Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency General Background The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was established in 1970 and seeks to curb the spread of nuclear weapons. With the 187 signatories, there are two categories of NPT members: Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) - consisting of the U.S., Russia, China, France and the U.K. - and NonNuclear Weapons States (NNWS). The NPT has the widest adherence of any arms control agreement. India, Israel and Pakistan remain outside the NPT. Since the treaty restricts NWS status to those nations that have manufactured and exploded a nuclear device prior to 1967, these nations would have to join the treaty as NNWS by dismantling their nuclear weapons and placing them under international safeguards. The treaty prohibits NWS from aiding NNWS from acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. The NPT also establishes safeguards for the transfer of fissionable material and ensures transfers of nuclear material are not being used for nuclear weapons. The NPT conducts a review conference every five years and a decision after 25 years over whether the treaty should be extended. The 1995 review conference extended the treaty indefinitely. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is charged with inspecting non-nuclear weapons states nuclear facilities. It operates an international inspection system to provide assurances that nuclear materials and technology are not diverted for use in nuclear weapons. The agency also provides assistance in civilian applications of nuclear technology. All nuclear weapon members of the NPT agree to allow the IAEA to inspect their nuclear inventories. The IAEA conducts thousands of inspections annually. However, even if IAEA inspectors detect clandestine nuclear activity, the NPT contains no formal provisions for enforcement. The IAEA is headquartered in Vienna, Austria. There are approximately 2,193 staff representing 93 nationalities. The overall budget of the IAEA is about $300 million including voluntary contributions. Challenges and Concerns Events since September 11 have drawn attention to the political danger of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons. IAEA inspectors recently helped Georgian scientists to transfer radioactive material discovered at a nuclear storage site. The IAEA recovered two Soviet era radioactive batteries which were plucked, steaming, from the bushes, and encased in lead in the remote mountains of the Caucuses mountains. While officials have declared this a success, the possibility of more radioactive material turning up to manufacture a crude nuclear weapon cannot be ruled out. The IAEA held a special session on November 2001 to focus on the issue of combating nuclear terrorism. The IAEA Director General stated that the willingness of terrorists to commit suicide for their aims makes the nuclear terrorism threat far more likely than it was before September 11. According to the IAEA there have been 175 cases of trafficking of nuclear material since 1993 and 201 cases of trafficking other radioactive material. The IAEA estimates that $30-50 million annually will be needed to strengthen and expand its programs to meet the terrorist threat. Some NPT member states, such as Iraq and North Korea have violated the NPT and diverted civilian nuclear technology and materials to covert weapons programs. Iraq was a party to the NPT for many years and has used its civil programs to disguise its nuclear weapons program. Iraq ended cooperation with UNCSCOM in 1999 and efforts to reestablish inspections in Iraq have been blocked by Russia and France in the U.S. Security Council. North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985 but refused to accept safeguards until 1992. When the IAEA discovered discrepancies, it reported them to the United Nations National Security Council, which urged North Korea to comply. North Korea remain obligated under the NPT to allow inspections, despite its noncompliance. Inspections in Iraq and North Korea provide lessons for strengthening the IAEA. The IAEA has upgraded safeguards to prevent repeat problems in Iraq and elsewhere. Although prior to the Gulf War, member states have not provided intelligence information to the IAEA, they are increasingly using intelligence from member states. Recently the agency has begun to use commercial satellite imagery to augment its information databases. The IAEA has reasserted itself to gain access to facilities, additional authority is needed. A new inspection agreement, the Additional Safeguards Protocol, would increase inspector's authority to collect more information about a wider range of activities, use more intrusive inspection methods, and expand access to undeclared activities. The U.S. and the IAEA reached agreement based on the model protocol, but it was never ratified. The IAEA will continue to need technology upgrades for detection of nuclear materials and depends on support from member states and its budget is limited - divided among missions popular with certain members such as nuclear safety and technical assistance. Missile Technology Control Regime General Background The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a voluntary agreement among states pledges to control the export of missile systems and technology capable of delivering 500 kilograms of payload 300 kilometers or more. The objective of the MTCR is to create a common export policy for missile technology. There are 33 nations in the MTCR and membership is determined by consensus. The MTCR does not has a formal independent mechanism and does not have a budget. Technical meetings are held on an ad hoc basis. An office within the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs acts as the point of contact for coordination of meetings. Since there is no official secretariat, the regimes activities are carried out through bilateral diplomatic relations. Unlike the NPT and the CWC, the MTCR is neither an international treaty nor a legally binding agreement. Its members voluntarily pledge to support the regimes export guidelines. There are no provisions for enforcement or sanctions. U.S. laws do require sanctions against entities that import or export items controlled by the regime even if traded with a state that is not an adherent Trade of MTCR with non-members is not absolutely prohibited but rather constrained by export laws. MTCR guidelines call for restraint in the transfer of missile technologies, especially whole missile transfers. Transfers require the exporting government obtain binding assurances on enduse from the recipient government. While originally designed to address the spread of missiles delivering nuclear weapons, the MTCR was expanded in 1993 to include the restriction of delivery systems for biological and chemical weapons. Manned aircraft and space programs are exempt from the agreement so long. as they do not contribute to the delivery of WMD. Missiles and missile technology covered by the MTCR are defined as the following: The MTCR faces a wide range of challenges and concerns over preventing missile proliferation. There is