"Well, yes, we talked [about trade matters]. As a matter of fact-and this, of course, was outside any secret realm-everybody knows that we are concerned about this thing. I believe it is not only the wool fabrics, but it is electrical machinery and I believe some activities in the airplane realm.

"Now, both of us agreed this: to study it as seriously, as exhaustively as we can, because both of us believe in what we call the principle of interdependence. We believe that you cannot keep a coalition of free countries, each with its own problems, its own aspirations, its own special conditions-you cannot bring them together, keep them close together, unless we adopt cooperative measures that do promote the interests of all. And to be too selfish, or, let us say, too shortsighted in looking at our own possible advantage for the moment-I think the greatest need is to look at the long-term benefits of the whole group, because with that group our own fortunes are tied up."] 1o

10

188. THE UNITED STATES POSITION RESPECTING THE HOLDING OF A MULTILATERAL "SUMMIT" CONFERENCE: Replies Made by the President (Eisenhower) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, March 25, 1959 (Excerpts)1

First of all, ... all of this exercise of negotiating and dealing with the Soviets has as its basic purpose the reduction of tension. We have been-the free world has been-trying to bring that about for a good many years. Now, with respect to conditions [regarding a summit conference] laid down in the notes, as you people well know, all of these notes have to be coordinated with our friends, including NATO. This has now been done. Our note will be sent very shortly; and very quickly after that, as quickly as it can be done, it will be released. So, I would suggest, for the actual letter of our intentions, there is a place to find it, and very quickly.

Now, I just will say this one thing: I have been talking for some years now about the convictions that I hold with respect to this whole business. I have never changed them; I don't expect to change them unless there is something cataclysmic or, let us say, unexpected, rather, that comes along and that would bring some change.

It is rather difficult to visualize such a thing [as a series of summit conferences where the world leaders could get off in some secluded spot and discuss informally the problems of the world]. If you meet with a group of world leaders, it is rather hard to keep the spotlight off of it. And if you are going to talk, doing this informally, it would be with the batteries of interpreters and recorders and all that sort of thing. It would almost inevitably change, I think, into

10 Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959, p. 296.

1 The replies printed here are taken from pp. 292-293, 294, and 299 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959. See infra.

something rather formal. I will say merely this: if, assuming that we have an atmosphere that permits periodic negotiation [and] gives some hope of its beneficial effects for our country and for the free world, well, certainly, I would never decline to go along in that kind of an effort.

Of course, if I tried to make that [summit] conference [with Chairman Khrushchev and other heads of government] here [in the United States], I would know of no place you could do it except in the United Nations Building. You see, the job of having all these simultaneous translation instruments, and of the building, the accommodation so set up that it can be done, that would be the only place. And New York is a very crowded place. There is another thing: if I am here, I am on the flank of this whole group of nations to be talking, and it is a little bit unfair, I think, to ask them all to come over here, because they all have to go a long distance. The purpose would be to get into a central point. Now, I don't mean to say that I bar this idea from consideration. I just say we have not taken it seriously as one of the prospects at the moment.

I think it is perfectly clear that he [Chairman Khrushchev] is the only man who has the opportunity-let us say, the authorityreally to negotiate [for the U.S.S.R.]. If you had anyone else with whom you were negotiating except in detail, or method or procedure or agenda, things like that-I really believe that the only way that man could do anything would be to be on the telephone all the time with Moscow. So, in effect, you would be negotiating directly with Moscow. And I think that there is probably some validity to the argument that if you are going to talk really substantive measures and hope to get some agreement that can be valid on both sides considered valid on both sides-that he [Chairman Khrushchev] has got to get into the picture pretty well.

I want to make this very clear: this doesn't mean that anyone can command anybody else to come to a summit meeting. You can't bluff them or blackmail them or anything else. This is to be a meeting, if there is one, of heads of government who are acting voluntarily and because of their beliefs in the possibilities, with some kind of grounds for such a belief, that real measures can be discussed profitably by all of us.

189. THE WESTERN POWERS' PROPOSAL FOR A FOURPOWER FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING "TO CONSIDER QUESTIONS RELATING TO GERMANY, INCLUDING A PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY AND THE QUESTION OF BERLIN," PREPARATORY TO A CONFERENCE OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT: Note From the American Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Delivered March 26, 19591

The Government of the United States refers to the note of the Government of the U.S.S.R. of March 2, 1959,2 in response to the United States note of February 16,3 proposing a conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States.

The United States Government has consistently favored meetings of interested powers that could provide opportunities for conducting serious discussions of major problems and could be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects. It was for this reason that the United States Government in its note of February 16 proposed a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States. The United States Government notes with satisfaction the Soviet Government's agreement to such a meeting.

Specifically, the United States Government proposes that a meeting of France, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States at the Foreign Minister level be convened in Geneva on May 11, 1959, to consider questions relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the question of Berlin. Naturally, any of the four participating governments should have the opportunity to present its views on any question which it may consider relevant to the problems under consideration. The purpose of the Foreign Ministers meeting should be to reach positive agreements over as wide a field as possible, and in any case to narrow the differences between the respective points of view and to prepare constructive proposals for consideration by a conference of Heads of Government later in the summer. On this understanding and as soon as developments in the Foreign Ministers meeting justify holding a Summit Conference, the United States Government would be ready to participate in such a conference. The date, place and agenda for such a conference would be proposed by the meeting of Foreign Ministers. The conference of Heads of Government could consider and if possible resolve some wider problems such as those referred to in the Soviet Government's note of March 2 and in previous communications from the United States Government and where necessary establish machinery for further negotiation on these problems.

