International Proliferation Prevention (IPP) Program: requested FY02 funding = $ 22.1 million Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI): NCI works to both reduce the size of the nuclear complex within the city and re- Nuclear Safety Cooperation: approved FY01 funding = $19.4 million requested FY02 funding = $13.8 million; Senate FY02 request = $19.7 million Department of State's International Science and Technology Center (ISTC): requested FY02 funding = $45 million (Dept. of State), OMB FY02 funding request = $37 million FY01 funding was $10 million less than one year FY00 increase due to concerns in Congress that money was not being spent efficiently. FY02 State Department request returns to FY00 levels 4. Assessment of Non-Proliferation Programs: Problems identified of Non-Proliferation Programs on U.S. side: Organizational and Bureaucratic Issues - current administrative and bureaucratic arrangements on the U.S. side appear adequate, although it took several years to find the right distribution of responsibilities among the various agencies. The Ukraine has a relatively effective CTR administrative system. On Russian side, effective administration is greatly complicated by the ongoing reform of the government, whereby some agencies are eliminated, others are created, and responsibilities are constantly redistributed. Privately, U.S. agencies and contractors express a desire to streamline the bureaucracy on the Russian side and enhance contacts with those responsible for implementation. Interview with Russian personnel also demonstrate a strong desire on the part of implementation groups for more direct contacts with their American counterparts. Taxation Issues - one issue that has not yet been satisfactorily resolved is taxation of CTR assistance. The heart of the tax problem is the desire by the relevant Russian authorities, whose main responsibility is finding sources of revenue, to tax CTR-related assistance. CTR assistance was supposed to be exempt from Russian taxes, the legal status of this agreement was uncertain, and bureaucratic implementation of its provision was complex. Although direct U.S. assistance as a rule is not subject to taxes, subcontractors often are taxed, especially since many forms of contracts could be construed as services rather than participation in an assistance program. A recently adopted law "On Grants (Assistance) to the Russian Federation" provides for considerable tax exemptions. However, salaries and benefits paid by subcontractors are taxable and implementation procedures for the law have also not been developed or put into effect. Immunity Issues - The privileges granted to CTR personnel emerged as a problem during negotiations on the extension of the 1992 umbrella agreement in Russia that grants CTR personnel the same privileges as technical and administrative personnel under the Vienna Convention. The U.S. asked that these be expanded to the scope of privileges accorded to diplomatic personnel, including full immunity from prosecution. The Russian side refused to grant such extensive privileges, and employees of private contractors performing CTR functions continue to not have diplomatic immunity. Both taxation and immunity issues, while not preventing CTR programs from moving forward, drain time and energy from the implementation of the program and undermine some of the trust that has developed on both sides. Environmental Concerns and Regional Governments - a relatively new problem is the increasing role of local authorities. The power of environmental groups, whether working with or against regional governments, also deserves notice. Many environmental concerns need to be taken seriously, given the toxic nature and complex technologies involved in elimination processes. CTR programs must work in an open and direct manner and closely with local Russian governments, contractors, and Russian non-government organizations. Funding and Sustainability – the future of the CTR program depends on domestic and international politics. CTR programs are clearly vulnerable to possible fluctuations in levels of funding that could be caused by unrelated political developments. The CTR programs are not at an advanced stage and involve expensive, multi-year projects that cannot be easily terminated. Even with constant funding, plans must be made for ensuring that the dismantlement infrastructure is sustainable over the long term. After a period of three to seven years, the whole infrastructure the U.S. is now creating might become unusable because Russia cannot replace some critical elements of equipment. This problem is partially alleviated by the fact that the U.S. is transferring relevant technologies so that Russia will hopefully be able to build its own replacement equipment. Creeping Missions and Slippery Slopes - the original expectation for the CTR program (provision of money and equipment to facilitate weapons elimination) has turned into a considerable more massive endeavor of creating the infrastructure for elimination, disposal and safe storage and transportation of weapons, materials and delivery vehicles. This expansion was perhaps inevitable because one cannot eliminate, for example, Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) and leave the problem of liquid propellant aside. While most CTR programs are now established, and further mission expansion is unlikely, there is another form expansion