resentment among non-MTCR members over the control of missile technology. There is a lack of clear and reliable information about countries' missile programs and capabilities. There are questions over the effectiveness of the regime as the threat of missile proliferation has continued to widen. It is currently estimated that fewer than 10 countries have the capability to indigenously develop and maintain missiles. At least five countries - India, Israel, Iran and Pakistan and North Korea - have active testing programs. According to recent testimony from Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, Russia, China and North Korea are the leading proliferators of missile technology. While several non-member states have committed to adhere unilaterally to MTCR guidelines, problems persist. China is not a member of the MTCR but has agreed to abide by MTCR guidelines. China's adherence to the MTCR remains in question and CIA reports on proliferation continue to cite Chinese transfers to Pakistan and Iran which violate terms of the regime. The U.S. imposed sanctions on China in September of 2001 for shipping missile equipment to Pakistan. China has agreed not to export missile technologies and in exchange the U.S. has continued to process U.S. companies applications to use Chinese space launch facilities. Unlike other regimes, the MTCR employs a supply-side approach to missile proliferation that many see as ineffective given the current and future trends in missile proliferation. There is no missile equivalent to the NPT, CWC and BWC. The MTCR is a norm setting organization that may only be effective while key technology remains in the hands of member states. Non-member states have possessed missile technology for some time and the emerging missile states such as Iran, Iraq and Syria may follow North Korea to become suppliers as well as consumers. The MTCR was not designed to deal with contemporary missile proliferation. It attempts to keep technology away from non-members and does not account for emerging missiles states and nonstate actors outside the MTCR. It was never intended to halt missile proliferation - rather slow it until a more complete regime could be adopted. There are also many challenges to controlling missile technology. Missile programs are dual-use. Rationales behind them include trade and security considerations. There are no commonly agreed to set of norms for the export of missile technology. Missile technology is difficult to identify and there is a shortage of information on countries' missile programs. Changes in military capabilities can take place with little or no warning. It is necessary to establish objective information on countries' capabilities, intentions and stages of development in missile programs. There may be clear signs of a new approach to missile proliferation. The Draft Code of Conduct developed at the 2000 Helsinki Plenary designed a set of principles and commitments and confidence building measures which were circulated among states world wide to develop a common concept of responsible missile behavior. The definitions in the code are intended to be broad enough to allow non-NPT and non-MTCR members to sign the agreement. The last Ottowa Plenary Meeting in 2001 addressed the need for further adaptation to new technologies and stronger enforcement of export controls. The Draft Code of Conduct is likely to encounter a set of challenges over the potential advantages increased transparency gives countries with developed missile programs. This would be especially true if those countries with less developed programs are required to disclose information on their development. Useful Websites 1. Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org) 2. The Acronym Institute for Disarmament and Diplomacy (www.acronym.org.uk/dd/index.htm) 3. Arms Control Association (www.armscontrol.org) 4. Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (www.opcw.nl) 5. International Atomic Energy Agency (www.iaea.org) Appendix: A Recent Non-Proliferation Statements from the Administration John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Statement to the Conference on Disarmament Geneva, Switzerland January 24, 2002 Mr. President and distinguished delegates, It is an honor for me to address the Conference on Disarmament (CD) at the beginning of its 2002 session. At the outset, let me congratulate you, Mister President, on assuming your office. I can assure you of the full support of the United States in carrying out your duties. I would also like to recognize the outstanding CD Secretary General, a counterpart of mine on UN matters during the first Bush Administration. It is a particular honor for me today to be able to introduce the new U.S. ambassador to the Conference, Eric Javits, who comes to you after a long career specializing in what he characterizes as "difficult negotiations." He clearly has the proper background for the CD and has the full support of the Bush Administration as he strives in this distinguished Conference to advance international peace and security. Permit me to outline to this body, the world's oldest multilateral arms control negotiating forum, the fundamental elements of the Bush Administration's security policy. Our timing is particularly opportune. The September 11 terrorist attacks have made all too clear the grave threats to civilized nations that come from terrorists who strike without warning, their state sponsors, and rogue states that seek weapons of mass destruction. We must defend our homelands, our forces, and our friends and allies against these threats. And we must insist on holding accountable states that violate their nonproliferation commitments. The fight against terrorism will remain a top international security priority. As President Bush said: "Our lives, our way of life, and our every hope for the world depend on a single commitment: The authors of mass murder must be defeated, and never allowed to gain or use the weapons of mass destruction." The United States and its partners in this fight will meet this threat with every method at our disposal. Above all, we are acting to end state sponsorship of terror. The United States believes that with very few exceptions, terrorist groups have not acquired and cannot acquire weapons of mass destruction without the support of nation-states. This support might be technical assistance. It might be funding. Perhaps such assistance has taken the form of simply turning a blind eye to terrorist camps within one's borders. But the fact that governments which sponsor terrorist groups also are pursuing chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs is alarming, and cannot be ignored. Nations that assist terror are playing a dangerous game. As President Bush stated to a joint session of the U.S. Congress last fall: "We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime." If the September 11 terrorist attacks taught the United States nothing else, it taught us not to underestimate the intentions and capabilities of rogue states and terrorist groups. We will not be complacent to the threat of any kind of attack on the United States, especially from weapons of mass |