many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly as possible." He began his administration announcing a review of Russian nonproliferation programs. This was a welcome first step.

One of the reasons for this hearing is to determine how we can focus our aid efforts more effectively. Unfortunately, the administration cut the budgets for these programs before completing its review. This approach does not seem to me to make sense, particularly in light of the events of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks.

I hope today the administration will be able to brief us on the results of its review and indicate to us what its intentions are concerning funding for the future of these vital programs. If it still proposes to advocate cutting these programs, the administration needs to justify why these cuts increase our security.

We have lost valuable time in figuring how to recork the bottles containing dangerous chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. I hope the administration shares my sense of urgency, and if it does not, I would like to know why not.

After the first day of the Bush-Putin summit, President Bush remarked that, "Our highest priority is to keep terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction . . . we will strengthen our efforts to cut off every possible source of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons material and expertise."

Today's witnesses will discuss how the administration proposes to carry out that pledge. I hope we may learn how the various programs in the different agencies involved in nonproliferation and threat reduction work together, how these agencies include private sector and nongovernmental efforts in nonproliferation activities. We must make certain that government and non-government spending on nonproliferation programs complement each other so that resources are used effectively and efficiently.

Let me again thank our witnesses again for being with us today. I look forward to your testimony on these important and timely questions.

At this time, I would like to call on my colleague for his statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It has been clear to me for some time that nonproliferation is an absolutely critical element to our national security. I believe that we must expand and enhance our current nonproliferation programs to eliminate as quickly as possible the threat posed by inadequately controlled weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet Union.

A bipartisan task force led by Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler recently concluded that the funding for these programs should be increased to four times the current level. As I stated at our previous hearing on this topic, the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 is a useful step to take in conjunction with the increased funding recommended by the Baker-Cutler task force.

In their recent book, "Plague Wars"-and I have a copy of it here it is a fascinating book. Investigative journalist Tom Man

cal weapons research that was conducted by the Soviet Union. They portray a bureaucracy run amuck with layers of secrecy that prevented effective oversight by any responsible agency.

Furthermore, they cite Defense Intelligence Agency and CIA reports that as late as 3 years ago, we could not preclude the potential of ongoing biological warfare research in Russia. Some reports even suggest the Russian program has produced genetically engineered anthrax and other pathogens resistant to existing antibiotics and vaccines.

The proliferation problem is two-dimensional. We must ensure that any existing stocks of biological agents are properly secured and destroyed as soon as possible. We must prevent Russian scientists with expertise in such weapons from selling their skills to rogue states or terrorists.

In the face of this clear and present danger, we have disturbing evidence that our own capacity to respond to bioterrorist attacks is inadequate. Besides the difficulties in coordination revealed by the recent anthrax attacks, Department of Defense exercises over the past several years have highlighted problems in our preparedness. Even with this overwhelming evidence that more must be done quickly, my efforts to speed funding to improve the facilities at the CDC have met with opposition.

The CDC is the arm of our government responsible for controlling outbreaks of disease. The almost accidental involvement of the CDC in the first anthrax mailing in Florida is all that stood between this country and a far higher casualty count from these anthrax attacks.

The current facilities at the CDC that house these critical links in our ability to detect and respond to a biological attack are painfully and woefully inadequate. In the middle of the anthrax crisis, a broken cable line interrupting the CDC's testing of samples for 12 hours was found. With a finite window of opportunity to test, diagnose, and treat victims of a possible biological attack, every minute of testing counts. To lose half-a-day is an eternity for scientists and technicians. Yet, it has happened, and it will happen again if Congress does not act to upgrade these facilities quickly. That is why I introduced the Public Health Emergencies Accountability Act earlier this month. This act puts in place a procedure that allows clear assignment of responsibility in cases where the public health is threatened. It further mandates the exchange of information between institutions primarily responsible for public health, such as the CDC, and those primarily responsible for countering criminal and terrorist activities.

We must resource the CDC to carry out its critical function. The CDC currently has a 10-year construction plan to make these necessary upgrades, but since September 11, it has been painfully obvious that we do not have 10 years to get the CDC ready for what we now know is a very possible bioterrorist attack.

We need a 5-year plan at the very least. That means Congress needs to approve the $250 million in funding this year. The Senate has approved the full $250 million, and I helped to get $100 million here, added on in the Senate, over the $150 million the President proposed, but I am getting very concerned that the Members of the

The Members of the House who are participating in the Labor/ HHS/Appropriations Conference Committee are not willing to fund the CDC above the $175 million for construction which passed the House this fall. I do not know what else has to happen in this country to demonstrate to the Members of the House that this construction is not only important, but mandatory, to upgrade the CDC as soon as possible. And I call on them today to match the Senate's mark of $250 million in construction aid to the CDC.

My friend, the former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, continues his tireless advocacy for the nonproliferation initiatives begun under his sponsorship 10 years ago. He has recently provided testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee upon which I sit with a series of recommendations for enhancing our counter-proliferation programs as well as improving our ability to respond to a bioterrorist attack.

These recommendations include increase funding for nonproliferation programs, including a program to actively engage the scientists of the Russian and former Soviet Union programs in our own defensive research. Such a program could enhance our ability to produce and stockpile needed vaccines while preventing the loss of dangerous skills to other parties.

