will continue to play a critical role in combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the post-September 11 world, we believe that stemming the flow of WMD materials, technologies, and expertise worldwide has to be among our highest national priorities and our programs must address that challenge.

The private sector and nongovernmental organizations play several important roles in this endeavor. In our efforts to redirect former weapons scientists to peaceful civilian scientific and commercial research, U.S. industry is helping scientists and their institutes make a permanent transition to peaceful pursuits.

The Science and Technology Centers' industry partner program, for example, now attracts over $20 million annually in corporate funding.

In export controls, U.S. companies have a great deal of expertise in implementing export control regulations. They know the ins and outs of licensing systems, and they have a great deal of knowledge to share with countries and foreign companies that are new to this world. U.S. companies play an important role in our effort to inform and educate their foreign counterparts.

During the past year, a new opportunity for public-private nonproliferation partnership emerged with the establishment of Ted Turner's Nuclear Threat Initiative. Its management and board of directors, which includes several members of Congress, have consulted actively with the administration on their program and have made a commitment to coordinate their activities with those of the government.

I think it is clear that the Bush Administration fully shares the objectives that led Senator Hagel and the other sponsors of S. 673 to offer this legislation. I believe a close examination of how we are coordinating policy and implementation of these programs today will provide clear evidence that we are already doing what Congress would have us do in this regard. S. 673 is not needed, as the Bush Administration has already acted and has already taken the kind of steps this legislation calls for.

We look forward to working with you and other committees and to keeping you fully informed on how we conduct these programs of U.S. nonproliferation assistance to the states of the former Soviet Union, on how we work with other concerned governments to increase their contribution and ensure that our respective assistance is complementary and not duplicative, and on how we seek to work with private-sector donors of assistance in these areas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Van Diepen, for your statement.

Mr. Billingslea, you may give your statement now.

TESTIMONY OF MARSHALL S. BILLINGSLEA,1 ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATION POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. BILLINGSLEA. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before your Subcommittee this morning to discuss nonproliferation assist

ance programs to the republics of the former Soviet Union and the need for careful interagency coordination of these projects.

A key objective of this hearing, as I understand it, is to obtain administration views on S. 673. So I will address this legislation first and then will turn to a brief discussion of the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and our views on proliferation issues in general. And with your permission, I will simply summarize and highlight my testimony and submit the remainder for the record.

The Department of Defense has reviewed S. 673, legislation that would establish an interagency committee within the Executive Branch to review and coordinate U.S. proliferation prevention efforts. We agree that interagency coordination of nonproliferation programs is crucial, but the Department of Defense believes that the Bush Administration is already doing precisely that.

We believe that a legally mandated interagency committee could complicate the existing interagency_coordinating process that is currently managed by the National Security Council. We must be careful not to preclude delegation of authority below the Assistant Secretary level since this would be inconsistent with the way the Executive Branch is currently doing business. A great deal of coordination and policy work is done at successive levels beginning with action officers proceeding through office directors and on to Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Defense and up.

The strategy that the Executive Branch is pursuing is straightforward. First and foremost, we seek to destroy weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, if possible, at their existing location. If it is not possible to destroy such weapons, as is sometimes the case with pathogen stocks that might be needed for disease research, then we will seek to consolidate and secure them. Further, we seek to prevent weapons of mass destruction materials and knowledge from leaving the territory of the former Soviet Union.

The Department of Defense has worked closely with the NSC and other Departments such as the Departments of State, Energy, and Commerce to ensure effective execution of these programs. We also work closely with other agencies to ensure that there is no duplication of effort.

Finally, we must take great care to ensure that U.S. assistance to the former Soviet republics cannot be diverted, cannot contribute to offensive weapons programs or proliferation, or subsidize or otherwise offset other military activities.

A good example of this coordination that is ongoing is found in the Department of Defense's efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons. The Department of Defense is part of an interagency group that reviews all biological weapons proliferation prevention projects that are proposed through the Department of State's International Science and Technology Center. Based on those reviews, approved projects are matched to various departments' areas of expertise and authority.

For our part, the Department of Defense is most concerned with the threat that is posed by dangerous pathogens, particularly the infectious diseases such as smallpox. Over the years, we have

sights into the pathogenesis of various biological agents. The Department of Defense engages in targeted biodefense research projects with Russia in these areas, as agreed to in the interagency process. These projects are designed to cooperatively exploit knowledge to enhance U.S. detection of, protection from, and treatment of these potentially deadly substances. I will return to the matter of biological weapons in a moment, but I use it here to illustrate that we do have a good process in place and that that process is working well.

Let me turn now to an overview of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and the areas of activity in the former Soviet Union. We believe that the CTR program is an important part of our national security strategy. We are privileged to have enjoyed sustained congressional support and robust funding since the inception of this program.

The President's fiscal year 2002 budget request included $403 million for the DOD CTR program, $403 million, which was virtually the same amount budgeted by the previous administration. We appreciate the House Appropriations Committee's full funding of our request and are hopeful that the Senate Appropriations Committee will be equally supportive.

