given to matter, so, in conformity to its nature, a law might be given, or a system established, for the regulation of the mind; and as uniformity is everywhere traced in matter, the moral world would not, under the same good and omnipotent sovereign, be for ever abandoned to lawlessness and sin. The mechanism of the universe unfolds not, indeed, the moral government of the Father of Spirits. The world by wisdom knew not God; though it might clearly discern his eternal power. Yet the more closely that a rational inquirer, when accustomed to look upon the operation of His hands, scans the universal arrangement which external nature presents, and the wisdom which it displays, he might, in moral discernment, the more vividly see the want of a corresponding harmony in the spiritual state of man; and not without reason might he deem it possible that the law which has given its perfect structure to the smallest insect might be suspended for a moment, or in a few solitary instances, to call to like order the spirits of all flesh, and, by such a manifest interposition of his power, to give an evidence to man, who is placed at the head of earthly creatures, that it is the will of Jehovah that harmony should prevail over the moral as well as over the natural world. And as the wisdom of God is seen in every particle of matter; as his goodness fills the earth, and his power hath lighted up the heavens, there is surely no necessity or even warrant from thence to think that he would not—it were blasphemy to say that he could not-give demonstration of his power in order to accredit a system of salvation, calculated to renovate human nature which sin had ruined, and (however introduced) to wipe out the only blot on earth that has stained his works, which lies in the heart of man, whence issues the wickedness that is followed by destruction. The wisdom that is perfect does not necessarily imply the exclusion of the power where there is the need of healing, any more than the most perfect knowledge of anatomy would deter the surgeon from an operation by which the life of his patient might be preserved, for fear of disturbing the perfect texture of the skin. The argument here alluded to is so essentially atheistical and self-contradictory, that its united impiety and absurdity could not escape the observation of skeptics. "Can God work miracles? that is to say, can he derogate from the laws which he has established ?" asks Rousseau. "The question," he adds, "treated seriously, would be impious if it were not absurd." Well, therefore, might such an argument be at once discarded by every believer in God. But being itself an evidence of scriptural inspiration-supplying a calculus, when rightly applied, most powerful and complete for demonstrating, to a degree that imagination could not have conceived, one great branch of Christian evidence—and being founded on a principle, deducible from all the works of nature, which is the very basis of another leading evidence of Christianity, this very argument of scoffers is as available on our side as any fact confirmatory of prophecy can possibly be; and it cannot be here passed over without our showing again that they who would fain be against us are for us. The Christian, in taking their spoil from his enemies, only reclaims his own; and the surreptitious spoils of Amalek may without injustice or profanation be laid as a rich and hallowed incense on the altar of truth; so much the more precious, as being, on their part, neither an intended nor free-will offering. Now, as of old, though in a different sense, it may be asked, is Saul also among the prophets? Some professed gainsayers have dwelt in metaphysical abstractions, some have sought to scale the heavens, while others have pried into the bowels of the earth, in search of a witness against revelation; but it has fared no better with them all than those who catered for skepticism amid historical details and geographical descriptions. Let the potsherds strive with the potsherds of the earth; but wo unto him that striveth with his Maker. Human science, however excellent in whatever rightly pertains to it, can never triumph, nor be devoted to its proper end, when, as the word or device of fallible man, it is set against the word and counsel of an omniscient God. The cause that is His, if his indeed it be, cannot, like the arguing of man with man about any vain thoughts of theirs, be ultimately left in such a conflict to a doubtful issue. Every high imagination which exalteth itself against the knowledge of God must be cast down; and all that the pride of reason can urge must be answered. The place at last for all the enemies of Jesus is beneath his feet; and there every argument, as well as every fact, which bears upon the evidence of his faith, must finally be found in its allotted station. In seeking proof against the truth, were man to search creation through, he must return empty; or were he, with that intent, to climb the tree of knowledge to its height, it is but to show that he is naked. But though one purpose be not achieved, another is accomplished; the record of nature confirms that of revelation; and, after all the labours of the adversary of the gospel, the work which he has finished is fitted for the Christian's purpose, and the fruit which he brings down is ripe for the Christian's use. Whether it be drawn out in metaphysical subtility by Hume, founded on as a principle in judicial reasoning by Bentham, or set forth as the result of mathematical demonstration by La Place, there is one great argument against the credibility of miracles, already referred to, to which they all appeal as incontrovertible; an argument which Hume has styled an everlasting check against delusion, and which alone is characteristic of that high school of modern skepticism of which these are the redoubted masters. The air, the heavens, and the earth have all been explored for materials to establish it. All evidence of revelation has been discredited; all testimony whatever to the truth of miracles, in confirmation of religion, has been held untenable and inadmissible: and all witnesses for God have been discarded from the court of reason, and are refused a hearing; because, as it is said, the laws of nature are inviolable. But the academy, though science has there concentrated her labours, is not destined to triumph over the college of the apostles, though they were unskilled in human lore. It is the prerogative of the Deity to turn by creative power the darkness into light; and Divine wisdom shines forth in all his works. But, from the fatal perversity of man, the highest exercise and "largest discourse" of reason may be made to deepen the moral darkness that naturally rests upon the mind, and to render it incompetent to comprehend the light or the witness that is borne to it. The main, or, rather, the only argument against the credibility of miracles, owes its origin to the discoveries of modern science. And, as these have advanced, it has been urged more generally