Resolved, that, upon the death of the Lord Protector, in the intervals of Parliament, another fit person shall be forthwith elected to succeed him, which election shall be by the Council, so constituted, and with such limitations and restrictions as the Parliament shall think fit.

Monday 23. It was debated whether the elections shall be, in case the Lord Protector should die during the continuance of the Parliament.

Resolved, that in such case, the election shall be in the Parliament and not in the Council.

The reasons given for the elective or hereditary succession, pro et con., were divers; but I was not there at the time of those debates. But the reasons given, why the election should be rather in the Parliament than in the Council, were also divers, some of which I will here remember.

For the Parliament.

1. It was asserted and so agreed, on all sides, that it was an original fundamental right, inherent in the Parliament, to choose their supreme officers. Something of authority was alleged, in all ages, even from Cæsar's time, downwards, how kings have been elected, or approved and confirmed by Parliaments.

2. It would be thought a great diminution and disparagement to the Parliament, not to choose the Supreme Magistrate.

3. The original rights of the people, being intrusted with the Parliament, they cannot depute or delegate that trust to another, therefore not to the Council.

4. It would be much more satisfactory to the people, and more safe for the Protector, to have his election by the Parliament, the stamp of whose authority upon him would make him more willingly accepted by the people, and, besides, he that shall be so chosen by the Parliament, the Parliament will be engaged to stand by him, and to support him upon all occasions, which obligation will not be so great, where the Protector shall be chosen only by the Council.

5. Besides, it was objected, that to have this in the Council

only, would be too strong, and too great a temptation upon them.

A few may choose sooner, but a multitude were like to choose safer, for in a multitude of counsellors there is wisdom. A few will be easier cajoled or corrupted than a great many.

If the election be in the Council, they are persons certain and known, who may be prepared and courted in elections, to serve particular interests, which cannot be supposed in a Parliament.

They are persons not known who they shall be, before they are chosen, and so can have no preoccupancies nor applications made unto them beforehand. And they are so many, as it would be a vain and impracticable thing to prepare or corrupt them, if any should never so much endeavour it.

6. The danger of introducing the line of Charles Stuart would, for the former reasons, be very great; because they are easy to be cajoled or corrupted to serve his interest, being but twenty-one at most; and nine of them being, by the present constitution, to make a Council; and five being the major-part of nine, it is but the making of five of the eminent persons of the Council, and Charles Stuart's business would be done.

It could not be doubted he would bid high for a Restoration. He would willingly part with two kingdoms for the third; and two such kingdoms would be a competent bait to satisfy the ambition of five counsellors, though never so chaste. And it is very possible that in three years, twelve of the Council may possibly die, and then, nine are the only Council left; of which nine, five will be the major-part, as before. But possibly, thirteen of the Council may die; and then no Protector can be chosen at all, for want of a Council.

7. All other inconveniences and objections that can be made against the election by the Parliament, and for the Council, are as broad as long, and will hold with as much strength against the Council as the Parliament.

8. It may seem not so fit in so great a trust, that the

Council should choose, considering that the Council are not nominated by the Parliament, but approved only; and the trust of the election is agreed on all hands to be in the Parliament.

9. As it is now resolved the Protector is to choose the Council; and if the Council choose the Protector too, it may seem not altogether so equitable and convenient to reason.

10. For the great objection of the army, that is agreed necessary, however, to be kept up to secure the new government against the old interest; and therefore, if the election. were not thus, we could not expect the army should be disbanded.

11. The argument from an inconveniency of an interregnum, might easily be solved by putting the administration of the government, or it, into the Council, during the vacancy; and for administration of justice, all commissions, both of judges and justices, may be continued by an Act of Parliament, notwithstanding the death of the Protector.

These were the most general arguments which were used by those who argued to have the election in the Parliament, and the answers to such objections as were made against it.

On the other side, the reasons and the arguments why the election should rather be in the Council than in the Parliament, even sitting the Parliament, were many and weighty; the most considerable whereof, so near as I can remember, were these which follow.

For the Council.

1. The great danger there would be in so long an interregnum, as must needs be, if the election be placed in the Parliament.

2. The great difficulty of calling and convening the Parliament, as it is especially now constituted, in regard of Scotland and Ireland, and the great prejudice which may happen before a Parliament can be called.

3. When a Parliament is called, and no single person in being to be a check upon them, they may then perpetuate

themselves and vote a new government; or, at least, take all by survivor.

4. It must needs be long and difficult, before a Parliament can be thought to agree upon any one single person; their judgment being, in all probability, so different as they are like to be, and their affections as strong to persons of their several interests. Which must needs beget both extreme delays, and strifes, and discontents, when so many interests shall strive for it, and but one can have it.

5. In future times, when all parties are restored to freedom of elections, it may so happen, as we may have a Cavalier Parliament, which may, possibly, endanger the bringing in again of Charles Stuart or his family.

6. To prevent which, and to provide that elections be well regulated, it will be necessary to keep up a constant and considerable army, which will prove as considerable a charge.

7. If an army must be kept up, there will be as great a fear, that the army will, if not engross, yet always oversway and overawe the election.

8. A Parliament will be easier violated by force than a Council.

9. In case an election made by Parliament, should once be overborne, it will necessarily occasion the overbearing, if not the destruction even of Parliaments themselves. For he that shall come in, contrary to, and against the election of Parliament, will never have cause to be in love with Parliaments.

10. Parliaments are ever apt to be factious, and factions in Parliament are seldom but destructive wars; not so Councils, because they may be reconciled again by a Parliament. But who shall reconcile a Parliament? especially when there is no check upon them. A Parliament may be arbiter or judge of others' differences, but who shall arbitrate theirs?

11. When Parliaments meddle in personal things, they ever jangle and differ, and therefore, the wisdom of Parliaments hath ever avoided it as much as may be.

12. Seeking to bring too much, especially personal business to the Parliament, will be the destruction of it.

13. As it is sooner, so it is easier done by a Council, and by a few than by many. It is not probable that a few persons, especially such whose interests, by long acquaintance and a joint employment in business, have united in understandings and affections, should differ so much, or more, than 400 persons drawn from several nations, strangers and unknown to one another, and coming wholly unprepared to such a business. Whereas, it cannot but be presumed that the Council upon any sickness or danger of the present Protector, have premeditated and advised beforehand, who shall be the succeeding Protector.

14. If the choice be in the Parliament, it was conceived that it could not but bring a great deal of danger, even to the life of the present Protector. For, when it shall be known that the next Parliament, or this present sitting, shall choose the Protector in case of death, some wicked or passionate person may attempt some violence upon the person of the Lord Protector, that so they may come to have a new one chosen by the Parliament, or rather that they may have none at all chosen, but leave the government in the Parliament alone, and so re-establish a Commonwealth.

15. It cannot be supposed but in Parliament many persons will, probably, be in nomination, and those in all likelihood of the most eminent in the whole nation. And, whereas it is most certain that but one only can have it, it will follow that all the rest that miss of it, must needs be disobliged by him that hath it. Which will occasion so many enemies, at least parties and factions, as will beget at last an immortal jealousy between them, and uneasiness to them both. He that is chosen will look upon them that stood in competition with him, as persons of as high interest in the affections of the Parliament as himself, and like to be his next successor, and they who have missed of it cannot but bear a regret in their minds, of the disappointment.

16. There may be rules given to a Council, concerning the election, rules by which they may be limited and restrained, or directed as the Parliament shall think fit, which rules the