that this has been a successful innovative program, not without problems but nevertheless successful and innovative, that can be expanded beyond the former Soviet Union. Two, developing world-wide civil constituencies for nuclear security. During the Cold War, the United States pursued a variety of initiatives to promote democracy around the world and to defeat communism. It set up a special institute to support democratic institutions abroad, established Radio Free Europe, and funded a variety of programs whose purpose was to develop a constituency for democratic governance. Congress later used this tactic in support of a different objective when it established the private U.S. Înstitute for Peace. For its own part, the executive has established a series of special funds; for example, the special fund on AIDS in Afri ca. These same tactics can be applied to the new problem of nuclear security. Congress could, for example, establish a foundation or an institute for the prevention of WMD terrorism. Acting as a private entity, this institute could train and support the development of professional nuclear societies, journalists and locally-based environmental groups and others from other countries, from foreign nations, and then these people could go and monitor the state of nuclear security and press for improvements in their own country, much as we did the same thing in our fight against communism decades ago. Third, Congress might look at the establishment of legislator-tolegislator dialogue with legislators from other countries on this issue of nuclear terrorism and WMD terrorism. This list of initiatives is obviously not exhaustive. Instead, it is meant to illustrate how Congress might approach the question of policy innovation. Simply put, it makes sense for Congress to think about policy instruments it has used in other issue domains and how they might be creatively applied in the new context of nuclear terrorism. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, it has been a great honor to speak with you today. In my testimony I have suggested that multilateral regimes have proven to be effective and that they can be even more effective if considered as part of a broader strategy against nuclear and WMD terrorism. This strategy, premised on the notion that homeland security begins abroad, seeks to prevent terrorism at the source, to stop terrorists before they reach our shores. September 11 was a wake-up call, as the Chairman rightly said. It is history grabbing us by the collar and telling us to act now before it is too late. No institution has shown more vision, steadfastness or creativity on the problem of WMD terrorism than the U.S. Senate but recent events clearly demonstrate that additional action is required. My hope and expectation is that the Senate will respond to this challenge as it has responded to the challenges of the past and that America will be a stronger and more secure Nation as a result. Thank you. Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Mr. Walsh. Before I ask for Mr. Gormley's statement I would like to ask Sen Senator STEVENS. I am sorry to be late, Mr. Chairman. I had another meeting. I have no opening statement. Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Gormley, your statement, please. TESTIMONY OF DENNIS M. GORMLEY,1 SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES Mr. GORMLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to offer my suggestions on ways to enhance the Missile Technology Control Regime to cope with the prospects of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of both state and nonstate actors. I fear we have fallen short in adapting the MTCR to cope with rapid changes in the technologies underlying WMD delivery. The most egregious shortcoming is in the way the MTCR is ill prepared to deal with the next great missile proliferation threat, that of land attack cruise missiles. Concern about the spread of land attack cruise missiles is driven by two realities. First, the quantum leap in dual use technologies supporting cruise missile development, and these include satellite navigation and guidance, high resolution satellite imagery from a host of commercial vendors, unregulated flight management systems for converting manned aircraft into unmanned aerial vehicles, and digital mapping technologies for mission planning. And second, the fact that the 33-nation missile technology control regime is much less effective at controlling the spread of cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles than ballistic missiles. To be sure, ballistic missiles receive top priority because they are already widely proliferated while land attack cruise missiles have only begun to emerge as a threat, but that is precisely the reason why improved controls on cruise missiles are so critical now. Were the gaping deficiencies in the way the current MTCR provisions handle cruise missile transfers eliminated, the MTCR could conceivably do as well with cruise missiles as it has with controlling the spread of highly sophisticated ballistic missiles. So far, ballistic missile technology that has spread is largely 50year-old SCUD technology, a derivative of World War II German V-2 systems. Many of the weaknesses of this technology can be exploited by missile defenses. It is equally important to say what has not spread because of the MTCR-sophisticated Pershing-2 technology with terrain contour guidance and maneuvering reentry vehicles, as embodied in Argentina's and Iraq's forestalled Condor missile program, which would have greatly stressed today's missile defenses. My prepared statement goes into some detail on ways to repair the regime but let me offer just two stark examples of what might very well occur absent essential reforms. First, whereas today's MTCR has hindered advanced ballistic missile sales, ambiguities surrounding the ground rules for determining the true range and payload of cruise missiles threatens to open the floodgates of advanced cruise missile sales. This would be the equivalent of uncontrolled sales of Pershing-2 missiles to states outside the MTCR membership. Second, perhaps the gravest near-term terrorist threat of exploiting cruise missile technology lies in transforming manned kit airplanes into unmanned and armed weapons carriers. There is a dizzying array of kit airplanes in today's marketplace. A simple Internet search recently produced close to 100,000 copies of about 425 systems in a growing worldwide market. But the biggest challenge in transforming these kit airplanes into unmanned attack means involves the design and integration of a flight management system. At present, MTCR controls fail to deal with an emerging phenomenon of small aerospace firms getting into the business of selling flight management systems for transforming manned into unmanned air vehicles. The mind spins with scenarios of such unmanned systems, which are ideal means for disseminating biological agents threatening both domestic and overseas targets. Essential MTCR reform will be impossible without the determined leadership of senior Executive Branch decisionmakers, as well as a more rigorous and consistent management of the interagency process by the National Security Council. Leaders of key MTCR states, spurred by U.S. leadership, must come together to convince the broad partnership of the benefits of enhanced MTCR controls on cruise missile proliferation. It is important to recall President Reagan's original objective in announcing the MTCR in 1987, "Hindering, not eliminating the spread of missiles capable of delivering mass destruction weapons.' However imperfect the MTCR has been as a non-proliferation mechanism, it has hindered the spread of the most advanced and pernicious forms of ballistic missiles, making ballistic missile defenses more conceivable. It needs to do as well with cruise missiles. Letting cruise missiles proliferate will ultimately not only present its own set of unique demands from a cruise missile defense standpoint but will make effective ballistic missile defenses more costly and demanding, too. That is simply because in many respects they use the same interceptors. Patriot-3 is one good example. We need to spend far less time expanding MTCR membership and writing an international code of conduct, which shamelessly neglects to include cruise missiles in its language, and much more time reforming and adapting the regime to cope with technological change and new missile threats. