STATEMENT OF HON. ROGER T. KELLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE A. DAOUST, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER RESEARCH AND UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. LEO A. BENADE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY, OASD (M. & R.A.); FRANCIS J. SULLIVAN, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS, OASD (SA); CARL DETWYLER, DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); CHARLES BREWER, DIRECTOR FOR ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER); JONAS M. PLATT, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER UTILIZATION, OASD (M. & R.A.); MAJ. GEN. W. D. CRITTENBERGER, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS AND POLICY, J-5 (INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS), OJCS; ROBERT E. MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. DE PUY, ASSISTANT VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY; REAR ADM. JOHN G. FINNERAN, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL PERSONNEL FOR PLANS AND PROGRAMS, USN; MAJ. GEN. E. B. WHEELER, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-1, USMC; AND MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM W. BERG, DIRECTOR, MANPOWER AND ORGANIZATION, DCS/P. & R., USAF

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read a portion of my statement, that portion that deals with the size and the composition of our forces, because I think I would not do justice to the subject if I gave you a capsule statement on that subject. The greater length of my statement I would reduce to a capsule summary, the portions dealing with the elements of the manpower cost and some of the major manpower issues we face.

Mr. Chairman, we propose for fiscal 1973 an average military manpower strength of 2,396,500, down 139,500 from the average strength of fiscal year 1972. This marks the fifth consecutive year in which Defense has requested fewer men than the previous year-a net 5-year reduction of 1.1 million men.

The President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress have all determined that past reductions could and should be made. We have not recommended, and we will not recommend, reductions which jeopardize national security. I am advised that the increased capabilities of several of our allies, improvements in our weapons systems, and changes in the threat in some parts of the world, have enabled us to make the manpower reductions of recent years without endangering security.

Today, I want to present not only the reasons why we are recommending a further reduction to the level of 2.4 million men in the Armed Services, but also an overview of the major manpower issues confronting us, including significant cost and other trends.

Despite substantial reductions in the size of our military forces, total manpower costs have risen sharply in recent years and now account for more than 50 cents of every Defense dollar spent. There are many reasons for this trend-including pay raises, higher retired pay costs, more technically trained and higher rated people, and high personnel turnover. These cost trends deserve further analysis as they relate to our most expensive and important asset-people.

Our basic national security objective is to preserve the United States as a free and independent Nation, to safeguard its fundamental institutions and values, and to protect its people. In addition, we have vital interests in other parts of the world, interests which relate intimately to our own security as well as that of our allies. Our military power, in partnership with other nations, helps to protect their interests and our mutual security.

The President of the United States, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, establishes basic policy on broad requirements necessary to fulfill our national security objectives. This broad guidance is, in turn, expanded by the Secretary of Defense and provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military services for use in force and manpower planning, including the development of recommended force structure and manpower requirements necessary to carry out the guid

ance.

In our force planning, under the total force concept, we take into account the forces of our allies for the purpose of meeting many of the threats with which we and our partners must be prepared to cope. As you know, Mr. Chairman, Secretary Laird has, for 3 years, laid special emphasis upon the concept of total force, giving effect to President Nixon's principle of partnership. Within our own military forces, the total force concept has meant strengthening our Guard and Reserve units so that they will constitute an effective augmenting force for our active forces.

Once given an approved force goal of, for example, "X" aircraft wings and "Y" divisions, the services are charged with meeting that goal through a combination of equipment, manpower, and training. They must answer such questions as: How many crews are needed to properly man the aircraft; how many men are needed to keep a comserviced and flying; how much support does it take to keep a combat division in the field; what headquarters are needed to direct the combat elements; and what sort of training establishment must be maintained? We must insure that the necessary manpower is distributed into forward deployed units, active CONUS units, and reserve units in order to preserve at minimum cost the capability to deter aggression.

It is my job to see that personnel policies serve the best interests of national security and that they are fair to people. Achieving that goal has not been easy during a period which has been one of the most turbulent in our military history. As we emerge from that turbulence we should jointly examine policies and practices to be sure that they will deliver the best manpower performance at the lowest possible cost. Tough issues must be addressed, and we need your help. This report should provide a basis for further review and discussion of personnel policies and the key manpower issues of defense.

We are moving toward an All-Volunteer Force. This fact requires restudy of basic personnel policies which govern such things as length of enlistments, nature and length of training, and services to be pro

vided (medical care for dependents, commissaries, et cetera). Personnel policies often have substantial impact on the rate of flow of personnel through the defense system and, consequently, affect the cost of training people, the number of people needed to maintain the required manpower levels in the forces, and the cost of maintaining them.

DOD MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCE LEVELS

Manpower requirements, Mr. Chairman, derive from analysis of the threat and what is needed to meet it. Table 1 shows our estimate of military manpower needed for fiscal year 1973, as well as the level maintained in the previous 3 years-broken out by major mission areas: Strategic, general purpose, other mission, and general support.

Note: Numbers in parentheses are additive to major area tota.s; numbers may not add to DOD totals due to rounding.

