mass-casualty attacks. Moreover, many of the so-called "new breed" of terrorists have an almost mystical fascination with chemical and biological agents because of the ability of toxic weapons to instill a pervasive sense of dread and their similarity to biblical plagues. Over the past decade, there has been an upsurge of interest by sub-state groups in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. Aum Shinrikyo, the apocalyptic Japanese cult, was most notable for the breadth of its activities. Aum tried to produce several biological agents, including anthrax and botulinum toxin, but because of technical problems the cult failed to inflict any known casualties in nine attempted biological attacks. The cult then focused on acquiring a chemical weapons factory and succeeded in producing several gallons of sarin, as well as smaller amounts of VX and mustard agent. Although Aum sought to inflict mass casualties in its March 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, the lack of an effective delivery system limited the impact to 12 deaths. 14 Another terrorist group, the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), has also demonstrated interest in CBW agents. Seydo Hazar, an ex-PKK member, reportedly told the British newspaper The Observer that he had been ordered to build a sarin bomb and that, after fleeing Turkey, he had left a cache of explosives and chemical precursors for sarin at a PKK safe house in Drosia, Greece. 15 Of course, the most prominent non-state actor believed to be involved with CBW agents is Osama Bin Laden. Numerous reports have claimed that bin Laden has attempted to acquire unspecified chemical weapons from entities in Iraq and Sudan, and biological agents (including botulinum toxin, plague, and anthrax) from biological suppliers in the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, and Indonesia. No hard evidence is available to verify these claims, however. 16 Dual-Use Equipment and Technologies Nearly all of the materials and equipment used to make CBW agents are dual-use, complicating the control, detection, and interdiction of proliferation-relevant exports. Chemical Agents Chemical warfare agents can be produced using 40-year-old technology and synthetic methods that have been widely published in the open scientific literature. Certain World War I-era chemical warfare agents, such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide, and sulfur mustard, are relatively easy to produce. There are, for instance, at least nine documented synthetic methods for sulfur mustard, small quantities of which could be manufactured in a crude facility such as a basement laboratory. Nerve agents require more technical sophistication, primarily because of the difficult and hazardous cyanation and alkylation reaction steps. 14 David A. Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo (1995)," Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons," Jonathan B. Tucker, ed, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 221. 15 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Excerpts from News Reports, Commentaries and Statements on PKK Terrorism," 09/28/97, <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupe/eh/eh04/01.htm>; Nils Lathem, "Osama Bought a Batch for 10G," NYPost.com <http://www.nypost.com/news/worldnews/32458.htm>. 16 Simon Reeve, The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden (Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1999). 17 Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BP-ISC-115, December 1993, pp. 21-22. Although the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Australia Group (an informal forum of 33 exporting countries) restrict trade in chemical weapons precursors, proliferant states have often been successful in circumventing these controls by purchasing these chemicals from unscrupulous suppliers and evading interdiction efforts by means of transshipment points and front companies. Thus, although export controls can slow proliferation, they do not constitute a long-term solution to the problem. Moreover, all of the key chemical weapons precursors can themselves be produced (with substantial effort) from more basic chemicals containing phosphorus, chlorine, and fluorine. Many of these more basic substances are commodity chemicals widely used in industry to make pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and other commercial products. Even if trade in these common chemicals could be curtailed, states often have the capability to use indigenous materials to derive more complex compounds through a process known as "back-integration." In the early 1980s, for example, Iraq was initially unable to produce thiodiglycol, a key ingredient in the production of mustard agent, and ordered more than 1,000 tons of this chemical from foreign suppliers. When the West imposed an embargo on chemical exports to Iraq, the Iraqis developed a way to produce thiodiglycol indigenously by reacting ethylene oxide with hydrogen sulfide." 