On the biological side, we still have not been able to get the Russian Government to designate an executive agent that the Department of Defense can work with directly, and as a result, we are working through the ISTC program that the Department of State manages to address those kinds of issues. Senator AKAKA. Well, I want to say thank you to all of you for your statements and your responses. This will certainly help the Subcommittee. The events of September 11 have made the prospect of WMD terrorism a reality. It has certainly changed our lives here in our country. I am pleased that the administration today has stated that it shares my sense of urgency for nonproliferation activities. I hope its words will be matched by action with appropriate funds. On another issue, every witness today said that the statutory coordination mechanism for U.S. nonproliferation is unnecessary. Mr. Van Diepen suggests that it could even be counterproductive or intrusive. This view contradicts those of every one of our witnesses from our hearing on November 14. Each of the proliferation experts welcomed the prospect of additional senior-level coordination and even suggested how the provisions proposed by S. 673 should be expanded. In fact, they all stated that improved coordination was vital to an effective national nonproliferation strategy. I am just giving you some idea of what happened in the last hearing. There is agreement that we need a national strategy. I hope the administration's review will be completed soon so that this Subcommittee can be briefed on its conclusions. Senator Biden has asked to submit a statement for the record. [The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S. Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to submit written testimony to the Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services in support of S. 673, the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act of 2001, of which I am an original co-sponsor. There are many important questions to consider on U.S. nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union, including the need to do far more than we do today. S. 673 would perform a narrower, but vital, function: To establish a high-level interagency committee within the Executive Branch to achieve better coordination of U.S. nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union. In addition, this new committee could help coordinate official U.S. Government activities with those undertaken by private sector organizations, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and by foreign governments. Senators Hagel, Lugar, and I decided to introduce this bill in April, shortly after the Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on the results of the Baker-Cutler Task Force, a high-level advisory panel which reviewed the Department of Energy's nonproliferation programs in Russia. Former Senator Howard Baker and the former White House Counsel, Lloyd Cutler, the co-chairs of the Task Force, reiterated to the Committee the report's principal conclusion: The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nationstates and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home. The events of September 11 and the risks that U.S. forces face in Operation Enduring Freedom only reinforce this conclusion. Every day, we learn more details about Osama bin Laden's chilling quest for weapons of mass destruction, including efforts to enlist the Russian mafia in purchasing and/or stealing sensitive nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. Over the past ten years, beginning with the Nunn-Lugar initiative, the United States has spent more than $5 billion to help the states in the former Soviet Union reduce the threat posed by poorly secured, excess stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, related raw materials and the human expertise behind it all. While these efforts have contributed vital individuals to the security of the United States and every other nation in the world, the bottom line is that we have not done enough. One glaring concern is the lack of sufficient coordination inside the U.S. Government in planning and implementing various nonproliferation activities. Dozens of program offices in various Federal agencies and departments, ranging from the State Department to the Department of Agriculture, implement nonproliferation assistance with little or no overarching strategic guidance. According to the final report released by the Baker-Cutler Task Force: In particular, the urgent risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction demands the attention of the highest level of the U.S. Government. Coordination within and among U.S. Government agencies is insuffi cient and must be improved. [Emphasis added.] Let me give you a sense of the costs of the lack of sufficient coordination within the U.S. Government on this issue. I'm not just talking about program duplication and overlapping efforts, although those are legitimate concerns which can be addressed by better coordination. More critically, the absence of an overarching strategic vision on U.S. nonproliferation efforts can result in missed opportunities to neutralize emerging threats. It can prompt a timid bureaucracy to ignore opportunities for enhanced cooperation with foreign governments. We cannot be satisfied with our efforts to date so long as some nuclear materials and chemical weapons storage sites and former biological weapons production plans in the former Soviet Union still have no more protection than padlocks or barbed wire fences. To ensure that the Executive Branch creates, implements, and manages nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union in a coordinated fashion, S. 673 will establish an interagency committee consisting of high-level representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Energy, and Commerce and chaired by a National Security Council official. This committee shall prepare appropriate analyses and provide the needed guidance to ensure appropriate monitoring of U.S. nonproliferation activities in the former Soviet Union. I understand the administration has implemented an interagency process on these lines, but judging by the slow pace of its review of existing programs, a committee that is empowered to make decisions would be a most beneficial addition to the policy-making