RE: Questions for Dr. Cupitt from Senator Daniel K. Akaka for the Record Hearing, "Current and Future Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Threats," Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, November 7, 2001. Responses Question Set #1 and #4: I don't believe the United States needs a new agency to address antiterrorist export controls. The current interagency framework already exercises control over the export of dual-use items, especially WMD-related items, for antiterrorist purposes. The existing framework has sufficient flexibility to meet new anti-terrorist threats as well. Constant evaluation and adaptation, however, form the hallmark of an effective export control system. Let me suggest four steps that might enhance the dual-use interagency process: a) Support efforts to improve the capabilities of the intelligence community, especially the Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center of the Central Intelligence Agency, to gather and disseminate sufficient information in a timely fashion to the licensing community. While some intelligence may be impossible to gather, such as a meaningful background check of a recent graduate of a Chinese university, unease exists with the quality and quantity of intelligence input into the licensing process. b) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) typically participates in reviewing encryption licenses, but not other applications. Given the transnational nature of terrorism, it might prove useful for the FBI to participate in the license process for items controlled for anti-terrorism purposes at least on an experimental basis. For these kinds of licenses, the FBI need not review the licenses, but integrating their information on the bona fides of the participants in the transaction (such as information on the exporter) could prove important, especially where the FBI can collect data that the CIA can not. c) Move forward with the creation of the Office of Technology Assessment at the Commerce Department as per S. 149. If funded and supported properly, this office should regularize reviews of the dual-use list and generate much more information about foreign export control systems. d) Improve access by the Commerce Department and other agencies to databases with financial and commercial information (such as Dunn & Bradstreet). This will improve analysis of the bona fides of end-users. While some capacity to do this exists now, access remains highly constrained. Question Set #2: No matter how well the US interagency process works, if companies do Currently, compliance practices among US exporters vary widely, even among those companies most familiar with US policy. Discussions with several industry representatives, surprisingly, lead me to believe that many exporters might welcome some mandatory standards for export control compliance programs, especially if this eased their licensing burden, went further to mitigate their civil or criminal liability, and was phased in gradually on the basis of a thorough dialogue between government and industry. Even the best compliance program will fail, however, if an exporter does not have access to a coterie of trained, competent export control compliance administrators. This expertise need not reside in-house, especially for small or medium size businesses, as freight forwarders or other service companies may fulfill this function. Unfortunately, no official standards either for industry compliance programs or for individual knowledge and competence now exist. The Commerce Department has produced standards for companies with Special Comprehensive Licenses, but few companies have such licenses. The Department also has a developed a broader set of compliance guidelines (i.e., the Export Management System), but survey data indicates that few companies follow these guidelines closely. Here, let me make two suggestions: a) While the diversity of business models argues against creating a single b) Several companies and the Commerce Department currently provide Question Set #3: Well before September 11, the inability of the United States to reform its Export Administration Act (EAA) in the 1990s had damaged US credibility and hampered US leadership on export control issues in the international community. In general, I believe the bill passed by the US Senate (S. 149), if it becomes law without many significant amendments, will match US dual-use export controls much more closely to the security and economic conditions of this century, including the threat posed by terrorists. While I have made several suggestions in my responses to other questions that might fit in the EAA, in this instance the of the threats and technologies) will certainly become the enemy of US efforts to lead the international community toward higher export control standards. Question Set #5: Effective chemical weapons appear easier to develop than biological weapons, as the experience of Aum Shinrikyo indicates. My understanding is that most experts believe that overcoming several significant hurdles, such as producing a highly virulent strain or dispersing the agent, would make the effective use of biological weapons difficult for all but the most determined, skilled, and well-financed terrorists. In addition, few large-scale offensive biological weapons programs have ever existed, so very few people have had any experience producing such items. Nonetheless, the history of the use of biological weapons in the United States --- first through the distribution of blankets contaminated by Small-pox in the late 18th century and most recently the use of the mails to spread Antrhax --- indicates that terrorists may find unsophisticated but effective methods which we have not yet anticipated. It is worth noting a parallel example from the nuclear field: the accomplishments of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program escaped attention for so long in part by using an outmoded technological approach. Finally, advances in genetic research may unveil new biological agents or toxins that don't face the same production or distribution hurdles, and these might become available to terrorists. In