18 States or terrorists need not seek to acquire proscribed chemical precursors if they desire a limited chemical warfare capability for use against civilians. Several chemicals not usually classed as battlefield weapons are still highly toxic, such as organophosphate insecticides. While not as lethal as sarin or soman, these "second tier" chemical agents have similar physiological effects to nerve agents and are far more accessible. Almost all of the equipment used to produce CW agents is dual-use and available to almost any country; no “smoking gun" piece of equipment exists. Corrosion-resistant reactor vessels and pipes and special ventilation and waste-handling equipment may be suggestive of illicit CW agent production, but states or groups unconcerned with worker safety or environmental contamination could easily eschew such precautions. Biological Agents 19 The dual-use problem is even more acute with respect to the production of biological warfare agents, such as anthrax and botulinum toxin. Pathogens are widely available, either from the natural environment in areas where diseases such as anthrax or plague are endemic, or from the hundreds of culture collections scattered across the globe that provide seed stocks for biomedical researchers and commercial biotechnology firms. The various types of nutrient media ("broth") needed to grow microorganisms are ubiquitous and widely traded. This situation is further complicated by the fact that some dangerous pathogens are not only studied by researchers but have also become commercial products. For example, pharmaceutical companies produce botulinum toxin (trade name Botox) for medical and cosmetic purposes, creating a large commercial market for this product. The equipment used to produce biological agents is almost completely dual-use: the same stainless-steel tanks suitable for growing anthrax are routinely used to produce 19 U.S. culture supply houses are now under stricter federal controls, but comparable controls do not apply to culture collections overseas. See Jonathan B. Tucker, “How to Regulate the Trade in Toxins" [op-ed], New York Times, October 26, 2001, p. A23. legitimate products such as vaccines, vitamins, food supplements, biopesticides, and fermented beverages. A multitude of companies manufacturing this equipment has grown up to service the burgeoning biotechnology industry, complicating attempts to impose restrictive export controls. Even freeze-drying (lyophilizing) and milling machines, which can be used to convert bacterial or viral agents into a dry powder for optimal dissemination as a fine-particle aerosol, have become standard equipment in the pharmaceutical industry. Military facilities that produce biological weapons are nearly indistinguishable from civilian vaccine plants, particularly if a proliferator deliberately cuts corners on environmental protection and worker safety to minimize the "signatures" of illicit production. Moreover, as occurred in Iraq, ostensibly commercial facilities such as vaccine plants or single-cell protein factories can be converted from legitimate to illicit production. Technological advances such as computer-controlled continuous-flow fermenters and hollow-fiber bioreactors have greatly reduced the size of a facility capable of producing large amounts of BW agents. Moreover, fermentation tanks equipped with "clean-in-place" technology make it possible to remove telltale residues of biological agent production in a matter of hours. As a result, detection of illicit military production has become substantially more difficult. Two simple facts highlight the difficulty of preventing terrorist access to dangerous biological pathogens. First, an individual with a modest amount of scientific knowledge and experience could culture small amounts of agent in something as innocuous as a laboratory flask. Second, the exponential growth of microorganisms means that a small seed stock of cultures can yield large amounts of agent in a relatively short amount of time. Nevertheless, chemical and biological agents do not become weapons unless there is a means to deliver them. Producing specialized munitions, such as artillery shells and missile warheads, requires a high degree of technical sophistication, but several more primitive delivery systems are dual-use. Unmodified agricultural sprayers (such as cropdusters) are not well suited for disseminating biological agents, but these devices could be used to spread chemical agents over a fairly large area, provided that the perpetrator takes precautions when filling the sprayer tanks and is aware of meteorological dynamics. Some agents, such as sarin, do not burn readily and hence could be dispersed using an explosive charge. Both of these delivery methods would be within reach of most states and certain sub-state terrorist groups. Accessibility to Dual-Use Technologies Attempts to regulate trade in dual-use technologies to countries of proliferation concern have faced intense opposition not only from non-aligned states that claim that such controls are discriminatory, but also from international suppliers, companies, and research institutes that benefit from the commercial sale and transfer of such technologies. Another problem is that the chemical and biotechnology industries are no longer confined to the highly industrialized countries of the West. In a number of developing countries, the availability of turn-key production facilities, an increasingly skilled work force, and low labor and regulatory costs have encouraged governments to promote these industries as a driver of economic growth. This trend has resulted in international trade in a wide variety of chemicals amounting to millions of tons per year, as well as a newfound interest in the indigenous production of generic pharmaceuticals and vaccines. Although the production processes utilized in developing countries might be a generation or two behind those in the United States and Europe, they are still more than adequate to produce both chemical and biological warfare agents. The burgeoning global commerce in the chemical and biotechnology sectors has spurred technological advances, some of which can facilitate the production of chemical or biological weapons by state or non-state actors. One example is the advent of microreactors that can process large volumes of chemicals yet are small enough to be disguised as laboratory equipment. Given the explosion of dual-use technologies, it seems more than likely that global commerce will continue to make it easier for state and sub-state actors to obtain chemical and biological WMD. A number of cases illustrate this ominous trend. 