It is no coincidence that NPT came into force in 1970, the very point at which the rate of proliferation begins its descent. Evidence from a variety of sources -- declassified documents, interviews, statistical data -- suggests that the treaty had a powerful impact on nuclear decision making, especially on countries that had nuclear weapons aspirations. In the absence of the treaty, the problem of proliferation -- and the danger posed by nuclear terrorism -- would be far

worse.

How did the NPT achieve this success? Many commentators associate the success of the NPT with the development of an international norm. My research, however, suggests that the effect of norms is a positive but secondary factor. Instead, the NPT's real influence has more to do with its ability to shape the internal political debates and bureaucratic battles of countries that consider going for the bomb.

Once a country joins the treaty, the pro-bomb forces within that country face an uphill political struggle. They have to persuade the country's leadership to either withdraw from the treaty or to

The treaty drew a line in time and required that countries openly declare their nuclear intentions. It reframed the debate over nuclear weapons from a purely "defense issue" to a broader "foreign policy issue" and in doing so, reshaped the the composition of the decision group. In short, the NPT defined the issue, influenced who got to sit at the table, and created a deadline for action. It also created political and bureaucratic winners and losers. Once a country ratified the treaty, the pro-nuclear constitiuency that had been

cheat. Both choices have obvious downsides. Withdrawing from the treaty will be correctly interpreted by other countries as a signal that the country is seeking nuclear weapons. Cheating carries its own risks. Both strategies require a major political commitment. In short, pro-bomb forces in NPT countries face numerous political and technical obstacles that make establishing a bomb program very difficult.

II. NPT Today: Preventing Future Proliferators

The treaty has been remarkably successful, but it also provides an invaluable tool for addressing today's proliferation threats. NPT-related safeguards are the largest element in the world's only existing system of nuclear accountancy. Virtually all states participate in an NPT or IAEA-based safeguards system. These safeguards are critical to the any future nonproliferation success, and as was discussed in Question 1, they are just as important from the standpoint of terrorism and material security.

Even without safeguards, a healthy treaty acts as a constraint, making it difficult for nations to go back and reconsider their nuclear posture. There are many countries that do not have nuclear weapons programs now, but that fifty years down the line, may be tempted. It could be Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea-- or a country we cannot today imagine. A robust NPT makes backsliding or a reversal less likely.

The NPT also provides countries with a non-military option for responding to the threats posed by other nuclear weapons states. Egypt provides an especially good example. Egypt faces a potential nuclear threat from Israel. Countries in Egypt's position have a strong incentive to balance against the forces of their prospective enemy -- matching the adversary weapon for weapon. The NPT has given Egypt another alternative. It has provided Egyptian leaders with a political strategy for dealing with a military problem. By embracing the NPT and using it to press for Israel's denuclearization, Egypt has found a way to counter the threat it faces without having to build its own nuclear weapon. Iran may find itself in a similar situation if Iraq acquires nuclear weapons, as could various countries in East Asia if there is an outbreak of proliferation in that region.

Finally, the NPT provides instrumentalities for countering countries that act on their nuclear ambitions. Together with UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq, the NPT provides the chief legal and political basis for action against a non-nuclear member state that has an active weapons program.

6

7

One problem for bomb advocates is that the treaty's effect is "asymetrically progressive." Once a country is in the treaty, the tendency is for the country to make progressively stronger commitments to nonprolferation (e.g., agreeing to stronger safeguards over time). The result is that officals who want a bomb program find themselves in an ever tighening straight jacket.

Thirty years ago, North Korea and Iraq were not of the lists of countries that were considered proliferation dangers. Twenty years ago, no one considered the possibility that the Soviet Union would break up and that Ukraine would have to decide whether to keep or renounce its inherited nuclear

Table. 1How The NPT Prevents Proliferation

• Influences internal political and bureaucratic battles over

nuclear weapons. Creates obstacles for bomb advocates.

Of course, no policy instrument is perfect, and the NPT is no exception. Critics of the NPT, complain that the treaty is flawed. They contend, first, that nations will cheat. The treaty, they maintain, limits the actions of the law abiding countries to the advantage of states that are willing to ignore international niceties. Second, they argue that inspections do not work -- that countries with a nuclear program can beat the system of international safeguards.

Let's consider each criticism.

A. Nations will cheat

Critics point to Iraq and North Korea as examples of countries that were willing to break their treaty commitments. Others point to Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan and Russian technology transfers to Iran as additional cases of cheating. Why should we rely on a treaty, they ask, when others do not live up to their obligations?

1. There have been very few cheaters.

The NPT is over three decades old and has 189 members. The surprise is not that there have been governments that cheated. No, the surprise is that there have been so few. The treaty promised prospective members that if they joined, they would enjoy broader access to nuclear technology. One might have expected therefore, that countries with clever leaders and bad intentions might join the treaty in order to gain access to nuclear assistance and then use this help to develop a bomb in secret. The historical evidence indicates, however, that countries that wanted and later developed nuclear weapons South Africa, India, Pakistan, Israel -- stayed out of the treaty. Moreover, countries that where unsure about their nuclear plans did not ratify the

treaty until after they decided to renounce nuclear weapons. They did not join first and decide later. In short, even countries that wanted nuclear weapons took the treaty seriously, more seriously than most international agreements. They went out of their way to avoid cheating. Iraq and North Korea represent extreme cases that are singularly rare.