taking place as now CTR funds are increasingly being used to provide "support services,” i.e. the infrastructure shortcomings, or transportation and support costs. Many are also concerned that the CTR program is becoming the funding source of first resort, rather than last resort for many of these support activities. Fungible Funds and Strategic Modernization – One of the strongest critiques of nonproliferation programs is that, by funding operational tasks and projects, funds are being freed for Russian military buildup, and may allow Russia to maintain and even modernize it strategic forces. Based on trends in Russian strategic modernization in the 19990s, if the Russian military and government face the choice between spending money for modernization, or spending on elimination, the latter task is likely to be relegated to second places. In Russia, nuclear weapons are the centerpiece of security guarantees. The other political issue that could affect nonproliferation programs are the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and changes to Russian tactical nuclear weapons. Concerns Relating to Chemical and Biological Weapon Non-Proliferation Activities: The current brain drain prevention programs favor funding research grants to former Soviet nuclear weapons scientists. The four brain drain prevention programs spent a combined $310.3 million on scientific grant activities from 1994 to 1998, for a total of 1,733 collaborative research projects. However, only $26 million went to biotechnology grants and $11.3 million to chemistry grants to fund 178 and 69 projects involving biological and chemical weapon scientists, respectively. The U.S. government conservatively estimates that there are 10,500 key biological and chemical scientists and engineers that pose a proliferation risk. However, the grant assistance programs have yet to reach important segments of the chemical and biological weapons communities, such as the experts in poison gas aerosolization and weaponization, the specialists in anti-crop and anti-animal agents, and the biowarfare researchers at four military institutes still closed to outsiders, totally about 3,500 scientists. On average annually, the four brain drain prevention programs have provided $8.4 million in chemistry and biology grants, an amount that would be insufficient to enable 10,500 critical scientists and engineers to keep small families above the poverty line. U.S. non-proliferation efforts have been hindered by decreasing access to many of the bioweapon laboratories. Four military bioweapon facilities are still closed to outsiders. Setting nonproliferation program priorities will require a detailed threat assessment which is dependent on knowing what capabilities and materials are housed in all former Soviet bioweapon laboratories. Appendix : Multilateral Nonproliferation Regimes Biological Weapons Convention General Background The Biological Weapons Convention took effect in 1975 after it was ratified by 143 nations, including the U.S. The treaty prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling and use of biological weapons and weapons agents. Parties to the treaty have agreed not to transfer or assist any state or organization to manufacture or acquire any biological weapons agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery. The BWC also requires all parties to destroy biological weapons stockpiles. The BWC was negotiated in a short period of time (1969-1972) and contains no provisions for enforcement or verification of compliance, often the most difficult elements of arms control. The treaty is run by the United Nation - there is no independent mechanism. BWC members have sought to identify possible verification measures and then negotiate a verification protocol. This was submitted at the BWC Review Conference in 2001, but was opposed by the U.S. Challenges and Concerns Biological weapons pose unique challenges to proliferation efforts. Unlike other weapons, biological agents are not countable or measurable and are naturally occurring. Biological agents are ubiquitous, difficult to identify and necessary for a wide range of legitimate purposes, such as pharmaceutical and medical research. Biological weapons labs can be quite small, difficult to identify and virtually indistinguishable from a peaceful research laboratory. The Administration's position on BWC has been influenced by the belief that biological weapons proliferation is inherently unverifiable and that efforts are best spent on ensuring greater compliance among Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The position states that compliance should not compromise bio-defense preparation, risk intellectual property of pharmaceutical and biotech firms or undermine the system of export controls for items that could be used offensively. The U.S. stance on verification measures within the BWC differs from its European allies. The Administration opposes random visits to declared facilities and instead supports managed access, where the facilities themselves control access. In November of 2001, a meeting of BWC member states discussed protocols under negotiation since 1995 to create a legally binding agreement to include verification measures within the BWC. The administration recommended focusing efforts on compliance among BWC member states and cited concerns over non-compliant members, particularly Iraq, Iran and North Korea. |