Elisa D. Harris Statement -3 February 12, 2002 other countries, including the Soviet Union, which was characterized in a November 1969 report to the National Security Council as having an interest in various potential biological warfare agents and “all the necessary means for developing an offensive capability." Based on defector and other information, we now know that the Soviet Union breached the BWC from the outset, launching a massive effort in the early 1970s to supplement its existing work on biological weapons at military facilities with R&D at civilian facilities under the management of an organization known as Biopreparat. Three other countries — North Korea, Egypt, and probably Israel - also had biological weapons programs at the time the BWC was concluded. Iraq began its biological weapons program in the mid1970s and South Africa in 1981. By the late 1980s, China, Iran, Syria, Libya, and Taiwan had been publicly identified by the U.S. as also having biological weapons programs. Except for Israel, all were either signatories or Parties to the BWC. Because of concerns about noncompliance, and the failure of politically-binding information exchanges to reverse the deterioration in confidence in the Convention, BWC Parties decided in 1994 to create an Ad Hoc Group to develop new measures, including a legally binding protocol, to strengthen the Convention. In April 2001, following six years of multilateral negotiations, a draft protocol was put forward by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group. This text contained a number of critical elements: mandatory declarations of facilities and activities that could most easily be misused to develop biological weapons; consultation procedures to clarify questions that might arise from these declarations, including the possibility of on-site visits; randomly selected transparency visits to promote accurate declarations; and, challenge investigations to pursue concerns that a country is developing, producing or using biological weapons. Throughout the negotiations, the Clinton Administration recognized that a BWC protocol would not solve the biological weapons problem. It would, however, establish legally binding procedures for pursuing evidence that others were developing or producing biological weapons, something we lack today. It would also provide new data that would enhance the ability of the U.S. to detect and respond to foreign biological weapons programs. Drawing from the procedures developed to protect sensitive information under the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Administration worked to ensure that the protocol could achieve these objectives without jeopardizing U.S. military or commercial interests. The Bush Administration, however, had a very different position. In July, the Administration announced its opposition not only to the compromise text but also to any subsequent protocol effort, arguing that such an approach was both too weak and too strong - too weak to catch cheaters; too strong to avoid putting at risk U.S. biological defense or trade secrets. At the five-year review conference for the BWC in November, the U.S. emphasized the importance of developing more effective measures to deal with Elisa D. Harris Statement -4 February 12, 2002 noncompliance, but the proposals it put forward focused largely on voluntary, national efforts. On the last day of the conference, the U.S. stunned and angered its allies by trying to force through a decision to disband the Ad Hoc Group and terminate its mandate. Desperate to avoid a complete collapse of this meeting aimed at bolstering the BWC, Parties agreed to suspend work until November 2002, having done nothing about the noncompliance problem. The Chemical Weapons Convention: Like the BWC, the CWC was considered another landmark treaty when it was concluded in 1993, because it required not only the elimination of all stocks of chemical weapons but also international monitoring of both government and commercial facilities to verify that Parties were complying with their obligations. The CWC has been in force for less than five years, and is thus still a very young treaty regime. Nevertheless, progress has been made under the treaty toward reducing the threat from national chemical weapons programs. concerns - During the CWC ratification debate in the U.S. in 1997, U.S. officials stated that about two dozen countries were trying to acquire chemical weapons. In January 2001, the Defense Department reported that about a dozen countries were pursuing chemical weapons programs. Ten of the countries previously identified by the U.S. as proliferation Russia, China, Iran, Libya, Ethiopia, South Korea, India, Pakistan, Sudan and Vietnam -- have become Parties to the CWC. Of these, two countries that had not acknowledged possessing chemical weapons, South Korea and India, have now declared chemical weapons stockpiles. Eleven countries, including Russia, China, Iran, South Korea, and India, have also declared current or past chemical weapons production facilities. In terms of actual destruction activity, some 6,400 metric tons of chemical agent have been eliminated under international verification since the CWC entered into force. All 61 declared chemical weapons production facilities have also been inactivated, 36 of which either have been destroyed or converted to permitted peaceful activities. Finally, over 1,100 inspections have been undertaken at about 500 sites in 49 countries of both military and industrial facilities covered by the Convention. Numbers, of course, only tell part of the story. The CWC also faces important challenges. First, several key countries, especially in Northeast Asia and the Middle East, remain outside the treaty. Of these, North Korea, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and Israel are of particular concern, given the likelihood that they retain chemical weapons programs. Second, questions remain about whether some Parties have made incomplete declarations or are continuing offensive activities. Russia, Iran, China, India, Pakistan and Sudan have been mentioned specifically by the U.S. as having not divulged the full extent of their chemical weapons programs. Third, although all four declared possessors are moving forward with their destruction efforts, both Russia and the United States have informed the CWC treaty organization -- the OPCW -- that they will be unable to meet the April 2007 deadline for destroying their chemical weapons stockpiles. Finally, the OPCW is in the second year of a financial crisis, resulting in serious cutbacks in verification activities. Elisa D. Harris Statement -5 February 12, 2002 inspections are expected in 2002. All of these issues - universality, noncompliance, CW destruction, and the budget -- must be addressed. Policy Recommendations Clearly, both the BWC and the CWC have the potential to make a much greater contribution to international efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons to national and sub-national groups. Steps can and should be taken to enhance the effectiveness of and reinforce the prohibitions in each of these treaties. With respect to the BWC, we should: Resume multilateral discussions on measures to strengthen the BWC: The Bush Administration's determination to kill both the BWC Protocol and the Ad Hoc Group last December blocked agreement on a process whereby the Administration's own BWC proposals could be considered by the international community. The U.S. should abandon its opposition to multilateral discussions and agree at the November 2002 meeting on a process