contrast, many countries had significant chemical weapons programs in the 20th century. Fortunately, the states party to the Chemical Weapons Convention have eschewed these programs and dramatically increased monitoring over chemicals of concern worldwide. While not perfect, this goes a long way toward making it much harder for anyone to produce or transport massive quantities of the most deadly chemical weapons. Nonetheless, hundreds of thousands of chemical weapons, either abandoned or part of illicit arsenals, already exist. Chemical weapons precursors play such an important role in the global economy, moreover, that many people have experience working with these items. In addition, weaponization can take very simple forms. The first use of chemical weapons in World War I, for example, involved the release of gas from buried pressurized canisters. A concerned citizen even outlined how to create chlorine gas munitions in a letter to President Lincoln in 1861. Perhaps most important, terrorists and at least one state (Iraq) have put chemical weapons to use in the last fifteen years. Although employing chemical weapons on a small scale seems to have less potential than radiological or biological weapons for causing massive damage, they appear simpler to produce, easier to use, and can cause devastating local effects. These attributes may make them more attractive to terrorists than other mass casualty weapons. Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Hearing November 7, 2001 Current and Future Weapons of Mass Destructions Question 1. You state that export controls can be effective only if they focus on technologies that are not widely available and only if the controls have a high degree of multilateral support. If we do control these technologies, do we make it impossible or difficult for terrorists to develop WMD? Answer. Strong multilateral controls focused on technologies that are not widely available will make it difficult for terrorists to develop some kind of WMD - nuclear weapons or missiles, for example. Other kinds of weapons - radiological weapons or chemical weapons - which do not require advanced technologies for development will be harder to stop. For these kinds of WMD, export controls are not the best response and we need to find other means to enhance our security. Question 2. China is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention. It "adheres" to the Missile Technology Control Regime. We provide the Chinese with information about their companies who proliferate. But we still cannot convince China to enforce export controls. We know China has aided Iran and Pakistan's weapons programs. What does this failure say about how successful we can be in strengthening WMD proliferation regimes if a country like China cannot comply with its obligations? Answer. This is a complex issue that goes beyond proliferation. First, we tend to overestimate the degree of control China has over its exporters. In several cases, the United States discovered that Beijing was not aware of exports made by Chinese companies and was embarrassed by our information. Official corruption, a serious problem for China, plays a role in this. One of our goals should be to help Beijing improve its export control mechanisms. Second, the U.S. has had success in persuading Beijing to end support for some programs of concem. When Beijing has committed to do something, it has generally lived up to these commitments. It is fair to note that these nonproliferation commitments are often qualified or more limited than we would like, so working with Beijing to adhere to broad international norms should also be one of our goals. Finally, proliferators will not be deterred from seeking WMD even if China does not support them - India is a good example of this, as without any support from China it created extensive and successful nuclear weapons and missile programs. Question 3. In your testimony, you state that the role of export controls in nonproliferation is shrinking, but you also concluded that the consequences of failing to reform export controls would be costly to controls from the diplomatic and arms functions to include law enforcement and counterterrorism activities. What steps would you take to initiate this? Would you accomplish this through interagency Answer. Export controls would not have prevented any of the tragedies that occurred on September 11th. These attacks were staged from within the U.S. and carried out with items bought in the U.S., and therefore not subject to export controls. Export controls are just not the best tool for dealing with terrorism. It would be better to emphasize domestic safeguards on certain WMD technologies that could be attractive to terrorists. The U.S. needs to ensure that certain WMD materials - those which are not widely available on the commercial market, such as spent nuclear fuel or laboratory pathogens - are appropriately protected. This is not an export issue, so the export control agencies are not the appropriate agencies. A program of this kind (which may need new legal authorities) might better be assigned to agencies responsible for homeland security. Question 4. There have been conflicting reposts on the difficulty involved in developing biological and chemical weapons. Some reports involve the specter of basement laboratories while others offer reassurance by stressing the technical challenges to make these weapons. Who is right? It is relatively easy to make certain biological and chemical weapons, but it is difficult to make effective - effective in the sense of being able to cause mass casualties. The issue is delivery. Toxins and toxic chemicals are easy to produce, but "weaponizing" them is much more difficult and has been a deterrent to the use of CBW. A terrorist would need a method to deliver the toxic substance over a wide area (this is why crop-duster aircraft are a concern - they are designed to deliver large quantities of toxic material over a wide area). The Soviet Union and other nations spent millions of dollars attempting to "weaponize" CBW and we should take steps to ensure that this technical know-how does not become available to terrorists. |