Hearing Date: July 29, 2002 Senator/Member: Sen Fred Thompson Russian Export Control Policy Question: Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation John Wolf testified before this subcommittee in June that "Russian export control policy is contributing to the proliferation threat" and that "Russian implementation and enforcement of its export controls remain insufficient." Please explain how Russia gained admittance to three of the four multilateral export control regimes when one of the key membership criteria is to have an effective and legally-based export control system in place. Which other regime members have gained admittance to the regimes without fulfilling basic membership criteria? Answer: Admission to any of the export control regimes is decided by consensus of all members. Russia became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1995 and assumed MTCR obligations to control missiles, related equipment, and technology and took steps to enhance and improve its export control system to restrict the unauthorized transfer of missile-related equipment and technology. However, while Russia strengthened its export control legislation, it has insufficiently implemented those legislative improvements. In the case of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Russia's export policy is a serious problem. The former Soviet Union was a founding member of the NSG in the mid-1970s and implemented its controls more rigorously than is Russia today. We also have the same concerns regarding Russia's participation in the Wassenaar Arrangement. Because there are no provisions in export control regimes to expel a member that is not following its obligations, we are pressing Russia to enforce rigorously its export control rules and legislation, but they remain weak and we continue to see problematic missile and nuclear-related trade activities. Hearing Date: July 29, 2002 Senator/Member: Sen Fred Thompson MTCR Controls Question: As you know, the MTCR controls not only ballistic missiles, but also cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Missile expert Dennis Gormley testified before ISGFS subcommittee in February that the MTCR has failed to achieve consensus on determining the true range and capability of cruise missiles and other UAVs. He pointed to the UK and French decision to transfer the Black Shaheen cruise missile to the United Arab Emirates. If the regime cannot reach consensus on payload and range definitions with our closest allies, how does this impact the effectiveness of the regime? Would the Black Shaheen transfer signal to other MTCR members and adherents, such as Russia and China, that a Category I transfer to volatile regions such as the Middle East is MTCR compliant? Does this proposed transfer undermine the credibility and purpose of the MTCR? Answer: The Black Shaheen is still in the development phase and has not been transferred to the United Arab Emirates. The principle of range/payload tradeoff is codified in the MTCR Annex and the MTCR Partners recently agreed at the 2002 MTCR Plenary to definitions for both range and payload. These definitions will provide a common base allowing Partners to arrive at similar determinations of the range/payload characteristics of individual systems. However, final determinations are made by each MTCR member, in accordance with national legislation and discretion - a fact that also works to U.S. advantage. If the U.S. is concerned about the activities of an MTCR member, the U.S. will first consult that nation bilaterally and then consider bringing the matter to the attention of all MTCR members if the matter cannot be resolved on a bilateral basis. Hearing Date: July 29, 2002 Senator/Member: Sen Fred Thompson Export Control Regimes Question: According to Michael Beck, Assistant Director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, "a regime is effective to the extent that its members comply or abide by regime provisions. However, in the case of the export control regimes, regime guidelines are often so vague that disputes can arise over what exports are contrary to regime provisions." Do you agree that regime guidelines are so vague that it is very difficult if not impossible to assess regime compliance? Do you agree that Russia's transfer of nuclear fuel to Tarpur India is inconsistent with Russia's NSG commitments? Answer: "Compliance" is usually used in referring to legally-binding arms control treaties which are intended to prohibit countries from having weapons programs, such as chemical or biological weapons, or to have certain safeguards in place, such as with nuclear energy programs. Export control regimes tend to be different to the extent that they often are based on informal, politicallybinding (voluntary) commitments between like-minded countries to stem proliferation of WMD and missiles by providing common guidelines to be applied in the case-by-case implementation of national export controls. The premise underlying export control regimes has been that members are "like-minded" and would implement the voluntary controls in a like-minded fashion. Unfortunately, that has not always been the case. For instance, Russia's insistence on supplying nuclear fuel to India's Tarpur reactors is inconsistent with Russia's obligations as a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG). Virtually every other NSG member voiced strong concern that Russia's transfers was inconsistent with the NSG full-scope safeguards principle. Most export control regime members, however, have been responsible in their exports of controlled items. But, we do not agree that it is difficult, or impossible, to assess compliance with a regime. Indeed, our ability to monitor the extent to which nations adhere to the commitments that they make to us is fundamental to our ability to place stock in those commitments in the first place. Hearing Date: July 29, 2002 Senator/Member: Sen Fred Thompson Export of the Global Hawk and Predator Long-Range UAVs Question: Press reports indicate that the U.S. would like American companies to be able to export the Global Hawk and Predator long-range UAVs. The chairmen and ranking member of both the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees have written to the Secretary of State urging that sales of these systems be restricted to only the closest U.S. allies. What is the position of the Defense Department on sales of these weapons? To what extent do U.S. actions on this issue undermine our credibility and leadership in the regime? To what extent is U.S. action on this issue inconsistent with our MTCR commitments? What impact might this have on the desires of other MTCR members to export such systems? Answer: The U.S. remains fully committed to the MTCR Guidelines -- including the unconditional "strong presumption of denial" for all Category I exports and the Regime's ban on the export of Category I production facilities. At the same time, unmanned air vehicles will play a growing role in alliance modernization and interoperability initiatives. U.S. UAV export policy is, and will remain, fully consistent with our MTCR commitments, which permit the export of Category I items on "rare occasions", and our decisions under this policy will be responsible. Hearing Date: July 29, 2002 Committee: SCGA Senator/Member: Sen Fred Thompson Export Control Regimes Question: What are the most important accomplishments of each of the four regimes? What are the areas that most need improvement for the regimes to remain effective in confronting proliferation? Answer: The regimes have induced many major suppliers to responsibly control their exports and thereby have reduced the availability of WMD technology and equipment. Effective enforcement of export controls, multilateral cooperation in halting shipments of proliferation concern, and outreach to key non-members to increase their awareness of proliferation threats, regimes members have made it more difficult, costly, and time-consuming for proliferators to advance their WMD and missile programs. The regimes' efforts have caused delays, forced proliferators to use elaborate procurement networks, and forced them to rely on older less effective technology which buys us time to enhance our capabilities to defend against these threats. However, despite these successes, the dangers from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and related technologies are growing. States of concern and terrorist organizations denied an item by one country are increasingly able to obtain the same item from sources outside the reach of traditional nonproliferation treaties and regimes. Proliferant countries have become much more sophisticated and covert in their acquisition efforts. They are getting more advanced technology from non-Western sources, diversifying their existing arsenals, improving delivery media, and becoming more self-sufficient in the development and fabrication of WMD components. The U.S. and the international community are formulating ways to improve their ability to deal effectively with these threats. We will continue to use existing diplomatic, economic, and military tools to activities to halt or reverse proliferation activities. And we will continue to work with and assist friends and allies to develop and implement their own domestic export controls to deny proliferators access to the necessary equipment, material, or technology related to WMD. Finally, as the recently released national strategy indicates, we are prepared to take steps to intercept shipments if necessary to protect the national security. |