Attorney General's memorandum dated March 26, 1979 (Appendix III), and is contingent upon approval of CRM's budget request for the fiscal years covered by the implementation plan. FV 1979 - Establish seven offices covering 21 Federal districts QUSAs with the program; FY 1982 - Add a second Specialist, as resources become available, to cover all districts within a Specialist's region while working through their unit district. Although the total number of units has been expanded to 30, there has been very little modification in the first two phases of the implementation plan. The following chart shows the establishment of ECE units during FY 1979 and FY 1980, and the location of the 18 existing units and 12 proposed units are illustrated on the map on page 101 (Appendix IV). for example, where the subject of one agency's investigation was cooperating with another agency in exchange for immunity or reduced charges, or where two different agencies requested subpoenas for identical documents, significantly jeopardizing the cases involved. By restructuring objectives and incentives, a proactive approach--that is, one in which the investigating agency actively seeks to identify or detect the crime with the assistance of other investigators and prosecutors--becomes more feasible. Since investigative agencies vary in terms of experience, traditional areas of specialization, methods of operation, and the background of their personnel, they also vary in the expertise and sophistication they bring to an investigation. These differing perspectives can greatly enhance an investigation, when they are properly utilized and coordinated. The Federal Prosecutive System and Its Relationship to the Investigative Agencies. The Federal system for prosecuting Federal crime is decentralized, comprised of numerous litigating divisions within DOJ and the 95 OUSAs. In general, the OUSAs operate autonomously, handling those cases they select as most important for prosecution in their district. Where a particular criminal operation crosses jurisdictional lines, a lack of communication between OUSAs can result in two or more offices either proceeding independently, without knowledge of the other's involvement, or disagreeing as to how they should proceed. Additionally, each V.S. Attorney has differing amounts of resources devoted to and expertise about white-collar crime, reflecting either the actual rceived extent and nature of white-collar crime in each district. As described earlier, white-collar crime cases often consume time and resources because of their complexity; hence, in offices where the AUSAs carry heavy caseloads, it is difficult to devote the resources necessary to prosecute many of these cases. Furthermore, where the prevailing view is to measure success by the quantity of cases prosecuted, rather than by the quality of those cases, then the pursuit of the complex or sophisticated case becomes less likely. This situation is reinforced by the fact that the investigators have historically taken a reactive approach to white-collar crime, interacting with prosecutors only upon completion of the investigation. Although experience has shown that the relationship between the prosecutors and investigators is an important one, this relationship is often not fully developed. Successful investigations and subsequent prosecutions are enhanced when investigators work with prosecutors early in the investigative stages of a case because it coordinates their two viewpoints. For example, as agents work with prosecutors more closely, their awareness of OUSA prosecutive priorities increase, so that their cases are selected more in line with those priorities. Additionally, many white-collar investigations rely on the investigative grand jury for obtaining information, necessitating early interaction between investigators and prosecutors. The heavy caseloads experienced by many AUSAs, however, do not always make it possible for prosecutors to interact closely with investigators through a long or complex case; where this is true, the prosecutorial approach to white-collar crime is also reactive. State and Local Investigative and Prosecutive Agencies. At the State and local levels there are thousands of investigators and prosecutors who have jurisdiction over many offenses that can also be prosecuted as Federal crimes. Problems at these levels are similar to those associated with the multiplicity of Federal agencies, namely, duplication of effort, work performed at crosspurposes, or a lack of coordination on cases. Concurrent jurisdiction, however, adds another dimension to the difficulty of solidifying efforts, since each level of government brings special capabilities to the investigation and prosecution of white-collar crime cases. One level of government can be more effective than another depending upon the strength of the jurisdiction's interest, its ability and willingness to prosecute effectively, and the probable sentence upon conviction. Sometimes the available sanctions for an offense and the expected sentence upon successful prosecution are different. For example, where a State statute carries a stiffer penalty than the parallel Federal law and it can be reasonably expected that such penalty will be imposed it may be more effective to prosecute at the State level. However, there are no general rules delineating which level of govern ment investigates or prosecutes a particular type of offense. Sanctions Available or Imposed. A final aspect to a comprehensive program to effectively address white-collar crime is to ensure the effective sentencing of the white-collar criminal. Traditional notions of the objectives of sentencing the criminal offender have included: recompensing society for the wrong committed, rehabilitating the offender, and deterring other possible offenders. If sanctions are appropriate for the offense committed, it is expected that crime should be reduced. Currently, however, sanctions imposed do not always achieve these objectives. The criminal takes minimal risks for the benefit he derives from his crime; thus, there is little compensation, rehabilitation or deterrence, and enforcement personnel become increasingly overburdened with the volume of white-collar criminal activities. THE NEED FOR COORDINATION AND A FORMALIZED STRUCTURE TO ADDRESS EFFECTIVELY THE ECONOMIC CRIME PROBLEM The preceding discussion depicts a large, complex system of numerous, decen tralized and reactive investigative and prosecutive agencies, loosely linked together. These agencies respond to numerous and diverse schemes that are difficult and time-consuming to detect, investigate, and prosecute. Finally, even where the efforts are successful, there is no assurance that there will be an appropriate sanction. From analysis of this situation, several needs emerged in formulating a national strategy to respond effectively to the problem of white-collar crime: Need to educate the general public, business communities and govern mental agencies as to the nature, scope and impact of white-collar criminal activities; Need to heighten public awareness as to the methods of preventing crimes and recognizing those that do occur, through the dissemination of public information; Need to foster cooperation and communication among the agencies and offices; |