One other question before I yield to my colleagues: Mr. Heymann, we are having for the first time at 1 o'clock, as I mentioned, an oversight hearing on the DEA-we just recently acquired oversight on that agency-and their budget is almost ten times over yours, over $200 million. I wonder if you could give us any suggestions as to what we should be looking for as we exercise our oversight and authorizing function? I know that's a very broad question, but it is the first time we have done that; and I know from talking with Mr. Bensinger that he works closely with the Department of Justice. But I wonder if you would give us any norms or suggestions as to how we could best help the DEA and Justice in our role? Mr. HEYMANN. The only thing I am tempted to say, Mr. ChairmanI think you people are probably familiar with-if I was sitting where you are sitting, and reviewing the budget activities of DEA, I would want to look at the division of what they do in two different ways, two crosscuts: One, being careful to distinguish between and among drugs: heroin and some of the artificial drugs, such as PCP, being presumably somewhat more serious than cocaine and marihuana, as you go down the line. Although the evidence coming in on marihuana is that marihuana looks dangerous, but not in the same category as heroin-I want to distinguish it that way. Then I would want to distinguish the type of activity. An important drug policy, as Mr. Bensinger will tell you, has to be a combination, first, of foreign affairs, that is, crop disruption. Disruption in Mexico was successful; Turkey also had a successful operation. And second, interdiction at the borders by the use of the Coast Guard, Customs, and DEA to try to prevent drugs from coming into the United States. Obviously it varies immensely among drugs. Marihuana comes in by the multiton; heroin comes in by the gram or pound. But other than this, I have nothing else to add, Mr. Chairman, except I think you have bought yourself a difficult and interesting jurisdiction. Mr. DRINAN. I thank you. The gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren? Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. Sir, I am sorry I missed the first part of your presentation; and I hope I am not going over ground that's already been covered. I would be interested in a subject you've probably heard a great deal of that is the ABSCAM. What are the efforts of the Department to seek out those people who either intentionally or unintentionally released information on that investigation? Mr. HEYMANN. I am not-I don't make any effort to keep some kind of daily or weekly awareness of what Mr. Blumenthal is doing. He's not working under me. I know him well personally, I talk to him, giving him my suggestions. I do not know what success he is having or not having. It is extremely difficult to track down leaks; that is my business in the national security area. We have perhaps 15 to 30 occasions a year; we are notoriously unsuccessful at it in the national security area. I give him a little bit more prospect for success than I give us, for three reasons: One, he is going at it with an unlimited commitment; if it requires interviewing 300 to 400 people, they will do it. Two, I think he is going at it in a muscular way, which I approve of. He's coming on hard; and I think that is wise. Three, he has got the manpower, which is perhaps the same as number one to spread out; and he has them on leaks in ABSCAM, BRILAB, and Pendorf, which were the three major leaks all taking place at the same time. It's a very hard thing to succeed in. All I can tell you without being up to date on it-and I don't want to be up to date, as I don't want Criminal Division treated differently, we are one of the groups-all I can tell you is it looks to me like a very efficient and energetic operation. Mr. LUNGREN. I know it's not in your control. Obviously as one of those who supports the Justice Department's efforts, and I think who believes the Department ought to be commended for a program which happened to come up against Members of Congress allegedly involved in this, I do think it is important that the whole question of the leaks be put on a priority basis. Because I think that is the one major area where the administration, where the Department, can be criticized. To the extent that it hangs over the head of the Department it interferes in some way with whatever future investigations you have. I think it clouds somewhat the confidence the Members of Congress may have in the Department. Mr. HEYMANN. I think so. Mr. LUNGREN. I have a question-again I am not sure if this is strictly within your bailiwick. I notice in your statement you mention in areas such as litigation, State-Federal-local prosecutorial relations, LEAA grant review, you are providing leadership. In an area that is just outside my district, but one which I have a great deal of concern about-Los Angeles Police Department-they have recently, I understand, had to cancel a new class of recruits for the LAPD because of the fact that they are in a rut where the DOJ had a lawsuit over its insistence on certain levels of minority participation in the Department-and they also include women in that definition of minority. Is that something in your division under LEAA grant review process? Mr. HEYMANN. No; I am pleased to say it is not, Mr. Lungren, because it must be a terribly difficult area. [Laughter.] Mr. LUNGREN. I had a whole series of questions for you on that. [Laughter.] Mr. HEYMANN. What we do on the LEAA review is with regard to new clients in most categories. Mr. Dogin has offered and I have readily accepted-and there's always Mr. Richard secretly in the background as the broker of this type of deal-that we have a system where we sit down with them and suggest, would this be a sensible grant? We are in an advisory role. We don't get into what you've just described. Mr. LUNGREN. I was very concerned with the withholding of Federal moneys to the Los Angeles Police Department, because the DOJ feels they are not matching up to certain standards that have been set back here. I see that is a difficulty we have when there are national grants and all of a sudden we make decisions back here as to what the makeup of the Department should be; and if the Department doesn't come up with those standards, they lose the grant moneys they depend on. So I am sorry I don't have the person I can ask about that. I would be happy to yield back the balance of my time. Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Heymann, I would like to go to, as deeply as we can, page 2 where you indicate the Department is committed to effective handling of internal security matters. I have a strong concern given the Iranians that are coming into this country since the problem we are having with that country, and the KBG agents we understand are proliferating in the Washington area, the New York area, and I am sure other areas in the United States: Are we giving proper financial resources for the internal security of this Nation to be protected? Are we adequately on top of these, what I consider to be very big problems facing us, facing the country? Mr. HEYMANN. Mr. Hall, I have to answer you the same way I answered Mr. Lungren, and that is, although it looks like it is in my area, it isn't in my area. The FBI has four crime units. Three of its priorities overlap with me. Those are: organized crime, fraud, and public integrity. Their fourth is counterintelligence. You are really asking your question about the counterintelligence function of the FBI. And a very small part of that function, and it's a priority area for the FBI, interfaces or meets my internal security section. My internal security section is about 17 attorneys. Whenever it is within the capacity and desire of the FBI counterintelligence operation to invite a prosecution, and we have had a series of very successful ones over the last 2 or 3 years, they will refer a matter to my internal security section. And we will prosecute it. And again, we have been very successful. We have had, I guess, somewhere between 8 and 12 successful prosecutions; but that is a tiny tip of the iceberg. Counterintelligence is the FBI's responsibility. And I honestly don't know enough to answer your question as to whether they feel it is adequately staffed. I know I am adequately staffed to handle any FBI case they send to us. We have enough people for that. But those are a very small part of the total program. Mr. HALL. Well, I'm not quite sure what your statement means when it says, "The Division"-which means Criminal Division, which you are currently in charge of Mr. HEYMANN. Yes. Mr. HALL [continuing]. "Is also deeply committed to the effective handling of internal security matters." You say if you have the capacity and the desire you would get involved in these matters that are referred to you by some other arm of Mr. HEYMANN. If I said that, I said it wrong, Mr. Hall. What I wanted to suggest was that of all the counterintelligence dealing with any foreign intelligence agency that the FBI is engaged in, on many occasions they may not be able to make out an espionage case for prosecution. They may be doing very important counterintelligence work for the country, and yet not be able to make out a case for prosecution. And in some cases they may not want to prosecute, if they have identified an agent of a foreign government, they may be much more anxious to see who the agent is dealing with in the United States than to prosecute the agent. Mr. HALL. Well, at what stage of these proceedings would your Division become involved? Mr. HEYMANN. Only when the FBI decided that, yes, they have the evidence, which we would check through to see that they have it and it is consistent with our counterintelligence program to prosecute. Kampiles, Madsen, Truong & Humphrey, Enger & Chernyayev-a long list; but the long list is 16 people, something like that, that have been prosecuted. Mr. HALL. All the prosecutions would eventually end up in your Division? Mr. HEYMANN. That is correct. We usually prosecute about 3 to 6 cases a year. Mr. HALL. Your Division, as I understand it, does no initial investigation on any of these people whose names you have just mentioned? Mr. HEYMANN. That is correct. They all would have been investigated as part of an ongoing counterintelligence program of the FBI, which is as large as any other activity. Mr. HALL. Well, would the CIA function in the same way as the FBI functions on referring these internal security matters to your Division for prosecution-if that area or arm of government felt there should be prosecution? Mr. HEYMANN. The CIA does not, as I understand it, conduct an ongoing counterintelligence program domestically. I think that would violate their functions, as the Congress understands them. But if they come upon a spy ring within the CIA, and that has happened-Kampiles was a CIA employee who left the CIA-they will refer him to us for investigation and prosecution. In other words, keeping track of Soviet agents is the business of the FBI; the CIA would propose something to us only if they found a CIA official was somehow or other engaged in the espionage. Mr. HALL. Do you believe that the 17 attorneys you have in your division is an adeqaute number? Mr. HEYMANN. Yes. It does not even take the 17 to handle the flow of espionage cases. A lot of the time of the 17 is spent on the Foreign Agent Registration Act. With the attorneys we have, we have ample resources to handle every espionage case that the FBI or CIA or Defense sends us, because they are quite rare. When I say quite rare, however, I think it is much more frequent in the last 2 or 3 years than ever before. Mr. HALL. Iyield back the balance of my time. |