Questions for Mr. Milhollin from Senator Akaka for the Record WISCONSIN PROJECT ON NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL December 5, 2001 Senator Daniel K. Akaka Chairman, Subcommittee on International Dear Senator Akaka: I am pleased to respond to the questions you posed in your letter of November 26, 2001. As you requested, my reply is being sent by e-mail. Response to question one. I do not believe that it would improve things to create a separate agency to review export licenses. The expertise of the various agencies that now participate in the process will still have to be brought to bear on the decisions, so any change would require that the experts in these agencies be transferred from their present positions. Such a step does not seem to be efficient. Rather than create a new agency, it would be better to transfer leadership on export controls from the Commerce Department, where it now resides, to a national security agency such as the State Department or the Defense Department. The Commerce Department suffers from a conflict of interest - it must promote trade and regulate it at the same time. The promotion function invariably prevails. In addition, it would improve the licensing process to give the Central Intelligence Agency a vote on license applications. This improvement is now essential in light of the recent terrorist attacks. Response to question two. It is altogether possible, desirable and necessary to control the export of technology, or "know-how." The transfer of knowledge can be just as empowering to a foreign government as the transfer of material or equipment. The recent transfer of rocket technology by U.S. firms to China is but one example. American technology, which was transferred by these firms in violation of U.S. law, enabled China to improve the performance of its largest rockets, which also serve as intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at our cities. It is vital to our national security to discourage this sort of conduct with export control laws. Response to question three. It is true that chemical and biological agents can be produced in a short time in simple laboratories using a small amount of commercially available equipment. Current generation mustard and nerve agents are based on technologies developed before World War II, and the paths to production have changed little since then. This is why chemical and biological weapons are so attractive to terrorist groups, such as the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan which attacked the Tokyo subway in March 1995. 1701 K STREET, NW SUITE 805 WASHING FON, DC 20006 PHONE: 202-223-8299 FAX 202-223-8298 However, weaponization and delivery of these agents can be more challenging. In the case of chemical agents, special production equipment, including corrosion-resistant pipes, valves, and reaction vessels need to be used, and rigorous safety precautions need to be followed, due to the volatile nature of the chemicals. For biological weapons, pathogen particles need to be an appropriate size for inhalation – it is a complicated task to make them so and must be stable for storage and delivery. Despite these difficulties, the increasing availability of production technology and of trained personnel will continue to erode the technical obstacles to the production and use of chemical and biological weapons. Sincerely, Gary Milhollin Questions for Mr. Billingslea from Senator Akaka for the Record Hearing Date: 29 Nov 2001 Committee: Senate Governmental Member: Senator Akaka Witness: DASD(NP) Billingslea Question #: 1 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Question: Mr. Billingslea, environmental and local public advocacy groups have gained influence in the former Soviet Union (FSU). What problems is this creating for American aid efforts, and how can we resolve those problems? Answer: In general, this is not a significant problem for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program because we work hard to build local trust on this issue. We take our environmental responsibilities seriously, and adopt the tougher of either country's environmental standards when working a CTR project. Many local citizens are happy to see the United States Government working on these projects because they know we have the resolve to accomplish the projects in an environmentally safe and secure manner. The only potential "problem" is when local groups or leaders ask CTR to correct environmental or other problems remaining from the Soviet era. These problems are not related to CTR activities, and when such questions arise we politely remind the recipients that environmental remediation is not our responsibility and that U.S. law prohibits us from using CTR funds for environmental remediation. However, these questions can cause implementation delays because local citizens or officials regard this as an opportunity to raise these issues with regional or central government officials working with us. To date, this has occurred only once, during construction of a solid rocket motor elimination facility in Russia. The Russians originally proposed building the facility in Perm, but local groups opposed the project and the Russian Federation moved our efforts to Votkinsk, where the project was accepted. The criticism in Perm was not with our technical approach, but with larger environmental issues, not directly related to CTR. Unfortunately, this site move increased costs and delayed the project. In all other cases, CTR projects have proceeded with little or no delay from environmental groups. We believe the process we use is adequate, and no additional action by Congress is required. Hearing Date: 29 Nov 2001 Member: Senator Akaka Witness: DASD(NP) Billingslea Cooperative Threat Reduction Program Question: Since the start of the Nunn-Lugar nonproliferation programs, Congress has authorized $5.5 billion for assistance to former Soviet states. How much of this money has been spent in Russia and the newly independent states? Answer: The Department of Defense (DoD) only received a portion of the $5.5 billion Congress authorized through FY 2001 for assistance to former Soviet states, which went to the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The Departments of State and Energy received the remainder of these funds for their assistance activities. From FY 1992 through FY 2001, Congress authorized just over $3.6 billion for the CTR Program to assist states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) in destroying, safeguarding and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The table below provides a breakout of DoD CTR Obligation Authority applied to assistance activities in FSU countries. Questions for Mr. Borman from Senator Akaka for the Record Specific Questions I will now address the specific questions posed by Chairman Akaka in the letter inviting Commerce to testify at this hearing. 1. How does the Department participate in nonproliferation activities with federal partners using multilateral export control regimes? Commerce's Bureau of Export Administration is responsible for implementing U.S. national controls over the export of dual-use items (goods, software, and technology with civilian and military applications) covered by the four multilateral export control regimes. Commerce reviews approximately 7,500 export license applications for items controlled pursuant to these regimes. In addition, Commerce works closely with the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy to formulate proposals for the regimes and positions on proposals made by other regime members. For example, at the initiative of Commerce, the Wassenaar Arrangement adopted a "best practices" standard for effective enforcement of export controls at its December 2000 plenary session. This was the first time that a multilateral nonproliferation regime had adopted enforcement standards. Enforcement is an essential element of any export control system and adoption of this standard will enhance the effectiveness of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Commerce also participates in efforts by the regimes to get non-member states to adopt nonproliferation policies and practices. For example, Commerce has participated in Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) outreach programs to key transhipment countries. Commerce has used this MTCR outreach program as the basis for the ongoing interagency effort to have these countries develop and implement effective transshipment controls, especially enforcement mechanisms. The initial step was the adoption of effective transshipment practices (modeled on those adopted by the Wassenaar Arrangement). Commerce is involved in ongoing efforts (both bilateral and regional) to strengthen export, reexport, and transit controls in these countries. In addition to regime-based efforts, Commerce has involved other nations - principally some of our major allies (the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Sweden) – in the technical workshops it conducts with the FSU countries. This involvement has included cooperating countries sending officials to participate as members of the workshop "faculty" and having officials of those countries make presentations in multilateral conference programs. 2. How well do federal nonproliferation programs interact with U.S. commercial interests? The export control cooperation program includes constructive interaction with U.S. commercial interests in two regards. First, Commerce's programs frequently include representatives of U.S. exporting companies. Participation by these company experts is particularly important in the exchanges focused on industry outreach and compliance. These experts can speak authoritatively |