Convention (CWC) of 1993 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) of 1972. The AG faces particular challenges in controlling biological weapons, since this capability rests more on the acquisition of information relative to material and equipment. Since the initial stages of legitimate biological applications and weapons production are identical, verification limits on biotechnology are likely to be more intrusive than in the case of chemical and nuclear weapons.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

The MTCR is an informal, voluntary association of countries that share the goals of nonproliferation and seek the coordination of export licensing of missiles and related technology. Since it was established in 1987, membership has steadily grown to 32 countries. It controls the export of missiles and related technology according to payload (500 kg) and range (300 km) parameters. Export contol arrangements also cover specially designed production facilities and related missile technology. Rules, incentives and sanctions for either adhering to or violating the agreement have varied considerably.

The Wassenaar Agreement (WA)

This informal agreement of 33 countries is the successor to the Cold War export control regime (COCOM) and was established in 1995 to control the transfer of conventional weapons and sensitive dual-use items and technologies. The agreement was established to promote transparency in export control policies and greater responsibility in preventing destabilizing accumulations of conventional weapons and related technologies. The arrangement does not identify countries that member states must avoid when exporting dual-use technologies. It does not require member countries to consult others prior to granting licenses and the regime does not have a single-member veto for either adding or removing items from controlled lists. States use aggregate reporting to obfuscate understanding of which specific technologies were exported.

1.

Appendix: Background on Non-proliferation Assistance Programs

Former Soviet WMD Programs, Stockpiles and Treaties:

Most former Soviet states, except for Russia, were unaware and unprepared for the materials they inherited when the Soviet Union collapsed. The weapons of mass destruction stockpiles turned over to their control included complete weapons and weapon systems, materials, facilities, technology and critical personnel.

A. Nuclear Stockpile and Arms Control Agreements

A comprehensive inventory of all Russian nuclear weapon assets does not exist. In 1991, at the close of the Cold War, Russia had more than:

40,000 nuclear weapons

1,000 metric tons of highly enriched uranium

at least 150 metric tons of weapon grade plutonium that could be used to make an additional 40,000 weapons.

A number of factors have come together to present an immediate risk of theft of these weapons and materials: delays in payments to guards at nuclear facilities, breakdowns in command structures, and inadequate budgets for protection of stockpiles and weapon laboratories.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) series were written to reduce the size of the American and Russian nuclear weapon stockpile, specifying the overall number of complete nuclear warheads, weapons, and delivery systems, and setting up a detailed verification system. The Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) within DOD works with the former Soviet states to comply with START provisions. The Table below contains the numbers of nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War, currently, and projected at future START milestones. As of April 2001 per START I, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are nuclear weapons free. Therefore, all numbers below reflect Russian stockpiles only.

START I - Reductions to equal aggregate levels in strategic offensive arms, carried out in three phases over seven years from the date the treaty enters into force. Central limits include: 1,600 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs); 6,000 accountable warheads; 4,900 ballistic missile warheads; 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) for the Soviet side. In addition to the elimination of missiles, their launchers and bombers, START establishes prohibitions on locations, training, testing and modernization.

START II - when implemented, will eliminate heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) and all other multiple-warhead (MIRVed) ICBMS. Only ICBMs carrying a single-warhead will be allowed. It will also reduce the total number of strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both countries to two-thirds below pre-START levels. By the end of the second and final phase, each side must reduce its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. No more than 1,700-1,750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMS, which may be MIRVed. The September 26, 1997 Protocol on Early Deactivation extends the date by which the START II limitations and reductions must be completed from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2007. It also extends the date by which the interim limitations must be carried out from seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty (December 5, 2001) to December 31, 2004.

START II Treaty was signed on January 3, 1993, by President George Bush and President Boris Yeltsin. The Treaty codifies the Joint Understanding signed by the two Presidents at the Washington Summit on June 17, 1992. The U.S. Senate ratified START II on January 26, 1996. Ratification of the Treaty in the Russian Duma, pending since 1996, was completed on 14 April 2000.

START III – will establish a ceiling of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons for each of the parties, representing a 30-45 percent reduction in the number of total deployed strategic warheads permitted under START II. START III will include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. The Russian Federation has proposed a reduction of the overall threshold of up to1,500 warheads, a more substantial reduction of nuclear arms than had been foreseen at Helsinki in March 1997. Since early 2000, the Russian Federation has been ready to hold talks on reducing strategic offensive weapons on the basis of basic elements defined during the meeting between its President and the U.S. President in Helsinki in March 1997, and confirmed in Cologne in June 1999. As of early 2000, Russia remained committed to the goal of reducing the number of strategic nuclear warheads held by each side to 1,500, while the American position remains that 2,000 to 2,500 warheads are needed for effective nuclear deterrence.

START IV - A future START IV agreement would involve all declared nuclear nations. The goal of such a multilateral effort would be to substantially reduce global warhead inventories to the point where the declared powers would have some level of parity. Negotiation of the details of START IV are pending negotiation and ratification of START III

Current negotiations between Russia and the U.S. linking strategic arms reductions to missile defense testing may change the lower limits in both the U.S. and Russia.

B. Chemical & Biological Weapons - Arms Control Agreements

Geneva Protocol

The Geneva Protocol restated the prohibition on use of poisonous gases previously laid down by the Versailles and Washington Treaties and added a ban on bacteriological warfare. When they ratified or acceded to the protocol, some nations -- including the United Kingdom, France, and the U.S.S.R. declared that it would cease to be binding on them if their enemies, or the allies of their enemies, failed to respect the prohibitions of the protocol. The American position is that the protocol does not apply to the use of riot-control agents and herbicides. The Geneva Protocol was signed on June 17, 1925, and before World War II, the protocol was

ratified by many countries, including all the major powers except the United States and Japan. The protocol was ratified by the United States on January 22, 1975. The Soviet Union signed the Geneva Protocol on April 5, 1928.

The Biological Weapon Convention of 1972

On April 10, 1972 the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R. signed "The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction" (BWC). Parties to the convention agree not to develop, produce, stockpile, or acquire biological agents or toxins "of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful purposes," as well as related weapons and means of delivery. The BWC does not prohibit BW research and does not contain provisions to verify compliance. The BWC entered into force in 1975.

At the second Review Conference in September 1986, the parties agreed to implement data exchange measures to enhance confidence and to promote cooperation in areas of permitted biological activities. The third Review Conference in September 1991, created an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to evaluate potential verification measures. The Special Conference, held in September 1994, established an Ad Hoc Group to draft proposals to strengthen the BWC.

This summer, the Bush Administration decided the proposed protocols to strengthen the BWC that calls for inspections and other means for verifying compliance posed an unacceptable risk to national security, including exposing the U.S. biodefense programs and the pharmaceutical industry to spying. In July the Administration promised to propose alternatives before the November 19, 2001, meeting in Geneva to discuss the protocols and options for strengthening the BWC.

On November 2, 2001, the Bush Administration outlined a seven-point proposal that State Department officials said would form the basis of the American negotiating position in Geneva. Many components of this proposal, called the "Bush Doctrine" are similar to the protocols rejected by the Administration in July. The guidelines demand strong laws in participating countries banning biological weapons, extradition requirements, and stronger controls over biological agents. It would establish a U.N. procedure for "investigating suspicious outbreaks or allegations of biological weapons use." The proposal focuses on criminal and underground activity and makes states responsible for dealing with scientists and others who might engage in bioweapon activity.

Chemical Weapon Convention