I am convinced that our national security depends upon the effective coordination and resourcing of our nonproliferation programs. I support both the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001 of which I am a co-sponsor and the creation of a Deputy National Security Advisor committed exclusively to reducing the threats we face from weapons of mass destruction.

We can no longer afford to under-resource nonproliferation. Many distinguished of both parties have cited the need for increasing nonproliferation funding. Our intelligence community continues to highlight the threat of improperly controlled weapons falling into the wrong hands. The time to act is now. I encourage the administration and my colleagues in Congress to support the full resourcing of required nonproliferation programs and our public health infrastructure. There is no higher national security priority. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for your statement, Senator Cleland.

Now I would like to ask for the statements of our witnesses. Mr. Van Diepen, you may give your statement at this time.

All the witnesses will have their full written statements entered into the record.

You may begin, Mr. Van Diepen.

TESTIMONY OF VANN H. VAN DIEPEN,1 DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. VAN DIEPEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator.

I am very pleased to be here to discuss nonproliferation assistance programs and coordination. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the missiles capable of delivering them is a central security threat facing the United States,

1 The prepared statement of Mr. Van Diepen appears in the Appendix on page 268.

our allies, and our friends. Where we once faced thousands of nuclear weapons under centralized command of a rival great power, September 11 and the biological attacks since have shown how much more diverse and less predictable the threat has become.

While we must be prepared to address the many avenues from which rogue countries and terrorists and their supporters may choose when seeking to advance their attack capabilities, we must also, as both of you have noted in your statements, address the Soviet legacy and its proliferation implications.

The State Department has direct responsibility for several nonproliferation programs directed at or relevant to the countries of the former Soviet Union. In addition, the Department provides foreign policy guidance and diplomatic support for the programs of other agencies.

When the Soviet Union collapsed, the new countries lacked the laws, expertise, and technical resources to implement effective export controls. State's Export Control Assistance Program was created to help establish or strengthen export controls in the new independent states of the former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. As funding increased and the program matured, the scope has expanded to include key countries through which weapons of mass destruction, materials, and technologies are likely to transit while continuing to support the development of more robust systems in potential supplier states. This program has grown from less than $5 million per year in the mid-1990's to the President's request for $39 million for this fiscal year.

State Department chairs an interagency working group on export control assistance which directs and coordinates the work of the various U.S. agencies that implement these programs in over 25 countries worldwide.

Another concern was the threat posed by the thousands of Soviet weapon scientists who no longer would be supported after the Soviet Union's demise, and this is something that Senator Cleland made clear in his statement.

The International Science and Technology Centers began their work to address this problem in Moscow in 1994 and in Kiev in 1995. As the program has matured, the focus has shifted from simply stemming brain drain to also redirecting scientists towards sustainable careers in peaceful, transparent, civilian endeavors in their home countries, be these commercial endeavors or scientific endeavors.

The program now includes nations of particular interest to the U.S. war in Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Armenia, and Georgia. Other key regional states, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, are in the process of joining one of the science centers.

For the past 4 years, the State Department has been an active participant in the U.S. effort to redirect former Soviet biological weapons scientists. The program provides incentives for scientists to refrain from cooperating with terrorist groups or states harboring them and focuses their expertise on critical public health needs such as HIV/AIDS, multi-drug resistant tuberculosis, and a number of plant and animal diseases. The solid collaborative re

springboard for expanded work that will respond to the Bush-Putin initiative to counter bioterrorism.

The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, created to permit a rapid response to unanticipated requirements or opportunities, is a flexible responsive nonproliferation tool. Of particular relevance to the request of this Subcommittee is the NDF's work on Tracker, a stand-alone software package that permits a country to use modern computer tools to track export licensing and enforcement matters from a license application through the process, among central government agencies, and with the export control personnel at ports and border posts. This system is now deployed in eight countries with further applications in process.

State Department also plays a key role in efforts concerning plutonium disposition, eliminating Russian plutonium production reactors, support of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and safeguarding nuclear materials worldwide and coordinating efforts to prevent nuclear smuggling.

Another priority is making sure that our friends and allies shoulder their fair share of the burden. It is important to build a community committed to paying more than lip service, and we are not shy about letting our allies know when we think they should be providing more resources.

On your question concerning how these programs are funded and how they are coordinated, all U.S. policy implementation and oversight of nonproliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union is coordinated at senior levels by the Proliferation Strategy Policy Coordinating Committee, or PCC, chaired by a National Security Council senior director with Assistant Secretary-level representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and other concerned agencies.

This committee works to ensure that individual assistance programs are coordinated within and across agencies and that they serve nonproliferation threat reduction priorities effectively. The PCC has also been charged to develop the strategic plan to guide near- and farther-term nonproliferation and threat reduction cooperation with Russia and Eurasia.

In addition, there are standing working groups to ensure close day-to-day coordination among programs so that the programs complement, not compete, with each other in addressing U.S. nonproliferation objectives. The work of these groups feed directly into the PCC. This structure works well and substantially addresses what is proposed in the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001.

As noted in several of the statements from the witnesses in your November 14 hearing, despite the number and complexity of nonproliferation assistance programs, effective implementation and senior-level coordination already exists.

As you know, President Bush directed that a rigorous review be conducted of all U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union. That review is now in the final stages.

Without prejudicing the White House's final decision, we expect