and strongly, till it has taken the lead in every cavil, and admits not of any concession in behalf of any conceivable or possible evidence of revelation. And it may not be amiss to trace its origin and its progress, if happily we may be enabled, with every lover of the truth, to rejoice over its obsequies. It would, indeed, be a blessed task to lay a helping hand to the demolition of that bane of immortal hope and barrier to Christian faith which obstructs the way of life and worketh death; to rescue the unstable and unwary from being the victims of the perverted ingenuity of those who, having argued themselves out of the use of reason as well as out of the need of salvation, neither enter into the kingdom of heaven themselves, nor suffer others to enter in. Ignorant as men were in ancient times of the perfect regularity of the laws of nature, now fully ascertained to be established throughout the universe, the great skeptical argument of modern times entered not into the imaginations of the early gainsayers. More candid than their recent imitators, they admitted the truth of the miracles, but denied that these gave proof that the doctrine was of God. Their pagan mythology and blind belief in the power of evil spirits perverted their judgments, and restrained them from distinguishing between natural phenomena or false and supposititious miracles, and supernatural events or actual violations of the laws of nature. All ancient history is full of the blind or superstitious credulity which universally prevailed; and which, even yet, is only imperfectly dissipated from among men; that originates in ignorance of the order of nature, and of the unvarying uniformity of her operations. A few instances may be selected. It was customary for the Romans, on beholding an eclipse, to make the loudest possible noise by striking on vessels of brass, and to hold up lighted fagots and torches in the air, as if to rouse and relight the expiring or extinguished luminary. The sight of the same natural event paralyzed armies, and, as in the case of the Macedonians on the invasion of their country by the Romans, and of the Thebans under Pelopidas, rendered them incapable to encounter the enemy or to quit the spot on which they stood. The inspection of the entrails of a victim could daunt the heart of the fiercest conqueror, or urge on to immediate battle the most cautious general. Soothsaying was a trade. Oracles were consulted from every quarter. Auguries were of old universally regarded. And every peculiarity or inexplicable incident, however insignificant, was accounted an omen. The spirit of armies rose or sunk according to the number or appearance of birds, and the direction of their flight was interpreted by soothsayers as signs of victory or defeat. A dictator, with absolute authority, was elected by the Roman senate to fix a nail in the door of a temple, in order to stay a pestilence. A few unintelligible words on a scrap of paper are prized as a charm or antidote from evil by the ignorant Arab, African, Indian, of modern as well as of ancient times. And even in the middle of the fifteenth century of the Christian era, when the true philosophy of nature was beginning to dawn, the pope, in his wisdom and infallibility, directed public prayers to be offered up on account of the appearance of a comet. All history is full of illustrations of such blind and superstitious credulity, which originated in the general or universal ignorance of the order of nature. The light of science has dissipated the darkness, in respect to the knowledge of matter, in which men were previously involved. And it is now held as a principle, that "it is to the imperfection of the human mind, and not to any irregularity in the nature of things, that all our ideas of chance and probability are to be referred." "The farther that our knowledge has extended, the more phenomena have been brought from the dominion of chance, and placed under the government of physical causes; and the farther off have the boundaries of darkness been carried. It was, says M. Laplace, to the phenomena not supposed to be subjected to the regulation of fixed laws, that superstition took hold, for the purpose of awakening the fears and enslaving the minds of men. The dominion of chance is suffering constant diminution; and the anarch old may still com plain, as in Milton, of the encroachments that are continually making on his empire."* When the human mind was rescued from the delusion of a blind credulity, its proneness to error became speedily manifest in the danger which arose of falling into the opposite extreme of an irrational skepticism, and all belief in anything supernatural was rejected as unwise. "The probability of the continuance of the laws of nature," says La Place, "is superior, in our estimation, to every other evidence, and to that of historical facts the best established. One may judge, therefore, the weight of testimony necessary to prove a suspension of these laws, and how fallacious it is in such cases to apply the common rule of evidence." "The first author, we believe, who stated fairly the connexion between the evidence of testimony and the evidence of experience, was Hume, in his Essay on Miracles."+ In a letter to Dr. Campbell, Hume states that the argument first occurred to him in arguing with a Jesuit respecting a pretended miracle said to have been wrought in a convent; and, as if marking its origin in these last days, he adds that Dr. Campbeli would perhaps think that the sophistry of it savoured of the place of its birth. It is then a fact, that from the probability of the continuance of the laws of nature, an argument which now forms the characteristic standard of a host of unbelievers has been prominently urged against the belief of miracles, and, though till recently unthought of, is the confident boast of every scoffer in these enlightened times, when the knowledge of the laws of nature can be founded on as an argument. But, instead of fearing to meet it, the Christian may well claim it as wholly on his side. And had it not been urged, and even had not all the peculiar importance been attached to it which there has been, the evidence of the Christian faith would have been lessened by the want of such an argument against it. However much men may seek deep to hide their counsel from the Lord, however long the genius of infidelity may defer to inspire its votaries with any novel imaginations, adapted for delusion and suited to the times, HE with whom light dwelleth holds them in derision, and turns their scoffings into credentials of his word. Had Hume looked into the Bible-which, it has been said, he never read-he would have found that his vaunted discovery, his everlasting check against delusion, was described by the apostle Peter seventeen centuries before the supposed period of its birth; and that, instead of his being its original author, he could, in strict justice, have only claimed the right of being accounted * Edin. Review, vol. xxiii., p. 320, 321. |