that will allow both the U.S. and other proposals for strengthening the BWC to be explored. Expand the UN Secretary General's authority to investigate illicit BW activity: In 1982 and again in 1987, the UN General Assembly gave the Secretary General the authority to investigate allegations that chemical or biological weapons had been used. Pending international agreement on legally-binding enforcement measures for the BWC, the U.S. should support efforts to expand the Secretary General's authority to include allegations of the development, production or possession of biological weapons. Strengthen controls over dangerous pathogens: The FBI's investigation of the anthrax attacks has revealed serious gaps in the controls over pathogens that could be used for biological weapons purposes. The U.S. should take the lead in securing tighter international controls on culture collections and other repositories of biological materials. We should also work with other countries to strengthen oversight of laboratories to prevent deliberate or inadvertent misapplications of biotechnology for destructive purposes. Enhance oversight of the U.S. biological defense program: Revelations that the U.S. has produced weapons-grade anthrax and replicated a Soviet-era biological bomblet as part of its biological defense program have raised questions both here and abroad about the nature and scope of U.S. activities in this area. Until now, there has been no comprehensive review of these secret U.S biological defense activities, individually or in combination. The U.S. Congress should hold oversight hearings on the biological defense program to ensure that its scientific, legal and foreign policy impact are Elisa D. Harris Statement - 6 February 12, 2002 With respect to the CWC, we should: Make adherence to the CWC an explicit forcign policy goal: Libya's recent decision to join the CWC demonstrates that even in a complicated region such as the Middle East, there are opportunities for expanding membership in the treaty. It is not unimaginable that North Korea might agree to abandon its chemical weapons program and join the CWC as part of a broader security arrangement on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. should ensure that CWC adherence is a prominent issue in its foreign policy toward the remaining holdout countries. Use challenge inspections to pursue noncompliance concerns: In the initial years after entry into force of the CWC, the U.S. used the treaty's consultation provisions to try to resolve questions and concerns about a number of other Parties' declarations. Last month, Under Secretary of State Bolton described challenge inspections as a "flexible and indispensable tool" that can be instrumental in achieving the treaty's goals. The U.S. should be prepared to use challenge inspections to address serious compliance concerns, especially in countries where consultations were unsuccessful or not appropriate. Devote the resources necessary to meet the treaty's destruction deadlines: By the end of last year, both Russia and the U.S. had submitted documentation to the OPCW concerning their inability to meet the April 2007 deadline for destroying their chemical weapons. The U.S. should ensure that its technology and funding decisions allow it to complete destruction operations safely, and in time to meet the 20012 CWC extension deadline. The U.S. should also take the lead in creating an international consortium to assist Russia in meeting its CWC destruction obligations. Rectify the OPCW's budget problems: Partly because of the zero growth budget imposed on the OPCW over the past five years, the OPCW has begun another year millions of dollars short of what is required to carry out its implementation responsibilities. The U.S. should work with the OPCW and other Parties to ensure that there are sufficient funds to carry out all planned verification activities. Finally, we can further strengthen the BWC and the CWC by making it an international crime for individuals to develop, possess or use chemical or biological weapons. Both treaties impose legally-binding obligations on governments, but not on individuals, not to engage in prohibited activities. The U.S. should support the negotiation of a treaty like that proposed by the Harvard-Sussex Program that would make it a crime under international law for individuals to acquire or use chemical or biological weapons or to knowingly assist others in doing so. Prepared Statement Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services 12 February 2002 Amy E. Smithson, Ph.D. Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Project In the aftermath of last fall's multiple terrorist attacks, much focus has been placed on taking the most immediate steps needed to protect this nation's safety and security in an era where terrorists seek to inflict widespread and indiscriminate harm on US citizens and interests. Emphasis has rightly been placed on strengthening intelligence capabilities so that future terrorist plots can be thwarted as well as on better training and equipping of the nation's emergency responders to contend with all manner of terrorist-caused calamities. Initiatives to stiffen airline and border security have also come to the fore in the past few months, among other proposals and programs. Adjusting policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism is not easy. I would like to thank this committee for convening a hearing that looks beyond the obvious, a hearing that examines the utility of international treaties in helping to assure this nation's well being. Some tend to dismiss treaties out of habit or lack of understanding of the role they can and should play in an overall strategy for reducing security threats to this country. Critics deride accords that ban categories of weapons as weak tools that governments can break with impunity. Yet, arms control critics would hardly advocate that US laws against murder be scrapped, even if those laws are broken with disturbing frequency. Rather, they would call for better enforcement of those laws. As lawmakers, you can appreciate that even a good law is only as effective as its enforcement. Member governments are the custodians of international arms control treaties. The United States, arguably the world's most powerful nation and always self-described as a champion of nonproliferation, has a special responsibility to lead efforts to enforce these treaties. One of the frequent refrains of the past few months has been how easy it is for terrorists to acquire and use chemical and biological weapons. This misleading claim has led many to believe that mass casualty unconventional terrorist attacks are imminent, if not inevitable. While it is true that technical advances have made some aspects of chemical and biological weapons proliferation easier, there are many technical obstacles to the acquisition of a mass casualty capability with these types of weapons. A case in point is Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese cult that released the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway system on 20 March 1995. Aum Shinrikyo's sizeable corps of scientists figured out how to make small quantities of several chemical agents, as one might expect given how long both the formulas and the ingredients for such agents have been readily available. However, what stymied Aum Shinrikyo was the cult's inability to "scale up" its production of agent from a small quantity to the large amounts needed to inflict massive casualties. Aum's chemical weaponeers were unable to do this despite the |