The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials Testimony by Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D. Director, Chemical & Biological Nonproliferation Program before the Subcommittee on International Security, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs November 7, 2001, 2:30 p.m. Room 342, Dirksen Senate Office Building Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, and guests: Many thanks for the opportunity to testify before you this afternoon on a topic of great importance and concern in the aftermath of September 11: the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to states and terrorist organizations. The recent series of anthrax attacks through the U.S. mail indicates that the global spread of dual-use technologies, materials, and scientific know-how relevant to the production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) poses a direct threat to U.S. national security. Indeed, although to date the exposures to anthrax-contaminated letters have so far remained limited, a large-scale attack with a chemical or biological agent against U.S. targets at home or abroad now appears to be a real possibility. Until the recent wave of anthrax attacks, experts disagreed over the likelihood that such an attack would occur in the foreseeable future. Previously, only a few terrorist groups had acquired and used unconventional weapons, and nearly all had encountered major technical hurdles in doing so. Perhaps the best-known example occurred in March 1995, when the Japanese doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyo released sarin nerve agent in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 people and injuring nearly a thousand. While psychologically devastating, this attack fell far short of the cult's goal of killing tens of thousands of civilians with the aim of triggering widespread anarchy and enabling Aum to seize control of the Japanese government. Despite Aum's estimated net worth of roughly $1 billion and its active recruitment of chemists and biologists from Japanese universities to create a CBW arsenal, the cult failed in repeated attempts to carry out true mass-casualty 'I am grateful to Cheryl Loeb and Gary Ackerman of the Monterey Institute for their invaluable assistance in preparing this testimony. attacks with either chemical or biological weapons. This case suggests that terrorist acquisition and delivery of CBW agents on a large scale is technically challenging. Nevertheless, the ongoing anthrax attacks against the United States indicate that the prospect of sub-state groups acquiring and using a biological weapon is no longer theoretical; bioterrorism has become a clear and present danger. Moreover, the high quality of the anthrax mailed to Senator Tom Daschle's office, containing dried spores that were reportedly milled to an extremely fine powder and processed with chemical additives so that they would readily become airborne and infect through the lungs, suggests that the perpetrators had access to specialized technology and know-how related to the "weaponization" of anthrax. Perhaps they acquired a limited supply of the material on the international black market, or more worrisome developed a manufacturing capability for dried anthrax powder. If the latter is true, the perpetrators would have the potential to disseminate larger quantities of dried anthrax spores through the air, potentially exposing thousands of people. Given the real possibility that the perpetrators have received assistance from former weapons scientists or from a state-sponsor, it is important to assess: (1) which states have been assessed to possess chemical and biological weapons, and (2) the extent to which trade in dual-use materials and technologies contributes to clandestine CBW programs. My testimony will first discuss the state and sub-state actors of CBW proliferation concern. I will then turn to technologies and materials that could be employed to produce and deliver these agents. States of CBW Proliferation Concern Evidence from open sources indicates that roughly 13 countries are actively seeking biological and chemical warfare capabilities. Proliferant states of particular concern to the United States include Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. (For more information on state-level chemical and biological weapons programs, see Table 1.) Iraq The current status of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs is unknown because of that country's efforts since 1991 to conceal the full extent of its prohibited activities. Iraq's expulsion of inspectors from the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in December 1998, and Baghdad's continuing refusal to admit inspectors from the successor agency, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), has further impeded international efforts to assess the status of Iraq's prohibited weapons programs. It appears likely, however, that Iraq has rebuilt key elements of its chemical and pharmaceutical production infrastructure that were destroyed during the Gulf War and by UNSCOM. These dual-use facilities could easily be converted to the production of CBW agents, and probably already have been. Various reports indicate that Iraq may retain a sizable stockpile of chemical munitions, including 25 or more special chemical/biological warheads for the al-Hussein ballistic missile and 2,000 aerial bombs. Iraq is also believed to possess sufficient precursor chemicals to produce hundreds of tons of mustard gas, VX, and other nerve agents. In short, Iraq retains the materials and technical expertise to revive its chemical warfare program within months, if it has not already done so. Iraq has not signed or ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention.2 Iraq is also believed to retain a substantial offensive biological warfare (BW) capability. During the UNSCOM inspections, Iraqi officials repeatedly misled the inspectors as to the nature and extent of its BW