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Gormley. We do have questions. I would like to ask Ms. Harris, the first question. There has been an on-going debate on the question of mass attack with biological weapons. Before September 11 and the anthrax attacks, U.S. military and nongovernment experts agreed that for some time to come terrorist groups are unlikely to have sufficient expertise and resources to succeed in a mass attack with biological weapons. Do you believe this statement? Ms. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I think that assessment is still valid, with one caveat, and that is assuming terrorists do not get assistance from a national biological or chemical weapons program. The technical and operational hurdles to terrorists acquiring these ca The worrying thing, as both the President and Secretary Rumsfeld have emphasized in recent weeks, is the possibility of assistance from a national program to one of these terrorist groups. This nexus between proliferation and terrorism really is the issue that we should be focusing on-to prevent national programs from being a source of assistance to terrorists' chemical and biological acquisition efforts. Senator AKAKA. Dr. Smithson, the administration has pointed to the failed UNSCOM inspections in Iraq as evidence of how even the most invasive inspections cannot stem biological weapon development and production. Do you agree? Ms. SMITHSON. No, sir, I do not agree with that position, the reason being that I have spent quite a bit of time in the company of those very UNSCOM inspectors. They have told me that virtually from the minute they walked into facilities, like Al Hakum and Salman Pak, they knew they were in the midst of an offensive biological weapons program. The same would hold true for the inspectors who first went over to the former Soviet facilities under what is known as the Trilateral Agreement. This also is the case with what U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry experts told me, and their views are presented in the Stimson Center report "House of Cards." So I think UNSCOM actually caught the Iraqi bioweapons program quickly, but did not come up with hard proof until very late in the game. So I would think there should be constructive measures that might be put in place to monitor the BWC. Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Dr. Walsh, Iraq nearly_completed building nuclear weapons despite IAEA inspections. There have been questions about IAEA's capabilities. Can current IAEA inspections detect clandestine nuclear programs? Dr. WALSH. It is an excellent question, Mr. Chairman, and I think when you look at the history of the non-proliferation regime what you see is, as in a lot of domains in life, something bad happens and then it is followed by something good. Something bad happens and it focuses attention, creates the political will, and then we have an improvement. When the NPT first came into force in 1970, it had no enforcement provisions, none. Subsequent to that we have had a series of arms control and other agreements that have become progressively more intrusive and therefore have given us greater transparency, a better look inside countries to see, in fact, if they are violating agreements. Now, in the case of Iraq, I think it is absolutely right that IAEA failed us, in part because they did not make use of the powers that they already possessed. They could have done more without having written an additional protocol but they failed to use those powers. Following Iraq, however, I think we have seen a reform of IAEA. There are still improvements to be made but you will remember that following Iraq we had the 93 Plus two protocol that would have established environmental monitoring and now there are a number of states who have joined that additional protocol. So, in response to Iraq, we developed new procedures and tech You also will have noticed that after Iraq, IAEA was much more aggressive and part of the reason why we knew about the North Korean problems, and were able to intervene to freeze that program, was because of the work of IAEA. I think also it would be unfair to say that IAEA was the only one responsible for negligence in the Iraqi case. Declassified documents indicate that a number of countries had suspicions about Iraq's nuclear behavior in the 1970's but for political reasons—animosity towards Iran after the hostage crisis, that sort of thing— many countries looked the other way. They knew what was going on but they looked the other way because they were more focused on Iran than Iraq. That was a decision that came back to haunt them. So in summary, it was more than IAEA that failed us in Iraq but since then there have been a number of administrative and technical steps that have bolstered and strengthened the regime. Senator AKAKA. Thank you. Mr. Gormley, your testimony mentions the challenge of determining cruise missile range and payload and how the range of cruise missiles may be changed with little apparent modification to its air frame. The question is could these challenges be addressed through an inspection regime? Mr. GORMLEY. That is a very good question and one I had not much thought about but it seems to me that an inspection regime with sufficient scrutiny would certainly provide one with enough information about the sheer volume of the missile and the relationship between the true payload and the amount of space earmarked for fuel. Then the calculation of range is a relatively straightforward one, assuming various launch altitudes, which account for the difficulty with cruise missiles compared with ballistic missiles. A ballistic missile is a ground-to-ground system and it is a simple determination of maximum range trajectory. In the case of a cruise missile, it can be launched from the ground and fly at a low altitude but because it is an aerodynamic vehicle, it can also fly at higher altitudes where the fuel efficiency is much greater. So the calculation based on an inspection with some scrutiny would certainly allow you to provide enough information to determine the true range capability of a cruise missile. Senator AKAKA. Thank you. I call on Senator Thompson. Senator THOMPSON. I will defer to Senator Cochran. Let me ask both Miss Harris and Miss Smithson for an interchange about the issues concerning the chemical and biological weapons conventions. I get the impression, Miss Harris, that you think the United States should have signed on to the recommendations of the November 2001 review conference. I get the impression, Miss Smithson, you really do not think that they should have and perhaps the United States is not going far enough in terms of the issues of verification. Here, as in other areas, it seems like we have a lot of nations who have signed on and a lot of nations who are in violation to the |