Madam Chairman, I am Ray Alfred, chief of the Jacksonville Fire Department. I also appear today on behalf of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (ICHIEFS).

I would like to start by thanking you for your advocacy on behalf of the fire service. We at the Jacksonville Fire Department are especially pleased with your efforts on our behalf. The issue of domestic terrorism is one in which America's fire departments have a vital interest. Violence perpetrated against our citizens for political purposes, national, international or otherwise, will be suffered locally.

It is our understanding that H.R. 4210, the Terrorism Preparedness Act of 2000, seeks to address the issue of coordination of programs spread across myriad federal agencies that are designed either to help prepare the local emergency response community or programs that provide actual response capabilities at the federal level.

There are two distinct areas of federal counterterrorism efforts that should be addressed. First, programs designed to support local emergency services personnel who will be first on the scene and second, the operational role of federal agencies in the wake of an attack. The Nunn/Lugar/Domenici amendment to the 1996 Defense Authorization and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 began federal efforts to help better prepare local fire, police and emergency services agencies for the possibility of terrorism involving chemical, biological, radiological and conventional weapons. Our association was involved in the development of both these laws, and continues to work with the Departments of Defense and Justice, along with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in their administration.

The Antiterrorism Act authorized a $5 million appropriation to train fire fighters and other emergency services personnel in terrorism response. Designated by the Attorney General to administer this law, the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) provided four jurisdictions with demonstration grants and, importantly, worked with the National Fire Academy in the development of awareness-level training curricula that has been available nationwide for two years. A train-the-trainer approach was used as both a cost savings and an efficient way to reach as many fire fighters and other emergency personnel as possible. Hundreds of thousands have received training based on these materials. This awareness-level training is excellent and should continue to be provided.

Chemical, biological and radiological weapons pose unique challenges. Fire fighters and emergency personnel, improperly prepared, will themselves fall victim to their effects. The lives of the initial survivors of an attack depend upon immediate care and attention from rescue workers. These men and women must be equipped to operate safely in a contaminated environment if lives are to be saved. Thus, personal protective equipment must be the top priority, followed by equipment that will facilitate decontamination of victims. Devices that can detect and monitor the presence of these agents are also very important. They can prevent mistakes that may cost lives.

2

Discretionary funds for counterterrorism initiatives provided by the Conference Report accompanying FY 1998 appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, were targeted by the Attorney General at these equipment issues. The OJP distributed $12 million to 41 jurisdictions across the country to begin addressing these urgent equipment needs.

At the same time OJP created, at the direction of Congress, a National Domestic Preparedness Consortium comprised of Louisiana State University, the New Mexico Institute for Mining and Manufacturing, Texas A&M University and the Nevada Test Site. The Justice Department also took control of the U.S. Army's chemical weapons training facilities at Ft. McClellan, Alabama and designated this facility as the National Domestic Preparedness Center. Training curricula and facilities offered by the Consortium have been well received by chief fire officers with both hazardous materials and training expertise. Managers at these facilities have actively sought out expertise from the fire service and have shown a willingness and demonstrated ability to respond to constructive criticism of their programs. ICHIEFS strongly supports expedited access to the Consortium's facilities for as many local emergency services personnel as possible.

We believe that the enhancement of existing local capabilities is the wisest, most costeffective course to follow in preparing for "weapons of mass destruction" terrorism. It is our experience that not only will we be the first responders on the scene, but we will be the largest supplier of personnel and equipment throughout the incident. Fire department hazardous materials response teams deal with spills and accidental releases of highly toxic chemicals on a regular basis. The fire service is the only organized group of responders, located locally - throughout America - that has the staffing, training and equipment to immediately begin mitigation of an incident.

I turn now to the coordination of these and other programs that H. R. 4210 seeks to address. Some of my colleagues in the fire service have appeared before this Committee in the past and spoken of their concerns as to the lack of a coordinated federal effort, both in terms of the preparedness and support programs I have discussed and the seemingly endless federal response capabilities that appear duplicative and continue to grow.

My friend, Chief Mike Freeman of Los Angeles County, chairs the International Association of Fire Chiefs' Terrorism Committee on which I also serve. He appeared before this Committee last month and spoke to the need for better coordination at the federal level.

I would like to simply repeat that message: It is said that the sum of human effort is greater than the individual parts. If none of us can quantify, or even find, the parts, it is more likely that the sum total of our national preparedness effort will be diminished. In my view, a more focused effort would be more effective. At the federal level, there is certainly expertise located in different agencies that should be leveraged to create the most effective preparedness effort possible. It seems to me, and many of my colleagues in the fire service, that this could be better accomplished by designating one federal official with responsibility and authority to coordinate and deliver these programs. It

would also be best if that official was not at the same time responsible for managing additional responsibilities on a day-to-day basis. Whom that official is and where he or she works is not for the fire service to determine. We have in the past requested a singlepoint-of-contact in Washington that we can access for answers and provide input to as we move forward.

The legislation before this Committee seeks to do just that. We are pleased that this legislation has been introduced and that Congress will focus on this issue. Any effort such as this that brings focus to issues as complex as those with which we are all grappling is worthy of support.

Thank you for inviting me to testify. We look forward to working with you on this legislation and I am happy to answer any questions you may have.

4 STATEMENT OF

MR. CHARLES L. CRAGIN

ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR

PERSONNEL & READINESS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS.

AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 4, 2000

Good afternoon, Madam Chairman and other distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank

you for the invitation to testify before you today on the Department of Defense's continuing efforts to support national preparedness to respond to acts of terrorism directed at the United States, its territories and possessions. The Department commends you for addressing the complex topic of consequence management and applauds your efforts to improve and enhance Federal efforts to assist state and local emergency preparedness and response personnel in preparing for domestic disaster response, regardless of its cause.

H.R. 4210, The Preparedness Against Terrorism Act of 2000, stipulates changes designed to improve Federal coordination and enhance domestic preparedness to respond to terrorist attacks. The Department of Defense's role in supporting national domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) preparedness is to be prepared to provide. when requested, available military forces and capabilities to support domestic requirements specified by the Attorney General of the United States or the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. I defer, in this area, to FEMA Director Witt. and FBI Deputy Assistant Director Watson to speak specifically on behalf of the Administration. However, let me add that the current organizational structure established by Presidential Decision Directives 39 and 62 and led by the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism enables us to improve Federal coordination and enhance domestic preparedness for domestic WMD incidents. We are making great strides to improve interagency coordination, however this is an evolutionary, not a revolutionary process.

In 1999, Secretary Cohen appointed an Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Civil Support (ATSD(CS)) within the Department of Defense (DoD) to focus specifically on WMD consequence management. Unfortunately, the ATSD(CS) is unable to testify before you today and has asked me to represent her this afternoon. I am an active participant with the ATSD(CS) in DoD's efforts to support the Lead Federal Agencies for domestic WMD incidents and welcome the opportunity to explain the Department's role. However, neither the ATSD(CS) nor I can address DoD's cyberterrorism response efforts, which are handled by our Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. I will have to take any questions related to cyberterrorism for the record.

At DoD, we define WMD consequence management as emergency assistance to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to those affected by the consequences of an incident involving WMD agents, whether they are released deliberately, naturally, or accidentally. DoD normally provides such assistance only in response to requests from the appropriate Lead Federal Agency to support specific state and local authorities' requests for assistance in mitigating the consequences of a domestic nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological or high yield explosive incident.