2. Without a treaty, there are no cheaters, but lots of proliferators.

In the absence of any international restriction on nuclear behavior, countries are free to do what they like, including building nuclear weapons. In an "anything goes" environment, it is far easier for countries with nuclear weapons programs to acquire technology and materials and do so in

secret.

3. Compared to what?

Public policy requires that one compare the costs and benefits of different options. Most policy instruments have limits or costs. The NPT is no exception, but it can boast an exceptionally high rate of compliance. What competing policy alternatives perform as well? Both counterproliferation and missile defense, for example, cost more and have higher failure rates. That is not to suggest that counter-proliferation and missile defense have no place, but rather a way of highlighting the fact that critics of the treaty need to employ a consistent baseline or yardstick when evaluating policy alternatives.

4. Allegations that China and Russia have cheated are simply that: allegations. Longtime students of proliferation have learned to be rather skeptical about the spectacular, press grabbing claims that are a prominent feature of nuclear affairs. Consider the China-Pakistan case. Historians of the Pakistani nuclear program point out that the program began in the early 1970s, and that the path to the Pakistani bomb was not through China but through Europe. Pakistan learn howed to produce enriched uranium by sending a spy to work at URENCO, the European enrichment consortium. Allegations concerning Chinese assistance come much later chronologically and focus on warhead design. The issue is not whether China "gave" the bomb to Pakistan. Pakistan gave Pakistan the bomb. The only issue is whether China helped Pakistan build a more advanced version of a weapon it already possessed. Still, if such information was transferred, it would constitute a violation of the NPT.

So, are these allegations true? It is difficult to say. Certainly there is no public domain evidence that would prove such a transfer. If it did happen, it flies in the face of a thirty year trend in Chinese nonproliferation policy. In the 1960s, Mao was one of the few leaders in the world who openly advocated more proliferation. He even offered to share China's nuclear weapons technology with other countries. The policy did not last long, however. Beginning in the 1970s, China adopted an increasingly mainstream policy of nonproliferation. This evolution in Chinese nonproliferation policy culminated in 1990s, when China joined the NPT.

The case against Russia is weaker. Minatom and the Russian nuclear industry certainly suffered following the collapse of the USSR. Both have an incentive to export, and there are Iranian officials who want to expand their nuclear infrastructure. What is lacking, however, is evidence

The two cases where there is the strongest evidence that China at least entertained the idea of transfering nuclear technology are Egypt and Indonesia

that the Russian government has knowingly transferred bomb-related technology. The Russians are helping build nuclear power reactors at Busheer, but these are light water reactors. They are of little use to a weapons program. Indeed, it is light water reactors that are being given to North Korea as part of the agreement to rollback its nuclear program.

Another area of concern is laser enrichment technology, but Russia's transfers have only involved "lab" level technology -- not technology that can be used to build nuclear weapons. American officials upset with the transfers have conceded as much but complain that any help to Iran's nuclear program even if it is not bomb related -- helps Iran build its general expertise in the field. This, however, is not a violation of the NPT. In fact, the NPT establishes that countries are entitled to access to civilian nuclear technology.

B. Inspections are flawed

Critics of inspection cite the failure of IAEA inspections to detect Iraq's clandestine program. They argue that governments guilty of cheating will not invite or allow inspections, and that inspectors can be fooled.

1. Proliferators do submit to inspection, and they get caught.

It is said that guilty parties will not invite or allow inspection, and yet that is precisely what happened in the case of North Korea. It was IAEA inspections that led to the North Korean nuclear crisis in the first place. In the case of Iraq, IAEA failed to identify Iraq's weapons program, which relied on undeclared facilities. An inspection is only as strong as its requirements, and up until the 1990s, most nations wanted IAEA to restrict itself to declared facilities. After the Gulf War, the inspections regime was strengthened. Now, under the Additional Protocol, IAEA will have the ability to identify illicit, undeclared activities.

2. Inspections are designed to deter, not defend.

There is a common misconception about inspections. It portrays the inspection regime as defense. According to this view, safeguards are a kind of wall that protects nuclear material from being siphoned off for a bomb program. Proliferators search the wall for a hole or a weak spot. When they find one, they exploit it and become a nuclear weapons state. This concept of safeguards is intuitively appealing. Unfortunately, it is just plain wrong.

The safeguards system is not designed to defend, but to deter. The question is not whether an inspection system is perfect. Rather, the question is how much risk a proliferator is willing to take that he or she will be caught. Say, for example, that there is a 10% chance that a country could beat an inspection system. One in ten sounds uncomfortably high, but one must look at it from the perspective of the proliferator. Governments, even "rogue" dictators, will not cheat when the odds of getting caught are 90%. Quite the contrary, proliferators need a high level of

9

Why would North Korea allow inspectors in if it had issued false declarations? It is curious just in the way that it is curious that crimnals will voluntarily submit to searches or disclose information that incriminates them. It may be that the guilty overestimate their ability to beat the system or that North Korea did not realize that the inspectors had better technology. In principle, this is an advantage that IAEA should have if the prolifertor is either a developing country (e.g., Iraq) or an isolated state (e.g., North