Mr. KELLEY. Table 2 shows general support apportioned by major mission area.

TABLE 2.-ACTIVE MILITARY MANPOWER SUMMARY WITH GENERAL SUPPORT MANPOWER ALLOCATED TO MAJOR MISSIONS

Note: Numbers in parenthesis are additive to major mission totals; numbers may not add to DOD totals due to round

Mr. KELLEY. I would like to comment briefly on each of the force categories, starting with strategic forces.

Strategic forces, as you know, are those whose primary mission it is to deter nuclear attack upon the United States and are the keystone of the free world deterrent to nuclear war. The President has set forth criteria for strategic sufficiency and the strategic offensive and defensive forces are planned to meet these criteria. The amount of military manpower required to man the missiles, submarines, bombers, command and control centers, and related support facilities for the strategic forces is relatively small. Strategic forces account for about 5 percent of military manpower, or about 10 percent with support allocated to it.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Far more defense manpower (40 percent or up to 75 percent with support allocated to it) is assigned to missions associated with U.S. general purpose forces. The major elements of our fiscal 1973 general purpose forces are: 16 divisions consisting of 13 Army and three Marine; tactical air forces consisting of 21 Air Force tactical air wings, three Marine air wings, and 70 Navy squadrons; and 594 naval ships. General purpose forces also include the 34 active airlift squadrons and 72 ships of our mobility forces.

These land, naval, mobility, and tactical air forces are maintained not only for defense of the United States but also for the support of other nations to which we are linked by common interests. The structure of these forces and their location around the world reflect two policy judgments which have been in force for many years. They are: (1) that the security of the United States and protection of our vital interests requires forces for forward deployment and forward defense; and (2) that strategic nuclear forces, by themselves, are not a sufficient deterrent against the entire spectrum of aggression we must be prepared to face.

Our general purpose forces are sized primarily to provide a capability, together with our allies, to conduct an initial defense either in NATO Europe or in Asia against aggression by the Warsaw Pact or the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). In addition to this capability, the U.S. general purpose force structure reflects a planning requirement to be able to cope with a minor contingency elsewhere, and to provide a strategic reserve.

The general characteristics that distinguish conventional from nuclear forces is that conventional forces permit the physical control of territory rather than provide a capability only to destroy enemy targets. In order to accomplish the physical control of territory, manpower is required. Beyond a certain point, we cannot substitute air or artillery support for land force maneuver units.

The level of U.S. general purpose forces deemed necessary to carry out our military strategy depends on the territory involved, the cooperation of the population, the postulated enemy force, the level and effectiveness of our allied forces, the type of control desired, and of course, the assumed effectiveness of our own forces. The bulk of our general purpose forces are maintained because of the judgment that it is in our national interest to help deter attacks on certain other countries and to help defend them if they are attacked, consistent with

our national interests. Only a small part of our force would be currently required for the territorial defense of the United States.

Thus, overall U.S. general purpose force levels and costs depend mainly on what types of crises and wars we decide to prepare for, what countries we decide to assist, and to what degree these countries can defend themselves.

If a war were to start and we were not adequately prepared with conventional forces, the risk of escalation to nuclear war, the loss of life and destruction of property, and the ultimate military forces and casualties would be much greater than if we were prepared initially. Furthermore, being prepared with general purpose forces in peacetime has significant value in deterring war. Peace would be precarious, indeed, if the President of the United States had no option except the threat of a nuclear attack.

In addition, our general purpose forces actually deployed overseas in peacetime take on a significance beyond their purely military function, because they symbolize both to our allies and our enemies the commitment of the United States to the area involved.

The size of our general purpose forces is determined largely by our NATO commitment. U.S. manpower deployed in Asia has been greatly reduced by Vietnamization and by the success of security assistance programs. Currently about 5 percent of our active forces are stationed in South Vietnam and, as the President has announced, those forces are being further reduced.

The level of U.S. forces in NATO reflects both an indication of our intentions toward Europe and a military capability of high credibility. The forces in Europe include over four divisions. [Deleted.] These forces are consistent with our treaty commitment to defend forward in Europe.

Over the past 10 years, the department has undertaken a series of analyses to determine "how much is enough" to defend Europe. These analyses are reflected in the present size, composition, and readiness of our NATO forces.

The total size of our general purpose forces will be cut by another 14,000 spaces during fiscal year 1973, with reductions of one active Army brigade and one support increment. The number of ships in the fleet will also be reduced.

My discussion of national security policy which forms the basis for our strategic and general purpose forces has been brief. Secretary Laird and Admiral Moorer will provide a far more detailed description of the threats to free world security and the President's strategy for coping with those threats in their testimony later before this committee.

OTHER MISSION FORCES

These forces include intelligence, communications, research and development, and support to other nations. Together they account for 8 percent of military manpower, and they are divided between support of strategic and general purpose forces roughly proportionally to the relative size of these forces.

Table 3 shows how other mission manpower increased from fiscal year 1964 into the Vietnam war years and then decreased again during our withdrawals from Vietnam and the corresponding reduction in total military manpower.