program and prevented them from verifying its claim to have unilaterally destroyed its biological arsenal. According to some estimates, Iraq may retain a stockpile of BW munitions, including more than 150 R400 aerial bombs and 25 or more special warheads for the al-Hussein ballistic missile. Iraq may also have retained a mobile production facility with the capacity to produce dried biological agents, which are particularly lethal. Iraq has not accounted for 17 metric tones of BW growth media, and may possess undeclared stocks of smallpox virus. Iraq currently maintains the technical expertise and equipment to reconstitute its biological warfare capabilities within months, including production of anthrax bacteria, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, and Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene) toxin.3 Iran Although Iran has ratified both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, it continues to pursue the acquisition of technologies and materials needed for the production of chemical and biological agents. Iran began its chemical weapons program in the mid-1980s, in response to Iraqi chemical attacks during the Iran-Iraq War. After 1985, Iran began manufacturing and stockpiling blister, blood, and choking agents, including cyanogen chloride, phosgene, and mustard gas. Reportedly, Iran began nerve agent production in 1994. Iran continues to augment its chemical weapons production capability by seeking to acquire relevant production technology, technical expertise, and precursor chemicals from other states, including Russia and China.4 2 U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2000," September 7,2001 <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_sep_2001.htm>; Javed Ali, "Chemical Weapons and the IranIraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance," Nonproliferation Review 8(1), Spring 2001, p. 43-58; Kelly Motz, “What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left? What Is On Its Shopping List?" Iraq Watch, http://www.iraqwatch.org/updates/update.asp?id=wpn200107231601; United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), “Report: Disarmament," January 25, 1999, http://cns.miis edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm; Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities" (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 17, 1998), pp. 1-5; U.S. Government White Paper, "Iraq Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs," February 13, 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/iraq_white_paper.html; Anthony H. Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Regional Trends, National Forces, Warfighting Capabilities, Delivery Options, and Weapons Effects, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2001, <http://www.csis.org/burke/mb/me_wmd_mideast.pdf>, pp. 75-79; United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), "UNSCOM Main Achievements," May 1998, <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/achievement.htm>; Physicians for Human Rights, Winds of Death: Iraq's Use of Poison Gas Against its Kurdish Population (Boston, MA: Physicians for Human Rights, February 1989), pp. 1-2. 3 United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), "Report: Disarmament," January 25, 1999, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/ucreport/index.htm; Kelly Motz, "What Has Iraq Been Doing Since Inspectors Left?" Steve Bowman, "Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) Capabilities," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 17, 1998), pp. 1-5; Barbara Starr, "UNSCOM Inspectors Still Doubt Iraq's Arms Claims," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 25, 1998, p. 18; U.S. Government White Paper 1998; Cordesman, Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, 2001, pp. 81-84; Jonathan B. Tucker, "Lessons of Iraq's Biological Weapons Programme," Arms Control/Contemporary Security Policy, 14(3), December 1993, pp. 229-271. E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 10, 1997, p. 37; Gregory F. Giles, "The Islamic Republic of Iran and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons," in Planning the Unthinkable, Peter Lavoy, Scott Sagan, and James Wirtz, eds., (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 79 Iran appears to have initiated a biological weapons-related research program in the 1980s. It is possible that Iran has produced small quantities of agents and has begun weaponization, although the types of pathogens being produced are unknown. Iran is suspected of having a BW research laboratory at Damghan. Furthermore, Iran has attempted to purchase BW-related materials from foreign sources, ostensibly for civilian use. Given the dual-use nature of many pathogens, materials, and equipment used in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries and biomedical research, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which Iran is engaging in legitimate or illicit activity. Libya During the 1980s, Libya produced more than 100 metric tons of nerve and blister agents at the Rabta facility, which Libya claimed was a pharmaceutical plant. A project to build a large underground chemical production facility at another site called Tarhunah has been underway since 1995, although international attention has slowed the pace of construction. Libya has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and it is heavily dependent on foreign suppliers for precursor chemicals and production equipment. The Libyan CW plant at Rabta was designed by the German firm Imhausen-Chemie and was supplied by a number of other West European and Japanese companies.' 