specific things. It will just naturally, I think, give way to very poor spending methods.

You have said in the course of your testimony, Mr. Warren, that it will give Congress and the taxpayers a better understanding of public expenditures.

In what way will I, as a taxpayer, have a better understanding of how the Federal tax dollar is being spent under the performance budget?

Mr. WARREN. That understanding and information is what I am talking about. I think that Congress, and especially this committee and its subcommittees, already know the type of reports that we are making up here on corporations. I think that our Maritime report that has been handled by this committee was considered one of the most outstanding reports ever sent to Congress, and it was unanimously approved after exhaustive hearings by this committee.

I might say that this joint accounting program is headed by an eminent accountant of distinction, who has the confidence of the entire Government, Mr. Walter Frese.

For the first time since our Corporation Audits Division in the General Accounting Office was established, we are now current on our reports. There is only one more report to be sent next week to the Congress, which would make it current. Our Corporation Audits Division, headed by Mr. Ives and Mr. Decker, will compare favorably with any accounting house in America today.