Contacts and Acknowledgments

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please call Joseph Christoff at (202) 5128979. F. James Shafer, Stephen M. Lord, Eugene Aloise, Lynn Cothern, Diana Glod, Jeffrey D. Phillips, Nanette J. Ryen, and Pierre R. Toureille made key contributions to this testimony.

*Countries pledging to abide by MTCR guidelines include the People's Republic of China, Israel, Romania, and Slovakia.

Source: Center for International Trade and Security, Nonproliferation Export Controls: A Global
Evaluation, 2001.

Appendix II

SELECTED GAO REPORTS ON EXPORT CONTROLS AND
FORMER SOVIET WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

EXPORT CONTROLS

Export Controls: State and Commerce Department License Review Times Are
Similar, GAO-01-528, June 1, 2001

Export Controls: Regulatory Change Needed to Comply with Missile Technology
Licensing Requirements, GAO-01-530, May 31, 2001

Export Controls: Inadequate Justification for Relaxation of Computer Controls
Demonstrates Need for Comprehensive Study, GAO-01-534T, March 15, 2001

Export Controls: System for Controlling Exports of High Performance Computing Is
Ineffective, GAO-01-10, December 18, 2000

Department of Energy: National Security Controls Over Contractors Traveling to Foreign Countries Need Strengthening, RCED-00-140, June 26, 2000

Export Controls: Challenges and Changes For Controls on Computer Exports, TNSIAD-00-187, May 26, 2000

• Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions to Controls on Computer Systems, T-NSIAD-00-139, March 23, 2000

Export Controls: National Security Risks and Revisions To Controls on Computers, T-
NSIAD-00-104, February 28, 2000

Export Controls: Statutory Reporting Requirements for Computers Not Fully
Addressed, NSIAD-00-45, November 5, 1999

• Export Controls: International Space Station Technology Transfers, NSIAD-00-14 November 3, 1999

Export Controls: Implementation of the 1998 Legislative Mandate for High
Performance Computers, T-NSIAD-00-53, October 28, 1999

• Export Controls: 1998 Legislative Mandate for High Performance Computers, NSIAD99-208, September 24, 1999

· Defense Trade: Department of Defense Savings From Export Sales Are Difficult to Capture, NSIAD-99-191, September 17, 1999

• Export Controls: Better Interagency Coordination Needed on Satellite Exports, NSIAD-99-182, September 17, 1999

Department of Energy: DOE Needs To Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors To Its Weapons Laboratories, T-RCED-99-28, October 14, 1998

· Export Controls: Change in Licensing Jurisdiction for Commercial Communications Satellites, T-NSIAD-98-222, September 17, 1998

• Export Controls: Changes in Controls Applied to the Export of High Performance Computers, T-NSIAD-98-250, September 16, 1998

Export Controls: Information on the Decision to Revise High Performance Computer Controls, NSIAD-98-196, September 16, 1998

Export Controls: National Security Issues and Foreign Availability for High
Performance Computer Exports, NSIAD-98-200, September 16, 1998.

Export Controls: Issues Related to the Export of Communications Satellites, T-
NSIAD-98-211, June 17, 1998

• Export Controls: Issues Related to Commercial Communications Satellites, T-NSIAD98-208 June 10, 1998

Department of Energy: DOE Needs to Improve Controls Over Foreign Visitors to Weapons Laboratories, RCED-97-229, September 25, 1997.

Export Controls: Sales of High Performance Computers to Russia's Nuclear Weapons Laboratories, T-NSIAD-97-128, April 15, 1997.

Export Controls: Change in Export Licensing Jurisdiction for Two Sensitive Dual-Use Items, NSIAD-97-24, January 14, 1997

Export Controls: Sensitive Machine Tool Exports to China, NSIAD-97-4 November 19, 1996

Export Controls: Sale of Telecommunications Equipment to China, NSIAD-97-5,
November 13, 1996.

Nuclear Weapons: Russia's Request for the Export of U.S. Computers for Stockpile
Maintenance, T-NSIAD-96-245, September 30, 1996

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Information on Nuclear Exports Controlled by U.S.-
EURATOM Agreement, RCED-95-168, June 16, 1995

Export Controls: Issues Concerning Sensitive Stealth-Related Items and
Technologies, T-NSIAD-95-158, May 11, 1995

Export Controls: Concerns Over Stealth-Related Exports, NSLAD-95-140, May 10, 1995

Export Controls: Some Controls Over Missile-Related Technology Exports to China Are Weak, NSIAD-95-82, April 17, 1995

FORMER SOVIET WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD Has Adequate Oversight of Assistance, But
Procedural Limitations Remain, GAO-01-694, June 19, 2001

· Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers
Program, GAO-01-582, May 10, 2001

Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE's Efforts to Assist Weapons Scientists in Russia's Nuclear Cities Faces Challenges, GAO-01-429, May 3, 2001

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Security of Russia's Nuclear Material Improving; Further Enhancements Needed, GAO-01-312, February 28, 2001

Biological Weapons: Effort to Reduce Former Soviet Threat Offers Benefits, Poses New Risks, GAO/NSIAD-00-138, April 28, 2000

Cooperative Threat Reduction: DOD's 1997-98 Reports on Accounting for Assistance Were Late and Incomplete, GAO/NSIAD-00-40, March 15, 2000

Weapons of Mass Destruction: U.S. Efforts to Reduce Threats from the Former Soviet Union, GAO/T-NSIAD/RCED-00-119, March 6, 2000

Nuclear Nonproliferation: Limited Progress in Improving Nuclear Material Security in Russia and the Newly Independent States, RCED/NSIAD-00-82, March 6, 2000