6 Libya's biological weapons program has apparently not advanced beyond the research and development stage. It is possible, however, that Libya can produce small quantities of BW agents. Libya's offensive BW program is heavily dependent on dual-use materials and foreign assistance." North Korea Evidence in the public domain suggests that North Korea has operated an extensive CW program for many years and has the ability to produce a variety of agents, including adamsite, mustard, sarin, and VX. North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention." Although North Korea is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention, it has pursued BW capabilities since the 1960s and reportedly conducts research on the biological agents that cause anthrax, plague, smallpox, typhoid, and hemorrhagic fever. 103; W. Seth Carus, "Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications and Responses," Middle East Review of International Affairs, 1998, 2(1), pp. 1-14; Henry L. Stimson Center, "CWC Status: States of Chemical Weapons Proliferation Concern," May 27, 1998 <http://www.stimson.org/cwc/status.htm>; Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Iran: Objectives, Strategies and Resources," Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: U.S. Departinent of Defense, 1997) <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf>, pp. 3-4; Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power: Capabilities and Intentions (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996), pp. 9-25; Anthony H. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: National Efforts, War Fighting Capabilities, Weapons Lethality, Terrorism, and Arms Control Implications," (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 1998), pp. 22-24; Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), "Devil's Brew Briefings: Iran," <http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb1.htm>. " Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," February 1998, p. 24; Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), "Devil's Brew Briefings: Iran," p. 24; Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Iran: Objectives, Strategies and Resources," p. 5, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1996), p. 68. 6 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," January 2001, p. 47. 7 Robert M. Gates quoted in William Tuohy, "U.S. Pressing Allies on Libya Chemical Plant," Los Angeles Times, January 3, 1989, p. 10. 8 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, pp. 47. 9 Ibid., p. 9. Given the advanced status of North Korean missile programs, it is capable of delivering warheads filled with chemical or biological agents." Sudan 10 A party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Sudan has pursued the capability to produce chemical warfare agents since the 1980s. Sudan has sought foreign assistance from a number of countries that have CW programs, including Iraq. During the 1990s, Sudanese officials allegedly produced chemical weapons in collaboration with Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network, although the evidence in the public domain for this allegation remains equivocal." There are no confirmed reports that Sudan is pursuing a biological weapons program. Syria Syria has one of the largest and most advanced chemical warfare capabilities in the Middle East. Analysis indicates that Syria has chemical warheads for Scud ballistic missiles and chemical gravity bombs for delivery by aircraft. With an estimated CW stockpile in the hundreds of tons, Syria is believed to be capable of producing and delivering sarin and VX nerve agents, as well as mustard agent. Major Syrian CW production facilities are located near Damascus and Homs, with hundreds of tons of agents produced annually. Syria's chemical warfare program remains dependent on foreign precursor chemicals and equipment, and it has continued to solicit foreign sources of these materials. Syria has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. 12 While it is likely that Syria is developing an offensive BW capability, current evidence indicates that it is restricted to a research program." With significant assistance from other proliferant states, however, Syria could acquire a BW production capacity. Syria has signed but not ratified the Biological Weapons Convention. Sub-state Proliferation Concerns Trends in terrorism over the past two decades indicate a shift from political to religious motives. Today's most pernicious terrorists are not motivated by political ideology on the far left or far right, but are more likely to be extremists on the fringe of traditional religions or idiosyncratic cults with an apocalyptic mindset. Because religion acts as a legitimizing force by subordinating individual responsibility to divine will, groups motivated by religious extremism are more likely to experience fewer constraints on the use of violence to inflict indiscriminate casualties. For example, a millenarian ideology that espouses a belief in the imminence of Armageddon could serve to justify "Michael Barletta, "Chemical Weapons in the Sudan: Allegations and Evidence," The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1998, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/barlet61.htm>, pp. 115-36. 12 Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Strategic Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review, May 1993, p. 170. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Syria: Objectives, Strategies and Resources," Proliferation: Threat and Response, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1997), pp. 18-19. Cordesman, "Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East," 2/98, p. 21. "Devil's Brews Briefings: Syria," Centre for Defence and International Security Studies (CDISS), 1996 <http://www.cdiss.org/cbwnb5.htm>. Ahmed S. Hashim, Chemical and Biological Weapons and Deterrence Case Study 1: Syria (Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 5. Uzi Mahnaimi, "Syria Builds Nerve Gas Arsenal," London Sunday Times, November 17, 1996 <http://personal.thetimes.co.uk:80>. Paul Beaver, "Syria To Make Chemical Bomblets For Scud Cs," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 3, 1997, p. 3. 13 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001. |