process. This bill would provide such a committee and not leave the policy process so dependent on individual personalities or temporary circumstances. I encourage the Governmental Affairs Committee to move quickly, therefore, on S. 673 and report this bill out for floor consideration. Two weeks ago, the Foreign Relations Committee incorporated a slightly revised text of S. 673 in marking up and passing the Security Assistance Act. Regardless of the specific legislative vehicle, it is my fervent hope that the Nonproliferation Assistance Coordination Act will become law in the near future. We cannot talk seriously about homeland defense or a war to deny terrorists access to weapons of mass destruction if we do not put in order our own efforts to work with the states of the former Soviet Union to secure, safeguard, and reduce its stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials. Senator AKAKA. And any Senator wishing to give a statement or offer questions for the witnesses may do so. The record will remain open for 1 week to do that. Again, I want to say thanks so much for your responses and your statements. The hearing is adjourned. MULTILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGIES, AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2002 U.S. SENATE, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, PROLIFERATION, OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. Present: Senators Akaka, Thompson, Stevens, and Cochran. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA Senator AKAKA. The Subcommittee will please come to order. I want to thank our witnesses, Ms. Elisa Harris of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland and Dr. Amy Smithson of the Stimson Center for being with us this morning. I want to also welcome Dr. Jim Walsh of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Dennis Gormley of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Today's hearing about multilateral non-proliferation regimes is the fourth of a series of hearings this Subcommittee has held on the issue of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. Last November the Subcommittee held a hearing on current and future weapons of mass destruction and proliferation threats and a second on combating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with nonproliferation programs. This Subcommittee has jurisdiction over intergovernmental relationships between the United States and international organizations of which the United States is a member. In holding today's hearing we will explore ways in which these organizations may be used more effectively to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means to deliver them. Since September 11 we have all become aware of the dangers directly posed by these weapons. Attacks against the United States are no longer in the realm of science fiction or Hollywood. As technology evolves, these weapons threaten to become even more deadly and more difficult to detect and to prevent from being used. If we do not take September 11 as a wake-up call history may well repeat itself with even more terrible consequences. We must use every tool at our disposal to deter the development and use of these weapons. We know now that the al Qaeda network was busy trying to develop biological, chemical and so-called dirty nuclear weapons. These were not weapons that al Qaeda could develop on its ownthey needed access to foreign technology and foreign scientists. Fortunately, so far it appears that they did not get enough information to perfect these weapon systems before we disrupted their efforts. This demonstrates why it is so important that we choke off the proliferation of WMD technology at its source-government labs and commercial enterprises. Terrorists can gain access to weapons of mass destruction or the technology to make them but they can only do so if foreign governments or foreign scientists or foreign companies willingly provide that information or technology to them. Multilateral agreements are one way to prevent terrorists from gaining weapons technology but multilateral regimes are worthless if they are not effective. China, for example, adheres to most of these agreements but as a recent unclassified report to the Congress by the CIA notes, China continues to provide missile-related technology to a variety of countries of proliferation concern. The CIA cannot rule out contacts by China with foreign nuclear weapons programs and Chinese firms continue to supply chemical weapons production equipment and technology to Iran. If we cannot get countries to abide by the international agreements they have adhered to, then our only alternative may be to take unilateral action to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. This is not the preferred step but it may be our only choice if multilateral agreements do not work. I welcome our witnesses to today's hearing. I look forward to their suggestions as to what works and what does not work in our effort to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction. I want to welcome Senator Thompson this morning to this hearing and ask him for his statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR THOMPSON Senator THOMPSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing today. I think it is an extremely important one. We, of course, these days are very concerned about the terrorism problem, but it is really hand in hand with the proliferation problem. At least 25 countries now possess or are in the process of acquiring and developing capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction-nuclear, biological or chemical weapons or the means to deliver them. The nexus between terrorism and proliferation is very disturbing. The possibility that a terrorist organization will acquire a weapon of mass destruction from one of the many countries developing weapons of mass destruction capabilities is increasing daily. According to a recent intelligence report, several of the 30 designated foreign terrorist organizations and other non-state actors worldwide have sought chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. Many of these terrorists are receiving assistance from countries of concern. Highlighting this danger is the fact that our troops recently uncovered rudimentary designs of a nuclear weapon in an al Qaeda facil |