1Department of State press release No. 223 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1959, pp. 507-508). Similar notes were delivered by the Embassies of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom.

2 Ante, doc. 181.

8 Ante, doc. 177.

The United States Government fully recognizes that Poland and Czechoslovakia, like a number of other countries, have a legitimate and direct interest in certain matters which will be discussed in the conference. The possibility of the participation of other countries at a certain stage in negotiations could therefore be contemplated. However, the United States Government believes that the proposed meeting should at least at the outset involve only the four powers responsible for Germany. The United States Government also notes that the Soviet Government agrees with the proposal made in its note of February 16 that German advisers should be invited to the meeting on May 11 and be consulted.

The Government of the United States in proposing a Foreign Ministers meeting on May 11 understands that the Soviet Government would find Geneva a suitable location. The Government of the United States will, therefore, inquire of the Government of Switzerland to determine if this place and time would be convenient and also of the Secretary General of the United Nations to ascertain if the facilities of the United Nations in Geneva can be made available.

190. THE WESTERN POWERS' INITIAL PREPARATION FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING ON GERMANY: Communiqué Issued at Washington by the Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States, April 1, 1959 i

The Foreign Ministers of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the Acting Secretary of State of the United States have concluded a series of useful meetings in Washington March 31 and April 1. They reviewed the report of the quadripartite Working Group, which met in Paris from March 9 to 21, as a basis in preparing for the foreign ministers conference with the Soviet Union scheduled to be held in Geneva beginning May 11. They provided guidance to the quadripartite Working Group for its next series of meetings scheduled to begin in London on April 13. The Ministers decided on the form of a report which will be made to the NATO Council Thursday afternoon [April 2].3

The Ministers conducted their discussions concerning Berlin on the basis of their declaration contained in the four-power communique on Berlin issued in Paris December 14, 1958 -with which the North Atlantic Council associated itself.

The Ministers agreed to meet again in Paris beginning April 29 in further preparation for the conference with the Soviet Union. A

'Department of State press release No. 240 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 20, 1959, p. 555).

*Not printed; for the establishment of the Working Group, see ante, doc. 176. 'Not printed; see ante, doc. 140.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, p. 600. 'See post, doc. 194.

report on the substance of those discussions will be made to the North Atlantic Council. All these preparations are based on a sincere desire to negotiate constructively with the Soviet Union in the interests of world peace.

[MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (WASHINGTON): Communiqué, April 4, 1959-Ante, doc. 140]

191. SOVIET INSISTENCE ON OBSERVATION OF A 10,000FOOT CEILING BY WESTERN AIRCRAFT FLYING THE FRANKFURT-BERLIN AIR CORRIDOR: Note From the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy at Moscow, April 4, 1959 (Excerpts)1

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the instruction of the Soviet Government deems it necessary to bring the following to the notice of the Government of the United States of America.

On March 27 a C-130 type American transport plane, going from West Germany to Berlin along the air corridor lying over the territory of the German Democratic Republic, rose to a height of 7,000 meters, which is a crude violation of the existing procedure of flights along this route. The demonstrative character of this violation is evident from the very fact that the American representative in the Berlin Air Safety Center, which regulates flights of foreign airplanes between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, was informed in good time by the Soviet side about the inadmissibility of the flight of the said plane at a height of more than 3,050 meters, which is the maximum for flights of the Western powers using the air corridors. Moreover, this same airplane, completing on the same day a return trip from Berlin to West Germany, again flew at a height twice exceeding the usual ceiling of flights in the air corridors, although a protest was made by the official Soviet representative to the U.S. representative against the violation of flight rules which had taken place.

One cannot help noting that the violations by American planes of the existing procedure and established practice of flights over the territory of the German Democratic Republic are undertaken at that moment when agreement has been reached concerning the carrying out soon of negotiations between East and West on the question of Berlin and other questions having prime significance for the cause of peace. All this is taking place after the U.S. Government through its Ambassador in Moscow declared at the time of the transmittal of the note on the question of the planned negotiations that in its opinion unilateral actions of any Government in the period of preparation for the forthcoming conferences will hardly help their successful outcome.' Analogous statements were made also by the Governments of other powers which are allies of the United States of America in NATO. It would seem that after such statements the Government of the United States of America ought also to have acted accordingly by avoiding everything that could complicate the effectuation of the understanding about the carrying out of the conferences.

In calling the attention of the U.S. Government to the dangerous character of the actions of the American authorities in Germany, the Soviet Government

1 Department of State Bulletin, May 4, 1959, p. 633.

'Statement made by Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson at the time of delivery of the U.S. note of Mar. 26 regarding the foreign ministers meeting on the problem of Germany. [Footnote in source text.] See ante, doc. 189.