UNCLASSIFIED Questions for the Record Submitted Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen by Senator Daniel K. Akaka Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Question: 4. What are the key nations with biotechnology and chemical industries that are not part of the Australia Group? Answer: In terms of trade, non-AG members' biotechnology industries remain far behind those of AG members. The three main non-AG members with highly developed chemical industries are, in order of size, China, India, and South Africa. UNCLASSIFIED Questions for the Record Submitted Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen by Senator Daniel K. Akaka Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Question 5: In your testimony, you state that Bulgaria is eliminating its missile program. Will the MTCR verify that Bulgaria has eliminated its missile program? If not, how will verification be done? Is Bulgaria abandoning its missile program to gain membership into the MTCR or another regime? Answer: Bulgaria has committed to destroy its SS-23 and Scud ballistic missile systems and its Frog rocket system, with U.S. technical and financial assistance from the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. U.S. participation in the destruction of these systems will ensure the process is transparent and that the systems are completely eliminated. Bulgaria is eliminating its SS-23, Scud, and Frog systems because it realizes that they have no utility in post-Cold War Central Europe and only divert resources from worthwhile defense programs. UNCLASSIFIED Questions for the Record Submitted Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen by Senator Fred Thompson Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Question 1: Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolf testified before this subcommittee in June that "Russian export control policy is contributing to the proliferation threat" and that "Russian implementation and enforcement of its export controls remain insufficient." Please explain how Russia gained admittance to three of the Which other regime members have gained admittance to the regimes without fulfilling basic membership criteria? Answer: Russia became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995. At that time, it had assumed the same responsibilities for controlling missiles and related equipment and technology adopted by other MTCR members. It also had taken steps to enhance and improve its export control system to restrict the unauthorized transfer of missile-related equipment and technology. The insufficient implementation and enforcement of export controls regarding Iran with which we are now dealing did not begin to become apparent until 1997. This was the same situation concerning Russia's participation in the Wassenaar Arrangement. While Russia has made progress in recent years in strengthening its export control legislation, enforcement of this legislation remains weak. UNCLASSIFIED From the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) perspective, Russian Government export policy, rather than its national export. control system, is the most serious problem. This is a problem that long post-dates Russian membership in the NSG. The former Soviet Union was a founding member of the NSG in the mid-1970s. Because authority was centralized under the USSR, its nuclear export controls were probably tighter than those of the current Russian Federation. Admission to any of the multilateral export regimes is decided by a consensus of all the current members, none of whom would agree to admit a country believed to have not fulfilled basic membership requirements. UNCLASSIFIED Questions for the Record Submitted Mr. Vann H. Van Diepen by Senator Fred Thompson Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services Question 2: As you know, the MTCR controls not only ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Missile expert Dennis Gormley testified before ISPFS subcommittee in February that the MTCR has failed to achieve consensus on determining the true range and capability of cruise missiles and other UAVS. He pointed to the UK and French decision to transfer the Black Shaheen cruise missile to the United Arab Emirates. · If the regime cannot reach consensus on payload and range definitions with out closest allies, how does this impact the effectiveness of the regime? Would the Black Shaheen transfer signal to other MTCR members and adherents, such as Russia and China, that a Category I transfer to volatile regions such as the Middle East is MTCR compliant? Does this proposed transfer undermine the credibility and purpose of the MTCR? Answer: The MTCR is a voluntary arrangement among like-minded member countries sharing a common interest in controlling missile proliferation. While the principle of range/payload tradeoff is codified in the MTCR Annex, decisions about such tradeoffs are made by each MTCR country, according to its national legislation and discretion, as is the case with all matters of MTCR implementation. The United States encourages MTCR members to make all such decisions responsibly. If the U.S. was concerned about how an MTCR member made such a decision, the U.S. would first consult that nation |