The rapid spread of information and technology has greatly complicated our efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The information on chemical, biological and even nuclear weapons is widely available on the Internet. Multilateral nonproliferation regimes are one of several tools that our country, and the global community at large, uses to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Today we will be discussing the strengths and weaknesses of those regimes. These regimes are not perfect. Each has significant shortcomings. Collectively, though, they have apparently made a difference in slowing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, we should keep in mind that a multilateral nonproliferation regime is only as effective as the strength of each member's commitment to abide by the principles and rules of the regime. Unfortunately, some regimes have members with weak national export control systems that invariably permit elicit technology transfers. Despite being a member of all of the regimes that we will discuss today, Russia, for example, has yet to develop an effective national export control system. Russia's export controls are still apparently incapable of preventing the illicit transfer of WMD technologies. Other regimes have members that are covertly seeking weapons of mass destruction. Iran, for example, is a member of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions, but has not honored the commitments to either regime. Intelligence reports tell us that Iran has manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons and aggressively sought biotechnical materials and expertise for its offensive biological weapons program. Compounding these problems is the fact that some regimes have members that deliberately sell weapons of mass destruction technologies to countries of concern. These suppliers, though publicly supporting the aims of multilateral non-proliferation regimes, are covertly selling dangerous technologies to rogue states. The most flagrant example of this behavior is China's WMD assistance to Pakistan. Though a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and a proclaimed adherent to the Missile Technology Control Regime, China has armed Pakistan with nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles to deliver them. We must never assume that because a country is a member of a multilateral non-proliferation regime that it will abide by its commitments. To do so, would lead us to a false sense of security. We must be cautious and diligent. And we must be careful not to rely on those regimes as the sole means of stopping the spread of WMD information and technology. Moreover, it is critical that we effectively use our other foreign policy tools, as well. Sanctions, national export controls, foreign aid, and military force are just a few examples of tools that could be used to address the growing threat of WMD proliferation. I am pleased that we have such a distinguished panel of experts with us today to discuss these issues, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again. I have some brief questions for you. Before I ask you the questions I would like to ask you for your statements. So will Miss Harris please begin? TESTIMONY OF ELISA D. HARRIS,1 RESEARCH FELLOW, Ms. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my testimony this morning I would like to address three issues, consistent with your letter of invitation: First, the nature of the chemical and biological weapons threat to the United States; second, the impact of the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention on this threat; and third, measures for enhancing the effectiveness of these multilateral treaties in preventing the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons by both national and subnational-in other words, terrorist-groups. I will summarize my prepared statement but would request that the full text be included in the hearing record. Senator AKAKA. Without objection, it will be included. Ms. HARRIS. Thank you. Prior to September 11 and the subsequent anthrax attacks, the threat of national and terrorist acquisition of chemical and biological weapons were often seen as separate issues requiring separate solutions. Now, however, we must recognize that these two proliferation problems are closely linked in that assistance from national programs is likely to be critical to terrorist efforts to acquire and use chemical or biological weapons successfully. According to the U.S. Government, about a dozen countries are believed to have chemical weapons programs and at least 13 are said to be pursuing biological weapons. These national programs pose a direct threat to U.S. military forces and to our friends and allies in the two regions where the weapons are proliferatingNortheast Asia and the Middle East. They also pose an indirect threat because of their potential to serve as a source of chemical and biological weapons expertise or materials to other national or terrorist programs. One cannot, of course, rule out the possibility that terrorists will acquire chemical or biological weapons on their own without assistance from a national program. But to date, the three most significant terrorist incidents involving chemical or biological weaponsthe recent anthrax attacks here, the Aum Shinriko CBW attacks and the Rajneeshee salmonella attack-all suggest that assistance from national programs is likely to be crucial to terrorist efforts to acquire and use chemical or biological weapons successfully. Of course, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention have had some impact on these national programs. But the 1972 BWC lacks enforcement provisions and has been violated by a number of countries, including the former Soviet Union, and more recently, Iraq. Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has opposed efforts to negotiate legally binding measures to strengthen enforcement with the Convention. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, by comparison, contains the most extensive enforcement provisions ever negotiated in the arms control area. But it, too, faces a number of challenges in these first years of its implementation. Clearly steps can and should be taken to enhance the effectiveness of and reinforce the prohibitions in each of these treaties. In the time that I have left, I would like to just mention a few of those steps. First, with respect to the Biological Weapons Convention, we should resume multilateral discussions on measures to strengthen the BWC. Specifically, the United States should abandon its opposition to multilateral discussions and agree at the November 2002 continuation of the BWC review conference on a process that will allow both U.S. proposals and other proposals for strengthening the Convention to be explored. Second, pending international agreement on legally binding measures to strengthen the Convention, the United States should support efforts to expand the U.N. Secretary General's authority to investigate allegations of the development, production or possession of biological weapons. Today the Secretary General can only investigate the use of these weapons. We should give him the power to investigate activities prior to use. Third, we should strengthen controls over dangerous pathogens. The United States should take the lead in securing tighter international controls on culture collections and other repositories of biological materials. We should also work with other countries to strengthen oversight of laboratories to prevent either deliberate or inadvertent misapplications of biotechnology research for destructive purposes. And fourth, we should enhance oversight of the U.S. biological defense program. Revelations that the United States has produced weapons-grade anthrax and replicated a Soviet era biological bomblet as part of its biological defense program have