Senator COCHRAN. Judging from press accounts, our President has been in active discussions with President Putin and others about this situation and has expressed our concerns, and has requested that Russia take steps to see that this activity, the proliferation aspects of it, come to a halt. Do you have any indication now whether progress is being made in that area? That is in the diplomatic effort to persuade and convince our friends in Russia that they have an obligation to take some positive steps here to ensure that security interests here and elsewhere, even in Russia, are not threatened by the development of this nuclear capability in Iran.

What is your reaction to that, Mr. Van Diepen? Could you give us the status on that? What is the latest?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, this continues to be an issue that is discussed with the Russians regularly and at the highest levels. It was discussed at the recent summit, and it has been discussed in every significant meeting of United States and Russian officials.

I think the honest answer is that it is a mixed picture. On the one hand, because of the high-level U.S. efforts since about mid1997, the Russians have taken a number of important steps to help them deal with this problem. They have put in place very good export control legislation, including so-called catchall controls, to deal with items not on multilateral lists. They have investigated some entities. They have taken some level of action.

But the unfortunate truth is that Iranian entities, in particular, still continue to have substantial success in obtaining missile and nuclear-related technologies from Russian entities. And so we are far from satisfied with the level of performance from the Russians. And so we continue to engage. We continue to try to get them to realize that this is a serious, ongoing problem that they need to devote the necessary resources and priority to, because it is happening in their territory, so it is fundamentally their responsibility to get it fixed.

Senator COCHRAN. We are also at a disadvantage with respect to discussions with Iranian officials because we do not have diplomatic relations, and we do not have people there. Is that true, that we have an impediment to our efforts to discuss this directly with Iranians?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, I guess potentially implicit in your question is some assessment of the effectiveness of having such discussions. Certainly, our European friends and others have had direct discussions with the Iranians on these matters, and the answers either range from, "We are not doing anything," to "Hey, we live in a tough neighborhood." So it is not clear to me that the addition of a direct U.S.-Iranian dialogue on this subject would necessarily be all that helpful, given where they are. I think, frankly, that our other range of nonproliferation activities is more effective in impeding Iran's activities than a direct dialogue would be.

Senator COCHRAN. There is a suggestion that the Iranian reactor and others that may come afterward would be subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and inspections. What is your assessment of that? And will that help assuage our concerns, or should it, that there is no plutonium being converted to

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, by treaty, the Iranians must subject reactors to IAEA inspections, so that is not an extra offer on their part. That is part of their current obligation as being a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. And likewise, the Russians in this case also are obligated under the treaty to subject reactors to those kinds of safeguards.

I think the real issue is less with the reactor itself than with, as Marshall indicated, what having the reactor and the reactor project in place may allow the Iranians to do under the surface and the sort of covert assistance that could facilitate to a nuclear weapons program.

Senator COCHRAN. It was also suggested in this newspaper article that the Russians plan to sell equipment to the Iranians for four or five additional reactors after this project is over. Do you have any assessment of whether that is true or not? And what, if anything, does our administration intend to do to convince them they should not do that or take steps to dissuade them from it?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Marshall, you may correct me, but my recollection is there has been talk off and on for years about potential additional units at Bushehr, and it remains to be seen to what extent they may eventuate.

By definition, our concerns about the current ongoing project would extend to any additional units, and additional units would simply make it easier to use the infrastructure of this project to try to facilitate a covert nuclear weapons program.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Billingslea, anything to add on that?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Well, Senator, all I would say is that, if we are upset about one reactor at Bushehr, you can imagine how upset we would be over the prospects of five or six.

Senator COCHRAN. This is considered to be a very serious matter, as far as this administration is concerned?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. This is a very serious matter. And the concern over Bushehr predates this administration as well. There has been a great deal of success in turning off cooperation with the Bushehr project in terms of other countries. But the quest to obtain Russian cessation is ongoing and has not produced the kind of results we want yet.

Senator COCHRAN. There was some talk at one time about our offering lucrative incentives to Russia to help them understand that it would be in their own interest if they took steps to stop this proliferation of technology and information that could be converted to weapons use. Has there been any indication that those incentives have been a positive contribution to getting the Russians to do what we hope they will do?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, certainly some of the progress we have seen out of the Russians-for example, legislation, actions against specific entities-has come in the context of previous efforts to use sort of a carrot-and-stick approach.

For example, in 1998 and 1999, we used discretionary authorities to put penalties on certain Russian entities that were involved with Iran's missile or nuclear programs. And in the wake of that activity, there was a noticeable upsurge in Russian efforts on the legis

So certainly, there is a generic understanding_that the carrotand-stick approach is helpful in getting progress. But we still have a substantial way to go, and the exact path ahead to get to where we want to go is sort of unclear right now.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I see that the red light came on, and I think my time is up for this round.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much.

I have a number of questions. I want to switch from nuclear weapons proliferation to missile proliferation, and you may have time after that for further questions.

This is to both of you. Israel is considering arm sales of the Arrow missile defense system to India. Do either of you have concerns over the Arrow sale for Missile Technology Control Regime reasons? And do you think that Arrow sales to India might further destabilize the security situation in South Asia or exacerbate the regional arms race?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Mr. Chairman, let me try to answer that in generic terms. First of all, the Arrow interceptor is a so-called MTCR Category I rocket system. Israel is a country that unilaterally has pledged its adherence to the MTCR, so it, just as we or countries that are members of the MTCR, is committed to apply what is called a strong presumption of denial to exports of any Category I system, including Arrow, to any end-user for any purpose.

And so, in the example that you cite in that case, Israel would have to go through the necessary procedures to decide that it could overcome that strong presumption of denial and make that sale. And that is, by definition, not an easy matter.