The funds that we have asked for will be used in a variety of program areas that I can summarize. In the nuclear weapons and delivery systems area, we maintain a Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination program that is reducing Russia's strategic offensive arms by destroying strategic WMD delivery systems. I can give you a breakout of the numbers of nuclear submarines, launchers for submarine launch ballistic missiles and SLBMs. It is in my testimony. We also have a Weapons Transportation Security program with Russia that assists in the movement and consolidation of nuclear weapons from Russia's Ministry of Defense operational sites to Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy nuclear weapons dismantlement facilities, and we are providing assistance to the Russian MOD to bolster their ability to respond to and to mitigate the effects of a nuclear weapons accident or an attempted theft.

For instance, in fiscal year 2001, we funded 53 train shipments designed to carry nuclear weapons to dismantlement sites. We funded the maintenance of 79 railcars and contracted for special emergency response vehicles and equipment to be given to the MOD.

We continue to be concerned, Mr. Chairman, with the potential for theft or diversion from Russia of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we have developed the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program to make physical security upgrades to key sites, to install inventory control systems and practices to account for these weapons in the custody of the Russian Ministry of Defense.

During fiscal year 2001, we completed testing and we finalized selection on an approved suite of sensors and equipment to be installed at Russian weapon storage sites. We shipped six sets of Quick Fix fences and sensors to various sites in northern Russia. We funded and verified installation of such kinds of equipment at numerous other sites, contracted for additional guard equipment, training, and facilities, and delivered certified computers to help in

security measures, preferably those that can be provided without extensive training of guard forces, is a good interim solution pending the eventual dismantlement of nuclear weapons stocks, and we may look to do more of this kind of work.

Because time is short, I will turn briefly to Ukraine and a few other countries. I am pleased to report that our Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination program in Ukraine has eliminated all of the START-accountable nuclear delivery system launchers, and we are dismantling other WMD delivery systems and infrastructure.

Similarly, we have completely eliminated all weapons of mass destruction from Kazakhstan.

On the biological weapons front, we believe that it is important to continue cooperation with the biological weapons designers and engineers in the former Soviet Union. This practice is enabling us to identify many research institutes that house dangerous pathogens and production-capable facilities.

The Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention program of the CTR program is consolidating and securing dangerous pathogen collections. We are dismantling former Soviet BW research and production facilities, and as I described earlier, we are targeting research to enhance U.S. biodefense capabilities against dangerous pathogens, some of the work we actually are doing with the CDC and other research institutes.

In our view, the Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention aspect of the CTR program is of exceptional and increasing importance. We also attach great importance to the comparable programs maintained by other agencies such as the Department of State's ISTC program and the Department of Energy's programs.

We have two objectives for the BWPP, the consolidation and elimination of pathogenic stocks, to prevent them from falling into the wrong hands, and collaborative research and development with foreign scientists who can assist the United States in better protecting the American people and the global community from these diseases. In this vein, the Department of Defense believes that the Joint Statement on Bioterrorism reached between President Bush and Russian President Putin creates an important opportunity for closer collaboration.

On the chemical weapons front, we also are concerned with the threat of chemical weapons proliferation, and we are troubled by inadequate security and safety measures currently being maintained on stocks of chemical agent and we have a program that is addressing this concern.

In Uzbekistan, we are dismantling the former Soviet chemical weapons research, development, and testing facilities, and there are numerous other activities that I could get in, time permitting, but I have already greatly exceeded my time, Mr. Chairman.

So let me just summarize by saying that we believe the CTR program has played a crucial role in the Department of Defense's efforts and the U.S. Government's larger efforts to prevent proliferation. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have all acceded to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and have rid themselves of their nuclear capability. The DOD portion of the CTR program was es

The Congress, the Executive Branch, and the American people can and should be proud of the Cooperative Threat Program's accomplishments to date, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify before this committee.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Billingslea, for your statement.

Mr. Baker, you may give your statement at this time.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH E. BAKER,1 PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINIS

TRATION

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today to talk about the Department of Energy's nuclear nonproliferation programs.

With your permission, I will make a few opening comments and submit a longer one for the record.

Senator AKAKA. We would appreciate that.

Mr. BAKER. I want to thank the Subcommittee and, indeed, all the Members of the Senate for their strong interest and support of the U.S. nonproliferation programs. Congress' demonstrated commitment to these programs has sent a strong signal that it knows the mission is critical and enduring and has helped the National Nuclear Security Administration to plan effectively and to work even harder after September 11.

In the aftermath of September 11, the attacks against the United States, the work of the National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Energy has taken on higher visibility and greater importance. Almost a year ago, in January 2001, the bipartisan report by Baker-Cutler mentioned by Senator Cleland concluded the most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today. This is the danger of weapons of mass destruction and weapons-usable materials falling in the hands of terrorists or hostile states and used against American citizens at home.

All of us have seen the reports that Osama bin Laden has attempted to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and that he has called the attainment of such weapons a religious duty. In a nutshell, that face of the threat is confronting us today. Let me assure you, all of the people in the National Nuclear Security Administration are committed to supporting with all available resources, this country's work, and accelerate our efforts to eliminate this threat from the face of the earth.

If I may make a few general comments on the draft legislation and more later that you are considering. The NNSA wants to ensure to you that the interagency coordination is as good as it can be in programs, and they are effective against the nonproliferation agenda. We have already been successful in many of these areas, and I will discuss a few of these in my following testimony.

Even before September 11, reducing the potential for diversion of Russian nuclear warheads and materials has been a critical priority for the United States. It is essential that such warheads and