20 20 Iran is only one of a number of counties in the Middle East that has relied heavily on foreign assistance to establish its unconventional weapons programs. Over the past few years, the Iranian government has attempted to acquire CW precursor chemicals, production technology, and scientific expertise from Russian and Chinese suppliers. Iran has also attempted to acquire a large amount of dual-use biological materials from Russian and other foreign suppliers, ostensibly for Although current Iraqi capabilities are unknown, Iraq received extensive foreign assistance to establish its offensive BW program. Between 1985 and 1989, U.S. suppliers exported to Iraq cultures of Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Clostridium botulinum (botulism), Histoplasma capsulatam, Brucella melitensis (brucellosis), Clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), Clostridium tetani (tetanus), and dozens of other dangerous pathogens.22 In the 1980s, Iraq's State Establishment for Pesticide Production ordered and received incubators and culture media from West Germany. Many of the dual-use materials that Iraq ordered from foreign sources, ostensibly for civilian purposes, were used in biological weapons research. 23 25 The Aum Shinrikyo cult utilized dual-use chemical and biological materials. Aum Scientists at DuPont and MIT have used microreactors to produce hydrogen cyanide and phosgene, two chemical warfare agents. See Nicolas P. Chopey with G. Ondrey and G. Parkinson, "Microreactors Find New Niche," Chemical Engineering, March 1997, pp. 30-33. 21 Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," January 2001 <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ptr20010110.pdf>. 22 William Blum, "Anthrax for Export: U.S. Companies Sold Iraq the Ingredients for a Witch's Brew," The Progressive 4, April 1998, p. 18. 23 Der Spiegel, FBIS-WEU-90-196, "We Have Surprises," October 8, 1990, pp. 148-152. 24 Robert Guest, "Cult Germ Was Claim as Police Find Bacteria," Daily Telegraph, March 29, 1995, p. 13. 25 Mainichi Daily News, "Bacteria Used in Germ Warfare Found at Cult Site," March 29, 1995, p. 1; Kyodo, "Aum Bought Experimental Cells Before Subway Gas Attack," May 18, 1995. Type Culture Collection, a leading biological supply company. Harris also purchased other dual-use equipment and materials, which he used to conduct research on anthrax.26 State-Sponsors of Terrorism The continued proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to states and substate actors poses real and immediate threats for U.S. national security. The unprecedented use of anthrax as a biological weapon against the United States has resulted not only in widespread fear and panic but has highlighted our vulnerability to larger-scale biological attacks. Although the recent attacks have been relatively small-scale and not designed to inflict mass casualties, the disproportionate psychological and economic effects on American society may inspire further BW proliferation by rogue states and terrorists. If the perpetrators are not found and punished, others could be inspired to acquire and use biological agents. Moreover, in a unipolar world in which U.S. conventional military might predominates, it is increasingly likely that rogue states will turn to chemical and biological weapons as a force equalizer or a means of "asymmetric" warfare. Further compounding the threat to U.S. interests from the continued proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is the possibility that rogue regimes could supply CBW materials, equipment, know-how, or even finished weapons to terrorist organizations. As the number of states with CBW capabilities rises, the risk of direct or indirect transfer to terrorists will also increase. 28 27 Of all state-sponsors of terrorism, Iran is still viewed as the most energetic." Current recipients of Iranian largesse include Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad. The rise of the (relatively) moderate Mohammad Khatami in recent years has done nothing to halt this behavior. Conservatives are still in control of the Iranian military and intelligence services, and it is estimated that Iran provides more than $100 million in aid to terrorist organizations each year. Iran's terrorist-sponsoring activities are directed mainly by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), controlled by hard-line ayatollahs who are also responsible for Iran's WMD programs. Despite Iran's official condemnation of the September 11 attacks, it is still considered a sponsor of Hamas, Hizbollah, and Islamic Jihad, and may have provided these groups with CBW training and materials before any recent change of heart. Before Iran became a vigorous supporter of such groups, Libya was considered the overlord of international terrorism. As recently as 1996, Libya provided support and possibly training bases for the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLPGC). Recently, however, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi has appeared to moderate his behavior. In addition to extraditing the Pan Am 103 bombers to Scotland for trial, Qaddafi has reportedly cut ties with some radical groups such as Hamas." Nevertheless, 29 26 Jessica Eve Stern, "Larry Wayne Harris (1998)," in Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons," Jonathan B. Tucker, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 227-246. 27 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism," Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000, April 2001,<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/>. 28 Boaz Ganor, "Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism", <http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=5#Conflicts>, p. 4. 29 Ray Takeyh, "The Rogue Who Came in From the Cold," Foreign Affairs, May-June 2001. |