Clearly, South Asia is a region of tension, as is obvious by ongoing events. India is a country that is pursuing programs of proliferation concern. So by definition, there would be issues that one would have to consider of that nature, in deciding whether or not to go ahead with such a sale.

Senator AKAKA. Do you have any comments on that, Mr. Billingslea?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, this matter came up in a hearing last week on the Moscow Treaty, where Senator Levin asked Secretary Rumsfeld about this, so I will cleave to, in essence, what my Secretary had to say.

We believe that missile defenses, generally speaking, are part of an inherently stabilizing concept. The right to defend yourself against these missiles is something that we feel is a matter to explore with the Indians, with the Pakistanis, if they are interested. What I would say is that we need to look at it more from the standpoint of what do the Indians feel they need in terms of defense for the region.

The Arrow system, because it is an MTCR-class missile, does raise certain obligations that we have under the MTCR. And I do not think the administration has come to a position on that whole complex issue of balancing the MTCR, our defense cooperation with India, so on and so forth. But it is a matter under active discussion. Again, we also need to hear from the Indians in terms of what they want and what they need.

Senator AKAKA. To both of you, the United States is considering

ing of a missile defense system. Would the interceptor technology anticipated for use in a missile defense system violate the MTCR if it is shared with non-MTCR partners?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, the answer is, it depends. It depends critically on what the capability of the missile system is we are talking about.

For example, Patriot PAC-3 is below the so-called Category I threshold, and so exports of PAC-3 would not be subject to this strong presumption of denial. MEADS, which Senator Cochran mentioned, falls below that line. So a lot of the more theater-oriented missile defense systems do not raise this issue of the strong presumption of denial.

If there were a future system that were capable enough to cross that line, then, again, we would be committed under the MTCR guidelines to apply that strong presumption.

Now, as we discussed in the UAV hearing, the strong presumption is not an absolute ban. It can be overcome on so-called rare occasions that are extremely well-justified in terms of five specific nonproliferation and export control factors in the MTCR guidelines. So another thing it would depend on would be who is the recipient, and how do they stack up against those factors?

So it is difficult to go too far down the hypothetical path, because the real world facts of what system to whom for what purpose really start to come into play very early on into this.

Senator AKAKA. Do you have a comment, Mr. Billingslea?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Well, happily, most of the countries with whom we would want and intend to work collaboratively on missile defense are within the MTCR framework as member countries. So a lot of this issue really goes away, in effect. I am certain that we will be able to balance these two priorities to get a good outcome.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Van Diepen, in your testimony, you discussed the possibility of challenge inspections as provided in the Chemical Weapons Convention. Is the administration considering using challenge inspections? And if so, against whom?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, Mr. Chairman, I certainly could not say anything in open session about anyone we might be considering challenging. But it is an active tool in the toolkit, and we are looking for potential opportunities for using it that makes sense, balancing all the various factors, including the very important need to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Van Diepen, in November 2001, the United States declared the Biological Weapons Convention draft protocols a dead issue and proposed voluntary measures for BWC members to demonstrate compliance. The question is, has the administration offered any standards or guidelines for these voluntary measures? And have any state parties enacted criminal legislation or stricter standards for security of biological agents?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Well, first of all, we made very specific proposals at the November 2001 review conference, along the lines that I described in my testimony. So there were very explicit proposals that we made.

Under the existing convention, states' parties are required to put in place criminal legislation to enforce their obligations under the

appointment, is that a large number of states' parties have not done so. And so we have been engaged in a remedial effort to try to get them to meet their treaty obligations in that respect. And certainly in the wake of September 11th and, in a sense, outside the context of the BWC, we have been engaged in separate efforts. As Marshall indicated, it is very important to try to secure dangerous pathogens that might fall into the hands of terrorists. And we have been engaged in a number of efforts in the Australia Group and elsewhere to try to promote awareness of this problem and to try to urge countries to put on higher levels of security in biosafety.

Senator AKAKA. Here is a question about control lists. The BWC and CWC have their own control lists. Is it realistic to pursue a comprehensive control list?

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. I am not quite sure I understand the question, Mr. Chairman. But, first of all, the BWC, the convention, does not have attended to it any lists of pathogens or equipment. Such lists were posited in the context of this protocol, but as you have already noted, the protocol is not going anywhere.

The CWC has lists of agents, but the purpose of that list of agents is to facilitate the work of onsite verification. In addition, those lists are used, in effect, as a sanction against countries that are not members of the convention to try to get them to join. There are so-called trade restrictions that limit to varying extents the degree to which state parties to the CWC can trade with nonparties in listed chemicals.

But, strictly speaking, there is not really an export control component to the CWC.

Senator AKAKA. Before I yield to my friend, Senator Cochran, I would like to ask Mr. Billingslea a question.

In your testimony, you state the United States has proposed an amendment to the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of maritime navigation. The amendment would allow military forces to board ships in international waters if they were carrying items in violation of the CWC, NPT, and BWC. How have our allies and international partners responded to this proposal?

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Senator, I do not have in front of me a roster of reactions. This is being worked through the International Maritime Organization.

What I will say is that there already exists a consent-based regime for dealing with narcotics trafficking. We have gotten good support out of a number of nations in terms of maritime operations to stop and board and inspect vessels suspected of trafficking or moving terrorists. And so there is a logical third piece to the puzzle that needs to be added here, which is the WMD cargo moving about.

If we feel that a vessel is carrying commodities that would assist a terror group or a terrorist-sponsoring state in acquiring WMD, we would like to see a consent-based regime, as well as a nonconsensual regime, established for stopping and searching certain vessels.

I am told that actually the United Kingdom has expressed a lot of interest in helping us on this, so it would appear that this piece