Governmental Affairs Subcommittee Questions for Ms. Elisa D. Harris 1. You have testified that previous chemical and biological attacks suggest that assistance from national programs is likely to be key for terrorists in obtaining chemical and biological weapons. Q: How important is the commercial availability of some chemical and biological agents or is government assistance the critical part? A. The commercial availability of materials and equipment that can be used to produce both chemical and biological weapons certainly can facilitate terrorist efforts to acquire such weapons. That said, knowing what is needed to make a chemical or biological weapon is not the same as knowing how to do it, as was demonstrated by the Aum Shinrikyo in the 1990s. Despite substantial financial and technical resources, the Aum was unable to achieve its goal of producing mass casualties with its chemical and biological weapons programs. Specialized knowledge from national programs is likely to continue to be critical to terrorist efforts to use chemical or biological weapons successfully, especially on a large-scale. 2. The President has recently emphasized Iran's continued support of terrorist Q: Why have the United States or other States Parties not used the OPCW's full range of verification measures to resolve this issue? A. There are a number of reasons why challenge inspections have not yet been utilized by the United States or other CWC States Parties. First, the U.S. spent the initial years after entry into force of the CWC in 1997 focused on domestic implementation, including drafting and passing implementing legislation, preparing data declarations for both military and industry facilities, and working with the OPCW to facilitate inspections of U.S. sites and facilities covered by the treaty. Second, the U.S. took advantage of the CWC's consultation provisions to pursue concerns about a number of other States Parties compliance with their treaty obligations. These consultations successfully resolved U.S. concerns in a number of cases. Finally, the OPCW itself was very much focused in the first years after entry into force on assisting States Parties in setting up their National Authorities and preparing data declarations, on reviewing the initial data declarations, and on verifying chemical weapons destruction activities. Preparing for a challenge inspection was not, understandably, the top priority. Q: Would you recommend that the United States request the OPCW conduct challenge inspections within Iran? A. I believe that treaty implementation is sufficiently well advanced in both the U.S. and the OPCW that it is appropriate to be considering the possibility of challenge inspections. Such inspections would be relevant either to those countries where consultations have not addressed U.S. concerns or in countries where such bilateral efforts are inappropriate or unlikely to be productive. In either situation, proceeding with a challenge inspection request would require solid intelligence information about the location and nature of the violation. 3. Many nations have ratified the CWC. But there are serious concerns over countries that have not - like Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria. Q: Is there a way the convention can address the threat posed by terrorist groups harbored in countries that have not ratified the CWC and may have chemical weapons material? A. Iran is a CWC States Party. Late last year, Libya, announced its intention to join the treaty. Given the potential for national programs to serve as a critical source of assistance for sub-national CW efforts, both the OPCW and States Parties themselves should undertake a concerted diplomatic effort to convince the key hold out countries to abandon their chemical weapons programs and join the CWC. Q: How can the OPCW better detect clandestine production and stockpiling? A. Both the OPCW and States Parties should ensure that all of the tools available in the treaty for pursuing concerns about clandestine activity, including challenge inspections, are utilized to their fullest. 4. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has been in operation for almost a decade, and has conducted over 1,000 inspections at 500 sites in 49 nations during that time. Q: How would you grade its effectiveness? A. Although a preparatory commission for the treaty began working nearly a decade ago, the OPCW itself only came into existence after the CWC entered into force, in April 1997. The OPCW's responsibilities are unprecedented in the history of arms control, in that it must not only ensure the elimination of weapons themselves but also monitor obligations. This entirely new multilateral organization has accomplished a great deal since its creation nearly five years ago. Q: What have been the most significant obstacles facing the OPCW in accomplishing it mission? A. One of the most significant obstacles facing the OPCW has been the lack of financial support from States Parties. For the past two year, the OPCW has experienced a financial crisis, requiring significant cuts in inspections and other activities relevant to treaty implementation. This financial crisis is the product of a number of factors, including the nominal growth budget policy insisted upon by the United States and other major OPCW funders. According to figures released by the OPCW last year, because of this budget cap, the total number of inspections in 2002 is unlikely to be higher than 2000, even though the number of inspectable facilities is likely to rise from 600 to more than 4,600. Q: Are CWC member's support adequate? What steps other than better financial support would you recommend? A. In addition to bolstering their political and financial support to the OPCW, CWC States Parties must also make every effort to meet the treaty's destruction deadlines. The U.S. must ensure that its technology and funding decisions will enable destruction operations to be completed safely and in time to meet the 2012 extension deadline. Both Russia and the international community must expand their efforts to eliminate Moscow's chemical weapons stocks. The U.S. and other States Parties should consider creating an international consortium to work with Russia to complete the Shchuch'ye and Kambarka destruction facilities. To encourage continued Russian investment, the consortium could offer to match the funds provided by Moscow. 5. Additional mechanisms for controlling biological weapons include global surveillance and control of emerging diseases, ethics education of biological scientists, and international self-monitoring of bioscience. Q: Is the Administration supporting such activities? A. At the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference last November, the Bush administration reaffirmed its opposition to a legally binding protocol to enforce the Convention. In its place, the administration proposed a number of voluntary measures, including enhanced disease surveillance and a code of conduct for and self-monitoring by biological scientists. The administration did, not, however, elaborate on these proposals. Moreover, it opposed efforts at the Review Conference to establish a multilateral process whereby the U.S. and other proposals related to the BWC could be considered. Q: What steps do you believe could be taken to increase their effectiveness A. In view of the fact that the CWC and the BWC impose legally-binding obligations on governments but not on individuals, both treaties could be further strengthened and reinforced by the conclusion of an international treaty making it a crime for individuals to develop, possess or use chemical or biological weapons or to knowingly assist others in doing so. The Harvard-Sussex Program has developed a proposal for such a treaty. Questions for Ms. Elisa D. Harris From Senator Max Cleland 1. In your opening testimony, you state that support from national programs will likely be crucial if terrorist groups are to acquire chemical or biological weapons. Do you believe that arms control treaties such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) will be effective in preventing state sponsors from assisting terrorists networks in developing weapons of mass destruction? What can/should the United States do to increase the authority and effectiveness of these treaties? A. The BWC and the CWC can help impede terrorist efforts to acquire chemical and biological weapons by limiting the number of countries from which CBW materials and expertise are available. More broadly, these treaties establish important norms outlawing chemical and biological weapons, thus making clear the illegitimacy of assisting others, including terrorists, in acquiring such weapons. The United States should take the lead in increasing the authority and effectiveness of these treaties. With respect to the BWC, we should resume multilateral discussions on measures to strengthen the BWC. Pending international agreement on legally binding enforcement measures for the Convention, the U.S. should support efforts to expand the UN Secretary General's authority to include allegations of the development, production or possession of biological weapons. We should also strengthen international controls over dangerous pathogens and enhance oversight of the U.S biodefense program. With respect to the CWC, we should ensure that CWC adherence is a prominent issue in our foreign policy toward the key holdout countries and should be prepared to use challenge inspections to pursue concerns about noncompliance by existing States Parties. We should also devote the resources necessary to meet the treaty's destruction deadlines and rectify the OPCW's budget problems. |