30 31 the State Department maintains that Libya maintains contact with other terrorist groups, including Islamic Jihad." U.S. government officials are also concerned about Libya because of its known chemical weapons capability and its close relationship with Iraq.3 Finally, Iraq's substantial experience with chemical and biological weapons needs no introduction. As a state-sponsor of terrorism, Iraq has supported the Abu Nidal Organization and the Palestine Liberation Front, although not as generously as Iran. Past allegations indicate that Iraq may be working closely with Islamic Jihad.32 Saddam Hussein's defiant and often erratic behavior, his hatred of the United States and Britain, and his history of attempting to enhance his stature as a regional hegemon, suggest that the transfer of Iraqi CBW materials or know-how to terrorists cannot be ruled out. Given the precedent that has now been set by the actual use of biological weapons against civilian targets in the United States, it is important for the international community to continue to strengthen the existing international norms against the possession and use of biological and chemical weapons. Although the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) impose a blanket prohibition on such weapons, both regimes have serious weaknesses that undermine their effectiveness. Accordingly, both regimes must be strengthened if they are to promote the international norm of non-use and possession by states of concern and, by extrapolation, by sub-state actors as well. For example, the United States has repeatedly accused Iran, a party to the CWC, of systematically violating its treaty obligations. A Central Intelligence Agency report to Congress in August 2000, states that "Iran, a... CWC party, already has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. During the second half of 1999, Tehran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly through intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW infrastructure."33 To date, however, Washington has failed to request a challenge inspection of Iran as permitted under the CWC, undermining the credibility of this key element of the treaty's verification regime. With respect to the BWC, the Bush administration decided in July 2001 to withdraw from a six-year effort to negotiate a legally binding compliance regime. Although the administration has recently proposed a package of alternative proposals, these measures appear insufficiently intrusive or effective to deter violations or to enhance compliance with the treaty." 34 31 30 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. "Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism." In the late 1980s, evidence surfaced that Libya had built two large chemical weapons facilities, including a secret underground plant at Tarhunah. The CIA also fears Libya may have engaged in joint BW development activities with Iraq. 33 Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999," available on-line at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications.bian/bian_aug2000.htm. 34 White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President: Strengthening the International Regime Against Biological Weapons," November 1, 2001. Conclusions In recent years, the growing availability of dual-use technologies, materials, information, and expertise associated with the production and delivery of chemical and biological weapons has exacerbated the CBW proliferation problem. Indeed, the relative ease of acquiring these weapons, when compared with advanced conventional or nuclear weapons, has increased their attractiveness to states that cannot afford more advanced weapons or are technically incapable of developing them. Moreover, history has shown that both state suppliers and unscrupulous companies are willing to sell sensitive technologies and materials to customers willing to pay. The legacy of the Soviet chemical and biological weapons programs, and the proliferation of these weapons to other countries, has also increased the risk that sub-state groups could acquire relevant technologies by stealing them from unguarded facilities or by recruiting unemployed weapons scientists. Given the dual-use dilemma and the rapid diffusion of legitimate chemical, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries around the globe, strengthened CBW export controls can buy time but do not offer a long-term solution to the proliferation problem. Instead, a strengthened international legal regime banning possession and use of these weapons, backed up with a credible threat of severe economic and military sanctions against violators, offers the best hope of reversing the spread of these heinous weapons. To achieve this goal, the United States should devote greater political and financial capital to strengthening the CWC and the BWC, make more effective use of existing treaty instruments (e.g., by requesting a CWC challenge inspection of Iran and other suspected violators), and seek to make the possession and use of chemical and biological weapons a "crime against humanity" under international law. BIO: Jonathan B. Tucker, Ph.D., directs the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program in the Washington, D.C. office of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is the editor of Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000) and the author of Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001). CNS Center for Nonproliferation Studies Table I: Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs, Past and Present This table summarizes data available from open sources. Precise assessment of a state's capabilities is difficult because most weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs were, and/or are, secret and cannot be independently assessed. Evidence for the existence of a program is characterized as: Known - where states have either declared their programs or there is clear evidence of chemical Probable where states have been publicly named by government or military officials as "probable" chemical weapons possessors or as producing chemical weapons Possible - where states have been widely identified as possibly having chemical weapons or a CW Former - where states have acknowledged having a chemical weapons stockpile and/or CW Detailed references for the table are available on the Center for Nonproliferation Studies web site at |