raised questions both here and abroad about the nature and scope of U.S. activities in this area. Today, there are no comprehensive review mechanisms in place for these secret biological defense activities. The U.S. Congress should hold oversight hearings on the biological defense program to ensure that its scientific, legal, and foreign policy impact is consistent with U.S. non-proliferation interests. With respect to the Chemical Weapons Convention, we should, first, make adherence to the CWC an explicit foreign policy goal. Libya's recent decision to join the Chemical Weapons Convention demonstrates that even in complicated regions like the Middle East there are opportunities for expanding membership in this treaty. It is not unimaginable that North Korea might agree to abandon its chemical weapons program and join the convention as part of a broader security arrangement on the Korean Peninsula. The United States should ensure that CWC adherence is a prominent issue in its foreign policy toward the key hold-out countries, including North Korea. Second, we should be prepared to use challenge inspections to address serious compliance concerns, especially in countries where bilateral consultations have been either unsuccessful or are not appropriate. Third, we should devote the resources necessary to meet the have indicated to the treaty organization that they will be unable to meet the April 2007 deadline for destroying their chemical weapon stocks. We should work with Russia and ensure in our own case that adequate resources are devoted to meeting this important obligation. Fourth, we should rectify the budget problems in the treaty organization for the Chemical Weapons Convention. Because of a zero growth budget imposed on the OPCW over the past 5 years, we are beginning another year millions of dollars short for implementation. This has serious implications for the verification activities of the OPCW. The United States should work with the OPCW and other parties to ensure that there are sufficient funds to carry out all planned verification activities. And finally, we can strengthen both conventions, both the BWC and the CWC, by making it an international crime for individuals to develop, possess or use chemical and biological weapons. Both the BWC and the CWC impose legally binding obligations on governments but not on individuals. The United States should support the negotiation of a treaty that would make it a crime under international law for individuals to acquire or use chemical or biological weapons or to knowingly assist others in doing so. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. At this time I would like to call on Senator Cochran for his statement. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I am pleased to join you in this hearing this morning and I thank you for convening the hearing and assembling the witnesses that we will hear from today. This is a very interesting and troubling issue. I have been frustrated over a period of time that our efforts to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other items that threaten the security of the world have not been more successful. We have these international agreements, these so-called non-proliferation regimes, and it seems to me that in most of the serious cases of proliferation these agreements are ineffective to stop or even slow down the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the missile systems that could be used to deliver them over long ranges. So I am concerned if we continue to put our trust and faith in that process, in those regimes, whether we are really contributing to a false sense of security. I am curious to know what the witnesses might say about alternatives to the regimes and I just heard Ms. Harris, of course, point out a couple of things that she thinks could be considered to improve the effectiveness of the regimes. It is this kind of suggestion I think we are looking for this morning, not only observations and discussions of the regimes themselves and what our practices have been in the past. And if there have been successes, we need to think about those. We do tend to focus probably on the ineffectiveness rather than the good that the regimes may have done and that would be useful for us, in order So it is important and I do not know of any other issue more serious to us as a country at this time, certainly coming on the heels of the attacks that we have seen last year and the concerns we have for future terrorism attacks against the United States and our citizens. So it is very timely and we appreciate very much the cooperation of all of you to help make this hearing a success. [The prepared statement of Senator Cochran follows:] PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COCHRAN The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is one of the greatest threats our nation faces today, and will continue to face in coming years. Countering that threat in order to ensure the security of our citizens and deployed forces requires a variety of means, ranging from diplomacy to intelligence to active and passive defenses, and even to military action when necessary. Nonproliferation regimes are important tools in this fight against the spread of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and their delivery means. Unfortunately, despite the existence of regimes covering all types of weapons of mass destruction, the spread of these weapons to nations and even terrorist groups continues, as the CIA has documented in its recent Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction. Consider Iran, for example. According to the CIA's report, despite being a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Iran has manufactured and stockpiled several thousand tons of chemical weapons, comparable in size to Iraq's stockpile before the Gulf War. And the Director of Central Intelligence told the Senate just last week that Iran, despite being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is at work now on a nuclear weapons and may succeed in developing one in just a few years. The extent to which these nonproliferation regimes can stop or slow the proliferation of WMD remains to be seen. I look forward to hearing our witnesses' views on how the effectiveness of these regimes can be improved, and I commend the Chairman for calling this hearing to examine this important issue. Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Senator Cochran. I would like to then call on a statement from Dr. Smithson. TESTIMONY OF AMY E. SMITHSON, Ph.D.,1 DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT, HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER Ms. SMITHSON. Thank you. Adjusting policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism is not easy. I would like to thank this Subcommittee for looking beyond the obvious, for holding a hearing that examines the utility of international treaties in helping to assure this Nation's well-being. Arms control critics often deride treaties as weak mechanisms that can be broken with impunity, yet these same critics would hardly advocate scrapping U.S. laws against murder even if those laws are broken with disturbing frequency. Rather, they would call for better enforcement of the laws. Even a good law is only as effective as its enforcement. Member governments are the custodians of these treaties. As the world's most powerful nation, the United States has a special responsibility to lead efforts to enforce them. Despite what you might have heard, terrorists are likely to have difficulty overcoming the technical hurdles associated with acquiring a capability to inflict mass casualties with chemical and biological weapons. Therefore one key to keeping such weapons out of their hands is to tackle the proliferation problem at the national level. Treaties such as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven |